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1. The Hypothesis Proposed 
This dissertation examines a four part hypothesis: 
(a) that liberal ethics in South Africa, particularly since the 
victory of the (Afrikaner} National Party in 1948, have been 
characterised by a sense of political powerlessness; 
(b) that as a consequence of this powerlessness, these ethics have 
been more concerned with principle, motives, conscience and 
internal consistency than with the. consequences of liberal action; 
(c) that this sense of powerlessness is not justified in the social 
and political environment of the 1980's; and therefore, 
(d) that liberals should review their ethical approach with a view to 
developing an ethic of responsible liberal action. 
2. ·Some Terms Defined: Liberalism: 
The intellectual origins of liberalism as a political philosophy are to 
be found in the work of the school of British Empiricists in the 
seventeeneth century, most particularly John Locke's Two Treaties of 
Civil Government which appeared irt 1690. 
The Empiricists continued a process of philosophical renaissance 
1 
commenced by Descartes. 
2 
I~ Locke's treatises, he attacks the divine 
3 
right of kings, asserts man as a naturally free, rational being, and 
4 
posits natural law and the fundamental equality of man under this law. 
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In these theses are contained the essential strands of the fabric of 
liberalism as developed in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. It is 
interesting to note that Locke's theories also contain elements and 
contradictions later to be taken up by the major challenge to 
5 
liberalism in the 19th and 20th centuries - Marxism. 
Locke's views were to be both influential and further developed in the 
thought and actions of 18th century politicians and revolutionaries, of 
6 
whom Thomas Jefferson serves as an outstanding example. They find 
their echo in the great pronouncements of the American revolution. 
In the 19th Century, liberalism ~as redefined by the social 
transformation of the industrial revolution. In Britain, where this 
transformation began, the nature of the polity post the absolute 
monarch, that is, the balance of· rights and obligations between citizen 
and government, was examined by men such as John Stuart Mill and Adam 
Smith. 
From this analysis, emerged the notion of the limited role of 
government in regulating the economic affairs ·of its citizens, as well 
as a commitment to the market place as a regulator of reward. The 
belief that market forces are the most efficient and the most just 
source of value is built upon Locke's earlier notions of rationality. 
The market is anonymous and results in free exchange between.free men. 
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L{beralism found organisational expression in England from the 17th 
century onwards in the political grouping know first as Whigs and later 
as liberals. This grouping, together with its alternative - the 
Tories, dominated English politics from 1680 until it was eclip~ed by 
8 
the newly emergent Labour Party in 1922. It is interesting to note 
that the ol~est and strongest tenets of this grouping are a belief in 
representative government (as opposed to the exercise of power by the 
monarchy or an inherited aristocracy) and economic freedom and limited 
.government (such as the commitment to free trade). The one can be said 
to be a legacy of Locke, the other of Adam Smith. Importantly, the 
support for representative government has more recently became 
9 
synonymous with universal franchise or populist democracy. 
7 
We have earlier referred to the Renaissance origins of liberalism found 
10 
in the philosophical revolution of Descartes. In Europe, as indeed 
in Britain and America, the impact of the religious Reformation should 
also be noted. Some authors have indeed credited Reformation thinkers 
11 
with the creation of "politics" as we now .know it, and also for 
creating the.pyschological pre-condition for the emergence of 
12 
capitalism.· In Europe, liberal phiiosophies were to be combined with 
the forces of nationalism.from Napoleon onwards, and it was these twin 




It is difficult to trace the organisational incorporation of liberal 
ideas in the United States, as here liberal notions intermingled not 
only with nationalism, but also anti-colonialism, an~ the econ6mic 
imperatives of what would, in today's terms, be regarded as a third 
world or developing nation. The liberal tradition cannot be associated 
with either of the major political parties which have dominated 
American politics in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Both 
parties have affirmed certain basic liberal values, and have from time 
14 
to time confounded others. 
A number of forces conspired in the early twentieth century to diminish 
the force of liberal ideas. The First World War seemed to take 
British, American and European liberals by surprise and confound their 
faith both in free market forces (though it ~as precisely the Bbsence 
of these which heightened national conflicts) and conc-epts such as the 
rule of law, the march of civilisation and "progress". 
Internationalism, which seem~d a natural extension of the notions 6f 
represen~ative government within nation states, suffered a severe 
15 
setback. 
The advent of mass industrialisation was brought about (and in turn 
gave momentum to) a concept of "social technology" - the idea that it 
was the role of authority and leadership in society not merely to regu-
16 -
late, but to redesign it. The Great Depression of 1929 and the early 
-11-
Thirties brought a new paradigm in economic policy - that of Keynesian 
economics, or the "managed" economy. The Roosevelt "New Deal" in the 
USA, Hitler's Gleichstal tung. in G_ermany, and the post-war 
reconstruction in Britain and Europe all entrenched a model of the 
17 
state not as policeman or judge, but as social engineer. Liberalism, 
with its notion of minimum government, maximum individual liberty and 
market forces seemed anachronistic. 
More recently as both welfarecapitalist and socialist experiments in 
modernisation have disappointed, there has been a resurgence in both 
political and economic liberal theory. A good example of this 
reconstructed, modern liberalism is to be found in Hayek's "The 
18 
Constitution of Liberty". 
The above gives a broad outline of liberalism's development. 
Liberalism's arrival and growth in South Africa are discussed in 
Chapter One. What, however, of an operational de-finition? James Leatt 
has given a catalogue of values of the "liberal spirit" in South 
Africa. This catalogue serves as a useful definition of the term 
liberal as used in this dissertation: 
"(a) All men share a co1ID11on humanity, differences between 
men are se~ondary~ 
(b) Man is to be viewed optimistically, being naturally good, 
capable of and responsible for shaping his own destiny. 
(c) Each individual has the same dignity and should be 
granted the same basic human rights without regard 
to race, culture, sex, or creed. 
Discrimination is therefore to be excluded. 
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(d) There should be freedom of thought and conscience,· 
of speech and the press, of movement and association, 
from arbitrary arrest and undue interference in the 
personal life. 
(e) Each person should receive the benefits of education 
and equal opportunity in all spheres. 
(f) By man's efforts, society will progress.towards 
greater social justice, economic prosperity, political 
stability and minimise his suffering. This progress 
ought to take place by evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary means. 
(g) In politics, the power of reason and compassion should 
prevail against biased and irrational attitudes and 
violent practices. 
(h) The individual is of supreme importance and his 
interests should not be overridden by the community. 
Likewise, the emphasis is on individual initiative 
rather than reliance on the community. The role of 
the state is to nurture this individualism. 
(i) Many liberals link individual freedoms with the 
emancipation of disadvantagedgroups in society 
and with independence for the nation state. 
(j) Within th~ state, liberals maintain there should be 
a distribution of power between the legislature and 
the executive with an independent judiciary to check 
abuse of power as far as possible. 
(k) Most liberals believe that arbitrary and authoritarian 
government can best be prevented by a multi:.:..party 
democracy in which utlimately every adult should have 
a voice and a vote whether in a unitary or federal 
state. But majority rule is no guarantee of liberty, 
the Rule of Law is necessary to protect the individual 
-13-
and minorities. This can be safeguarded by a rigid 
constitution which includes a Bill or Rights and an 
independent judiciary." 19 
3. Ethics 
The Oxford Dictionary lists four adjectival and four substantive 
meanings for the term ethic: 
adjectival: 
r~lating to morals; 
tr~aiing of noral questions, and of ethics as a science; 
characterised by "ethics"; 
the dative (i.e. grammatical dative) used to imply that a person, 
other than the subject or obj~ct, has an indirect interest in the 
fact stated (this ethical dative is more frequently used in Greek 
now than in English). 
substantive: 
the science of.morals or scheme of moral science; 
the department of study concerned with the principles of human 
duty; 
the moral principles or system of a ~articular leader or sehool of 
thought, or the moral principles by which a person is guided, or 
the rules of conduct recognised in certain associations or 
departments of human life; 
in· the wider sense, the whole field of moral science. 
-14-
In its historical derivation, its oldest use (and one that most closely 
suits our purposes) is given as: 
"The ethicke and politick consideration, with the end of 
. well doing and not of well knowing only." 
Sidney 1581 
In its wider etymology, a line can be traced through the Greek word J3 
Olkos whose meaning is given as character in the singular form and 
manners in the plural. Cicero translated this term as u~ed by 
Aristotle with the term morale or moralis from which our English term 
moral is derived. 
The link with the related Greek word ethos (J30os) has been noted; It 
is interesting to note that this term is rend~red by the Oxford 
Dictionary as "the prevalent tone or sentiment of a people or 
community; the genius of an institution or people, character, ideal 
excellence." 
In French, the term is rendered as ethique, so maintaining its close 
link with the concept of manners and conduct. In German, ethik is 
again closely linked to the related conc~pt oi ethos. 
Approached from a philosophical perspective, a similar range of 
meanings is evident. 
"To the layman, the word 'ethics' suggests a set of standards 
by which a particular group or community decides to regulate 
its behaviour - " 20 
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And in the words of another philosopher, ethics is: 
21 
"The science of the ideal .in human character and conduct." 
Athird offers three "different but related ways" in which the word is 
used in philosophy: 
"1. a general pattern or "way of life" 
2. a set of rules of conduct or 'moral code' 
3. enquiry about ways of life and rules of conduct." 22 
(original emphasis) 
Finally, a fourth philosopher, whilst evading the definitional 
approach, makes a definitional observation, noting the intimate 
relationship between moral concept on the one hand and social concept 
on the other, as well as between philosophical analysis and social 
behaviour or consequence: 
II to pos·sess a concept involves behaving or being able 
to behave in certain circumstances, ••• is to alter 
behaviour.. So the Athenians who condemned Socrates to 
death, the English Parliament which condemned Bobbe's 
Leviathan in 1666, and the Nazis who burned philosophical 
books were correct at least in their apprehension that 
philosophy can be subversive of established ways of 
behaving." 23 
The above is quoted chiefly to assert the close link between concept 
and ~onduct, between thought and action. 
Ethics when approached from the standpoint of Christian theology 
reveals an essentially similar picture. Hare notes a threefold series 
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of ethical questions, essentially similar to that given above. 
John Murray defines Biblical ethics as being concerned with "the manner 
24 
of life which the Bible prescribes and approves." 
The above definition raises one of the fundamental problems of ethics, 
namely the source of ethical norms. Here in philosophy and theology, 
both a continuum and tension are evident. The continuum may b~ 
described as between ethical objectivity, where the source of ethical 
·norms is external to the actor - given, known and fixed, and ethical 
subjectivity or relativism, where the source of norms is to be found 
in the actor and his subjectively experienced world. In philosophy, 
Plato, Aristotle and Kant repr~sent ethical objectivity in contrast to 
the Sophists, Ex1stentialists and Utilitarians who stand closer to the 
subjectivity pole. The tension may by described as one between ethical 
certainty or universalism as opposed to ambiguity and situation 
specificity. Even those close to the ethical objectivity pole on the 
continuum described above are subject to unc.ertainty when two objective 
ethical norms clash in a particular situation. 
In Christian theology a similar continuum and tension exist for 
although all Christian thinkers would agree that the source of ethical 
norms is man's knowledge of God there is disagreement about the nature 
of that knowledge. 
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Diversity arises firstly from the progressive nature. of revelation. A 
progression is clearly evident in biblical prescriptions for "right 
25 
living" from the old testament to the new. Secondly, revelation is 
often ambiguous - so the ethical debate about war, justice, divorce, 
abortion continues with each side of the debate finding vindication in 
a part of God's revelation. 
A final source of tension in Christiari ethics is a third aspect of the 
nature of God's revelation. God reveals himself to man ihrough the 
person of Jesus Christ. Therefore, revelation is not to be discovered 
primarily in codes or rules but in a person immanent in history. 
These tensions .are ~xplored further in Chapter Two. 
How then do we intend to use the word ethics in this dissertation? 
by ethics we imply the way in which actors choose between 
morally significant courses of action. 
In this sense, we· are seeking a logic of decision-making when actors 
have to choose between courses of action which have signficance in 
relation to the actors set of ultimate values, e.g. good, bad, just, 
unjust. 
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This meaning seems to fall well within the range of meanings and uses 
discussed above. 
4. Methodology 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the four point 
hypothesis outlined in Sec ti on One. The purpose of this sec ti on is. to 
indicate how the examination was undertaken. 
Several questions had to be addressed: 
What do we mean by liberal? 
What do we mean by ethics? 
How are liberals to be identified in the South African situation? 
How are we to gain access to liberal ethics? 
Are such ethics characterised by a sense of powerlessness? 
If so, has this sense of powerlessness led to an over emphasis on 
motive and principle a·nd an under emphasis on action and 
consequence? 
And again, if this·appears true, is both this sense of 
powerlessness, and the concentration on principle to which it 
leads, justified in South Africa's circumstances in the 1980's? 
And finally, if not, is an ethic of responsible liberal. action 
possible, and if so, what would such an ethic look like? 
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Hopefully, we have provided at least operafional meanings to the terms 
mentioned in the first two questions earlier in this introduction. We 
have identified liberals for our purposes here as white, English-
speaking liberals. In so doing, we do not suggest that this group have 
a monopoly of liberal values, but merely that they are the primary 
standard bearers of liberalism in South Africa. This group has also 
been chosen because they have had access to political power in the 
past, but are now generally excluded from political power. 
Without doubt the most difficult question was the fourth listed above 
that of access to liberal ethics. Liberal ethics are clearly value 
pre-disporitions. Defined as we have here chosen they must also be 
~een in the context of liberal action. 
An attempt has been made to gain access to liberal ethics 
phenomenologically. An attempt has been made to allow the data to 
speak for itself without super-imposing on it a framework such as th~t 
drawn commonly in the positivist approach to social research. 
These attempts are made in Section Two, in three different ways: 
In Chapt,er Three, a review is undertaken of liberal- literature. 
Little of analytical nature has been written on the subject 
of liberal e~hics, or even lib~ralism per se in .South 
Africa. Two important exceptions are Janet Robertson's 
-20-
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Liberalism in South Africa : 1948-1963 and Paul B.Rich's White 
Power and the Liberal Conscience : R~cial Segregation and South 
27 
African Liberalism. 
Whereas both works have been invaluable to this investigation, 
· th.ey differ from what is attempted here in two important respects: 
* the time periods differ significantly: 1948-1963 in 
Robertson's case, and 1921 to 1960 in Rich's case. In Rich's 
28 
study~ further, the emphasis is laid. on the earlier period. 
* their focus is not ethics or the ethical logic· of liberals, 
but rather their beliefs and actions per se. 
However, there is a rich historical, theoretical and especially 
biographical liberal literature. 
The second attempt to get close enough to liberalism to allow the 
data to speak for itself is.the attempt in Chapter Four to review 
policy statements in. three contrasting liberal organisation 
settings. In this Chapter, some 75 policy documents are.reviewed. 
A third attempt is made in Chapter Five, through 14 structured 
interviews with liberal spokesman, discussing the 1983 
Constitutional Referendum. Here, as elsewhere, data was selected 
for its significance, rather than for it~ representivity in a 
statistica1 or quantifiable sense~ 
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One of the problems with a phenomenological approach to social science 
is the danger that this approach renders a whelter of unordered 
"insights"., and nothing more. This, together with the practical 
difficulty of gaining significant direct access, has often limited this 
29 
perspective to small scale ''micro" research. 
30 
It has been argued 
elsewhere that this lack of structure as well as the pure 
subjectivity of much "phenomenological" research has resulted from 
incomplete and fundamentally flawed incorporation of Husserl.ian 
concepts. Both in an attempt to avoid this error, and to avoid the 
accusation of an unstructured floods of insights, Chapters One and 
31 
attempt to survey ideal typical "ethics" as well as developing an 
ideal type of a "liberal ethics of responsible action". These ideal 
types at least help delineate what we are looking for, as well as 
introducing a supra-personal element in the research. 
It is certainly clear that phenomenological or qualitative or 
an 
Two 
interpretative social research can be rigorous. Paul Ricoeur has, for 
example, drawn an analogy between text analysis and hermeneutics in 
social research. He constructs a model or.paradigm comparing these 
two: 
If the object of text analysis is the written as opposed to the 
spoken word, then the object of the social sciences is.Weber's 
sinnhaft orientiertes Verhalten, meaningfully oriented behaviour 
-22-
observed or recorded as opposed-to experienced by the agent. Four 
critical differences emerge between both the word as spoken and 
the written word and the agent's action and the action observed; 
Whereas both the spoken word and the agent'~ action are unique 
events in time, the written word and observed action "escape" this 
uniqueness, become atemporal and, therefore, accessible at all 
32 
other times; 
Whereas the spoken word has a speaker, the written word "escapes" 
its writer and develops an independent existence. 
"In the same way ••• an action is detached from its 
agent and develops consequences of its own 
our deeds escape us and have effects which we did 
intend." 33 
Just as the written word has references which go beyond the 
immediate situation in which it was written, so-the observed or 
34 
recorded act has a revelance which goes beyond the immediate or 
35 
existential situation in which it occuired. 
Finally, just as the written word is addressed to an infinite, 
36 
open, future audience, so too 1s the act observed~ 
This model enables Ricoeur to suggest that the relationship between the 
two archetypical processes of the nat~ral and social sciences, respec-
tively ERKLAREN, or explanation and VERSTEHEN, or understanding, is 
not, as Dilthey had it a dichotomous one, but rather a dialetical one. 
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Concretely, the social scientist guesses (as per Verstehen) the 
37 
possible meanings of the action observed, and then proceeds to 
attempt to validate his guesses as per Erklaren through a proc~ss of 
balancing probabilities. 
Postulating this movement from understanding to explanation (and back 
again) creates a supra-subjective and, at least, contestable area of 
knowledge for the social sciences. 
Whilst Ricoeur's model has not been followed in detail here, it does 
illustrate the author's attempt to capture a structure of meaning from 
the "data" examined in this diss~rtation. 
5. The Structure of the Dissertation 
This introduction states the hypothesis, defines key terms and 
indicates methodology: 
In Section One: 
~ Chapter One surveys ethical models in the twentieth century; 
whilst 
Chapter Two develops an ideal type of an ethics of r-esponsible 
liberal action. 
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In Se.ction Two: 
Chapter Three surveys liberal thought and action in the period 
1948 - 1984; 
Cha~ter Four reviews policy statements in three liberal 
organisation settings; and 
Chapter Five examines liberal options and opinions with regard to 
the 1983 Constitutional Referendum, resulting from interviews with 
key liberal actors. 
The Conclusion reviews the hypothesis and the evidence discussed and 
evaluates the extent to which the four propositions contained in the 
hypothesis have been demonstrated. 
-25-
S E C T I 0 N 0 NE 
ETHICAL MODELS 
II successive 
in the present 
CHAPTER ONE 
ETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
orthodoxies of moral philosophy in English 
century have been •· •• remarkably barren". 
· Ma~y Warnock 
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II an ethic of ultimate ends (inner conviction) and an 
ethic responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather 
supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man". 
Max Weber 
"We can merely ask • • • that, ·all things considered, the evil 
that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being 
forestalled". 
Simone de Beauvoir · 
"Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in 
which children are tortured. But we can reduce.the number 
of tortured children". 
Albert Camus 
-27-
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework for the meaning which 
is to be attached to the concept ethical in subsequent discussion. This is 
attempted chiefly from a philosophical perspective firstly because this is 
the perspective most familiar to the writer; but also because this appears 
to be a useful approach to political ethics which is the essential subject 
of the thesis. 
1. English Moral Philosophy 
In the twentieth centu~y English moral philosophy can be seen as a 
derivative of the rationalism of Descartes, and the empiricism of 
Locke, Berkely and Hume. Twentieth century writers developed a 
positivist philosophy which was to be vastly influential in the social 
sciences. As a broad school, most writers would be classified as· 
linguistic analysts, for reasons which will become apparant all too 
quickly.· How then was Ethics approached by this group of philosophers? 
The first, and often, seemingly, the only question to be addressed was 
the question: what is ethics? 
We begin with G.E. Moore, the major spokesman for what has come to be 
known as the Intuitionism school. 
"Ethics, Moore says, is concerned with, and may even be 
defined by, its characteristic concern with, the 
predicate 'good' and its converse 1 bad'; and though this 
concern may take more than one form, . the central question 
is what the predicate 'good' means or stands for." 1 
What is good? Good. is undefinable, says Moore: 
-28-
"If I am asked 'what is good? 1 my answer is that good is 
good and that is the end of the matter." 2 
Good is not an adjectival expression, it is rather "an assertion of 
substance. 11 3 
From good we move to the concept of right. This Moore believes is 
definable, but only in relation to the undefinable good. 
"the right course of action for any agent is,· by 
definition, that course of action which will, as a 
·matter of fact, produce the greatest amount of good 
in the circumstances." 4 
5 
Pritchard and Ross, developed Moore's work by. adding another 
undefinable quality to Moore's undefinable good; the concept of duty. 
This like good cannot be experienced naturally (i.e. seen, smelt, 
etc.); nor can it be derived logically. It i~ kriowable only in our 
intuition - hence the label intuitionism. 
This does not get us very far •. Moore, Pritchard and Ross have asserted 
that ethics and moral judgements are not judgements similar t6·the 
judgements we make in other areas of life. They do not arise out of 
experience (i.e. they are not empirical), nor can they be logically 
deduced. This tells us a little about what they are not. 
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Let us move then to our second 'school' - emotivism. Here, the 
6 
philosopher Ayer, noting the assertion of the Logical Positivists 
that there are only two kinds of propositions - tautologies (adjectival 
expressions) and empirically verifiable expressions - asserts that 
moral judgements are neither. What they do, in contrast, is to express 
7 
the feelings of the speaker. 
Stevenson then proceeds to distinguish between belief (what one 
understands a proposition to imply) and attitudes (whether one agrees 
8 
with this propostion or not). 
Thus he concludes: 
"the 'major use' of ethical judgements is 'not to 
indicate facts, but to create an influence'" 9 
Ethics then could be defined according to the purpose of ethical 
discourse~ We could detect the ethical by detecting the motive of the 
ethical speaker. "Are you trying to influence my actions?" we could 
ask. 
Whilst this does illuminate a further, and indeed an important, 
component of ethics, it is still not very helpful. Further, it is not 
necessarily a general characteristic of ethics~ As Warnock notes: 
"moral advice may be given in entirely dispassionate terms"- 10 
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So to our third school: prescriptivism. This school continues the 
enquiry into what ethics is by continuing to ask what the ethical 
speaker is doing. 
Urmson suggests that in making an ethical statement we are seeking to 
grade "things" in our world on a hierarchy· .of the good or the desired, 
ll 
rather as a sorter grades apples into categories of different kinds. 
12 
Hare argues that in making ethical s~atements the speaker is 
seeking not merely to influence others but to prescribe both to them 
13 
and to himself how they should act. Moral statements, then, are 
guidelines for actions or prescriptions (hence· the name). 
Both Urmson and Hare would agree that moral statements are neither 
. empirically knowable, nor logically derived •. Hare argues that all moral 
statements derive from or are based upon moral principles, to which 
individuals freely subscribe. Such moral pri~ciples are in an 
important sense beyond reason. Thus both Hare (and all the other 
English philosophers discussed here) assert the futility of ethical 
disputations - either you subscribe to the principle or you do not. 
Having surveyed these three schools, there is much· to commend Warnock's 
judgement that: 
"successive orthodoxies of moral philosophy in English 
in the present century have been ••• remarkably barren." 14 
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Why then did we. bother wit'h this survey? Firstly, because it provides 
an important starting point for the review of later schools, 
particularly the existentialist. Secondly, because it illustrates both 
the difficulty and failure of what we ~ight very broadly term 
rationalist philosophy to deal with the problem of ethics. This 
failure has central significance when it is considered that political 
liberalism is a direct genetic descendant of this rationalist 
philosophy. 
The rationalist seeks statements which are universal,. unambiguous and 
not capable of contradiction, or logical inconsistency. Yet ethical 
choices seldom render up such qualities. Warnock in her concluding 
remarks notes five areas of difficulty in choosing the good as Moore 
would have us do: 
people disagree as to what constitutes human welfare; 
we must often 'weigh' the shor.t against the lorig:-term; 
often any one action will harm some and benefit others; 
sometimes an action will harm one individual in some ways and benefit 
him in others; 
finally, most often the information required to make the above 
15 
assessments is partially or completely lacking. 
This is the real woild. Yet English rationalist philosophy often seems 
to defy common experience in order to satisfy reason. 
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2. Max Weber's Ethics of Responsibility 
We turn now from English shores to Germany: to the man who is almost 
.. 
certainly the outstanding sociologist of our century. 
Weber was born in 1864 into a home dominated by politics. His father, 
a jurist by training, was a prosperous politician active in local 
government (Berlin), regional affairs (Prussia) and in the new national 
assembly which resulted from Bismark's efforts to create a unified 
Germany. W~ber Senior was a supporter of the National Liberals led 
by Bennigsen. 
Weber Junior was bookish and learned from the beginning, writing, for 
example, an historical essay entitled "Concerning the Course of German. 
History, with Special Regard to the Positions of Kaiser ~nd Pope" at 
the age of 14. He was also subject to illness, contracting meningitis 
at the age of 4. Ill-health was to be his constant companion through 
hii; life. 
A religious sceptic, Weber trained as a Jurist at H~idelberg. After 
practising· law for a brief period, he pursued an academic· career, 
returriing to Heidelberg to take up a professorial appointment. Shortly 
after moving to Heidelberg, however, he suffered an attack on, or 
partial collapse of, his nervous system. This neurotic disorder was to 
be present until his death. Indeed as one biographer remarks, "h.is way 
of life from this time_ on seems to oscillate between neurotic collapse, 
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16 
travel and work." His travels took him through the lerigth and 
breadth of Europe, to the United States in 1904, and to the East. 
Although Weber constantly entered key political debates - for example, 
seeking (unsuccessfully) personally to persuade Ludendorf to offer '~is 
head" in expiation of German war-deeds, and thus save the honour of the 
17 
Nation, W.eber himself declined. political office repeatedly. During 
his lifetime his sympathies shifted fromMonarchist to Progressive 
18 
Liberal. In his widow's account he had sympathies for the social 
democrats, but believed because he could not share a workers lifestyle 
19 
he could not authentically espouse their cause. 
Aron, has suggested a contradiction in the fact that the man who 
advocated a politics of responsibility was himself never prepared to 
become directly involved in the political process. 
"Weber refused to employ the means necessary to obtain 
politic~l power. Be was prepared, in the abstr~ct, to 
calculate human reactions and to act in accordance with 
his calculations, but as a human being he refused to 
employ the means which he knew to be essential." 20 
Whether this criticism is justified is hard to judge. What oppor-
tunities were really available.to Weber? Certainly his serious and 
cronic ill-health was a barrier. That Weber possessed both energy and 
courage is attested by the consistent forthrightness of his views (and 
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their p.rolific quality) as well as the direct interventions he did 
make, such as his attempts to have the Kaiser restrict German submarine 
activities during World War I; his efforts on behalf of 'black-listed' 
academic colleagues, and his espousal of the cause of constitutional 
reform. 
However, it is Weber's thought rather than his actions which concern us 
here: in particular, his writings about ethics in the political 
process, as it was emerging in the early decades of this century. 
Weber's views on this subject are most lucidly set out in his lecture 
"Politics as a Vocation" given.at Munich University in the shadow of 
the end of World War I, and. the short-lived Bavarian (socialist) 
revolution. In ihe early part of this lecture, Weber describes the 
. development of modern p_olitics. We shall follow this description in 
outline as it is important in .relation to his discussion of e~hics. 
Weber commences by defining the State as: 
"a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory;" and . 
"the mod~rn state is a compulsory association which. 
organises domination." 21 
Politics, therefore, "means striving to share power or striving to 
influence the distribution of power, either among state·s or within a 
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state." It is of critical importance to Weber that all political 
action is based on the implicit or explicit, threatened or actual use 
of violence. 
The. modern state has emerged generically from the struggle between the 
Prince and the Estates (Aristocracy). In this long struggle which 
mark~ the beginning of the end of feudalism, a series of archetypical 
or modal political types emerge: 
Initially, the clergy whose value lies both in their link with the 
church, but also in their education;. 
Then the literati. In the West, these are seen in the Renaissance 
advisers to the feudal Monarchs and rulers; 
Theri the court nobil{ty or gentry: not aristocrats, but men of 
standing, who derive their status from the role the Prince affords 
them in the affairs of state; 
Then the jurist, who in a state increasing committed to the 
rational government of the affairs of men, are particularly 
23 
well-suited to govern. 
And, finally the· political professional,· or· the person who treated 
politics as a calling; who lived not only for politics but also 
from politics. 
This rise of this 'full-time' politician, or career politician was to 
be traced in the development of the political party as ~ social 
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institution. The party, of .course, has its origin in the creation of 
representative assemblies of one kind or another. 
In England, the creation of a representative assembly was followed by 
the formation of political clubs as well as relatively loose alliances 
amongst members of Parliament. Over time these solidified into parties 
in the sense of on-going associations. At first these were active 
really only at election time, and even then on a limited basis. 
However, particularly with .the extension of the franchise in 1868, mass 
organisatioris became necessary, as did the caucus system. This led to 
the creation of the election agent and the whip. Now a party machine 
was necessary, and someone, of course, had to to manage that machine. 
In the United States, the emergence of relatively non-ideological 
·parties- led to a situation where the party machine was based largely· on 
the spoils system. Here loyalty was bought with the promise of reward 
in the form of administrative offic-e. This has led to the absence of a 
civil service tradition in the United States. 
In Germany in contrast, politics is controlled by a well-trained civil 
service. Parliament is relati~ely unimportant, ~nd the party system is 
ideological, but highly fragmented. The.proportional representation 
24 
system, Weber notes, has contributed to this. 
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Against this backdrop, Weber enters the field c:if ethics: . "What kind of 
. . 
man must one be if he is to be allowed to put his hand on the wheel of 
25 
history?" Weber replies: three qualities are necessary: 
Passion, in the sense of a cause. This cause must be chosen as a 
subjective, value choice. Without this, politics makes no sense; 
Responsibility, for "The final result of political action often, 
no, even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and often 
26 
even paradoxical relation to its original meaning"; 
A sense of proportion, which enables him to combine passion with 
responsibility. 
These three qualities lead Weber to the di.stinc tion between the ethic 
of inner conviction and the ethic of responsibility. These ethics·thus 
. . 
distinguished may be delineated as follows: 
The ethic of inner conviction.is the ethic of the Sermon on the 
Mount: of 'pure' Christianity. It rejects all violence. It is 
concerned with individual motive and action not social 
consequence; 
The ethic of responsibility, in contrast, accepts what a later 
27 
philosopher was to describe as the antinomies of action. In 
terms of this ethic .the political actor weighs the consequences of 
his actions, takes account of the real ~orld and the deficienties 
of the people on whom the good end result of the action is 
dependent. 
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It is clear from the above analysis that Weber's sympathies lie with 
the ethic of responsibility. Indeed his definition of politics as 
inevitably involving violence precludes the inner conviction purist by 
definition. Weber says as much: 
"He who seeks the salvation of the souls, of his own and 
others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, 
for the quite different tasks of politics can only be 
solved by violence. •i 28 
However, this ethic of responsibility which Weber favours is not 
content-emptied utilitarianism or formless expediency. His own words 
again are the most eloquent advocates of the balance he seeks: 
"If in these times ••• politicians crop up en masse and 
pass the watchword, 'The world is stupid and base, not 
.!.', 'The responsibility for· the consequences. does not 
fall upon me but upon others whom I serve and whose 
stupidity or baseness I shall eradicat~,' then I decl~re 
frankly that I would first enquire into the degree of 
inner poise backing this ethic of ultimate ends. I am 
under the impression that in nine out of ten cases I deal 
with windbags who do not fully realise what they take upon 
themselves but who intoxicate themselves with romantic 
sensations~" 
"From a human point of view, this is not very interesting 
nor does it move me profoundly. However, it is immensely 
moving when a mature man - no matter whether old or young 
in years - is aware of a responsibility for the conse-
quences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility 
with heart and soul. · He acts by following an ethic of 
responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he 
says: 'Here I stand, I can do no other.' Ins6far 
as this is true~ an ethic of ultimate ends (inner 
conviction) and an ethic of responsibility are not 
absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in 
unison constitute a genuine man - a man who can have the 
'calling for politics'. 29 
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Weber ends his 1918 lecture by suggesting that the debate be continued 
in ten years hence. He then makes the chilling prediction: 
"Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a 
polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter 
which group may triumph externally now." 30 
Death spared him two years later from seeing just how right he was. 
3. Existentialist Ethics: The Ethics of Ambiguity 
Following our examination of English Moral Philosophy and Weberian 
Ethics, we turn now to what may be viewed as one of the maj-0r 
philosophical styles of the twentieth century. 
The word style is used deliberately as an existentialist school is an 
impossible concept. One of the unifying theses of existentialist 
philosophies is their abhorrence of objectivism, or sets of 
prescriptions or codes or systems. 
Initially, we are going to look at three existentialist writers: 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. Thereafter we shall take a more 
detailed look at the ethical approach of Simone de Beauvoir. 
Kierkegaard 
Kierkegaard in particular and existentialism in general may be seen as 
a response to, and a protest against, the rationalist philosophies 
dominant from the time of the Renaissance. Put differently, they mark 
-40-
a move from what Van Peursen has characterised as the ontological phase 
31 
of man's culture to a functional phase. 
Warnock observes that an essential characteristic of all existentialist 
writing is to be found in its purpose, this being to free the reader 
32 
from illusion. In particular, Kierkegaard wrote to free people from 
the illusion of objectivity. Warnock connnents: 
"Objectivity may be characterised in various ways. It 
shows itself in the tendency to accept rules governing 
both behaviour and thought. Thus, any subject matter 
which is bound by rules of evidence, or which can be 
properly taught in the classroom, is in the grip of 
objectivity." 33 
Just as the English moral philosophers insisted that ethical 
propositions were different, in that they wer~ neither experienced 
empirically, nor deduced logically, so Kierkegaard's entire philosophy 
is asserted to be different. If life is to be captured in eternal or 
absolute rules, then life is to be observed rather than lived. Truth, 
for Kierkegaard is fundamentally subjective. It.can only be 
experienced and known subjectively. Indeed it can only be known when· 
the subject goes to meet it in a leap of faith. 
Kierkegaard's contribution then is to go beyond the merely rational and 
universal. It is to shift the focus from what is being said (the 
ontological perspective concerned with essence) to the how of what is 
being asked, answ~red and the answer's reception (the functional 
perspective; concerned with existence). 
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Heidegger 
Heidegger replaces Kierkegaard's distinction between objective and 
subjective knowledge with another: 
au~hentic and inauthentic existence. 
Heidegger is concerned then with existence and its nature, or with 
34 
Existence and Time, as his major work is entitled •. Man's existence 
is simultaneous actual, in the sense that it is enmeshed in a 
particular context· of time and place,· and it is potential in that man 
can transcend that particular context - he can change in a willed way 
both where he is and.what he does. It is this tension between man's 
potential and· actua·l existence which defines the authenticity or 
·inauthenticity of his being. 
Man lives authentically when he realises his potential existence by 
willed, chosen actions for which he takes full responsibility. So the 
ethical is that which I choose, that which L accept responsibility for. 
Sartre 
The foundations of Kierkegaard and Heidegger bring us to the 
philosophical and literary writings of Jean Pau·l· Sartre. They also 
bring us to an historical event which has had the utmost significance 
on twentieth century ethics - the S~cond ~orld War •. 
35 
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This war, with the depths of evil which produced it - and which it 
produced - punctured both the idealism and optimism of ethicists and 
philosophers, dominant since the Renaissance. This optimism was the 
promise of rationalism. Man. was a rational being. The universe was an 
orderly system replete with moral codes and natural laws merely 
awaiting discovery. 
Who could believe this after the holocaust of World War IIr 
Universalism - as embodied politically in the League of Nations - and 
Rationalism lay in ruins. 
It 1s against this background that Sartre develo~ed his perspective. 
He firstly affirms the fundamental subjectivity of all knowledge. Any 
view of the ~orld must be the view of someone. On the basis of 
Heidegger's actual and potential existence, Sartre builds his 
distinction between Beings-in-themselves such as material objects, and 
Beings-for-themselves such as people, who have both the freedom and the 
capacity to transcend their present existence and transform it at any 
moment in time . 
. This ability to transform my exis·tence is the same as my capacity to 
act in the world. It is this ability to ~ct (or to put it differently 
to change my present "being" ) which is the constitutive quality of my 
conscious existence. This ability to act is a desire to overcome or 
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change a fact (such as being cold) of present existence. It is my 
ability to project myself from a given present state to a wished future 
state. 
Man is always free to transcend or change his present. He may not 
recognise this freedom. Indeed he may flee from it, for it is a 
terrible burden constantly demanding responsible choice, and choice 
which must be willed, and which cannot be derived from universal 
truths. To do so (i.e. to flee) is to live in bad faith. This is the 
equivalent of Heidegger's 1nauthentic existence, and to Kierkegaard's 
objectivity. 
36 
What then of ethics? Sartre agr~es with Kant, that ethical acts must 
be the result of choices freely made. He, however, disagrees that such 
choices can be made rationally in the sense of choosing that which is 
consistent with some pre-existing c~t~gorical imperative. For Sartre, 
man must choose freely, responsibly and subjectively, in the sense of 
rriaking his choice in direct response to the situation he lives, rather 
than i~ conformity with some code~ In Sartre's vie~, to live 
ethically, man must choose - constantly - in ·both full freedom and 
responsibility. But how does man exercise those thoices that are of 
.. 
i.e. the very core of ethics, those choices which affect others? This 
surely is the very heart of morality. 
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The problem of "the other" ls a major problem in Sartre's ethical 
37 
perspecti~e. In Being ~nd Nothin~ness, Sartre notes that our very 
consciousness is characterised (indeed constituted) by our attempts on 
the world, that is, our attempt to capture, control and change the 
reality around us - to "project" ourselves·. on to it. To the extent 
that that reality embraces other people, our relationship with them is 
characterised by this attempt to control. This attempt is of course 
reciprocal. 
Indeed, Sartre goes further to argue that our highest relationships 
I 
with others - i.e. our relationships with those whom we love - are 
characterised by this e~er to be frustrated desire to free ourselves of 
them, This leads him to pos.tulate three possible outcomes for a love 
relationship over time • 
. Indifference (when we turn our at.tention away from the loved one to 
someone or something else); 
Masochism (when ~e surrender ourselves to the loved one); 
Sadism (when we demand and obtain this same surrender from the loved 
one). 
No ~onder his work was characterised as a philoso~hy of pessimism! 
Again,· what then of ethics? 
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"The possibility of acting must be realised in the 
context of a concrete situation, where the agent is 
surrounded by actual other people. The moral question for 
each man is, then, to what extent he-cBn escape from 
the bonds of his particular situation, and how much 
responsibility he will take for creating, act by act, 
the world in which he lives." 38 (own emphasis) 
Warnock concludes her survey of existentialist ethics with this 
epigrammatic observation: 
"The only general law of ethics must be to avoid 
general laws." 39 
Simone De Beauvoir 
We have traced the foundations of existentialism in.Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger and Sartre. However, existentialist ethics receives its most 
developed and lucid treatment in a work of Simone De Beauvoir. The 
work, first published in 1948, and entitled "The Ethics of Ambig~ity" , 
addressed the fundamental ethical.dilermna's of modern man in the most 
40 
direct of ways. The aim of this work is unlike Kierkegaard, not to 
41 
evade illusion but to "assume" our fundamental ambiguity. 
She commences by making the point that without failure, there .can be no 
·ethics. This can be extended by saying that if what we had to do was 
42 
easy or obvious, there would be no need for ethics. Her second 
assertion is that there are no absolute values - no universal mor~l 
code. This immediately rai.ses the Dostoivesky problem "If God does not· 
exist, everything is permitted." Not so, replies De Beauvoir. Indeed, 
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the very absence of an external source of justification creates the 
43 
necessity for man to justify himself. It does mean that man is free, 
44 
and this is central to her conception of ethics. The struggle 
between man's true existence in responsibly accepted freedom and his 
45 
bondage in facticity is.a theme which recurs throughout this work. 
This provides De Beauvoir, and her reader, with a useful definition of 
46 
ethics: "Ethics is the triumph of freedom over facticity." 
De Beauvoir then describes a series of retreats from freedom, which 
equate to Kierkegaard's objectivity, Heidegger's inauthenticity and 
Sartre's bad faith: 
the serious man, who avoids both ambiguity and responsibility 
through his unquestioned allegiance to something, such as the 
army, the "Revolution" , economic. growth, irrespective of the. 
47 
costs this thing de~ands. 
the adventurer, who ennnerses himself in an activity without ever 
48 
consciously cho6sing that acti~ity's end "thereby (allowing) 
thems'elves to be collaborationists in '41 and communists in '45". 
The adventurer "thinks he can assert his own existence without 
49 
taking into account others." 
the passionate man, who adopts an object totally. We could call 
him the fanatic. ·The end is unquestioned and unexceptionable, and 
50 
the means follow automatically. 
The aesthetic, or detached observer: those who when the Germans 
entered Paris said "Let's try to take the point of view of 
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history" Here the present is sacrificed to some abstract and 
ideological past; or to some vague 'alles sal regkom' future. 
Next De Beauvoir tackles the problem which Sartre half-addressed and 
failed to solve: the problem of the other. The other is central to 
ethics, for as she notes: _ ''Man is never oppressed by things .... but 
52 
.. • • (by) other men" This being so to our concept of (individual) 
freedom, we must add the concept of the liberation (of others). 
Freedom in its very nature must seek this liberation.: 
11.A freedom wills itself genuinely only by willing itself 
as an indefinite movement through the freedom of others."_ 
and 
"to be free is not to have the power to do anything you 
like; ••• the existence of others as a freedom 
defines my situation and is even the condition of my 
own freedom." 53 
This of course does not resolve the pr-oblem of the other; it merely 
recognises it. It is close to the classical liberal conception of 
individual freedom, where the inaividual is free to do anything 
provided he does·not encroach on the freedom of others. The problem is 
that in the real world almost ever)' human action impinges on the 
opportunities and interests of others. In a concrete situation this 
formulation becomes an absurdity. De Beauvoir recognises this 
absurdity and face~ it directly. - It leads her to describe the 
54 
antinomies of action. 
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In seeking liberation (that is freedom for others as well as freedom 
for oneself), the liberator has to impinge on the freedom of the 
55 
oppressor. Indeed the oppressor has to be oppr~ssed. This was one 
of the objections which the Southern States in the American union used 
to oppose the abolition of slavery. Abolition denied the Southern 
56 
planter the freedom to own slaves. But this is only the first 
antinomy. Not only is i~ necessary in seeking liberation.to oppress 
(and often kill) the oppressor, but often: 
"We are obliged to destroy not only the oppressor but 
also those who serve him, whether they do so out of 
ignorance or out of constraint." 57 
Thirdly, often freedoms have to be prioritised. From 1939 to 1945 the 
first task was to ~efeat Hitler and n6t to liberate colonies. So we 
may find ourselves opposing and ev_en killing those whose cause we 
acknowledge to be just, _but whose timing we believe is inappropriate. 
58 
Finally, in pursuing liberat{on we will be.forced to. sacrifice from 
amongst those on our side. Those "antinomies" attest the fact that "no 
action can be generated for man without its being immediately generated 
59 
against man." De Beauvoir argues that all ideologies, all 
governments~ all parties seek to conceal this paradox. Fascist and 
Marxist ideology seek to do so by either denying individuai existence 
altogether, as we have seen in an earlier section, or holding the 
individual in contempt. Then the sacrifice of an individual - of 
60 
whatever category - ceases to matter. In so doing these ideologies; 
61 
and the societies they control pay a high price. 
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Another way in which parties, authorities and .movements seek to conceal 
the paradox and evade these antinomies is to justify the sacrifice on 
the basis of necessity: 
·"why this bloody revolution instead of slow reforms? 
•• ~ if only. one way shows itself to be possible, 
if the unrolling of history is fatal, there is no 
longer any place for the anguish or choice, or for 
regret, or for outrage." 62 
Yet another attempt to evade the fundamental antinomies of ethical acts 
is to be found in the justification of the Future. For centuries~ 
religious doctrine has sought both justification and edification of 
present sacrifice and present suffering in some mystical or apocalyptic 
future time. In the rationalism of the 18th and 19th century, the 
concept of Progress came to replace this as an all embracing 
justification. Modern ideologies continue to justify present sacrifice 
63 
on the basis of the promised better or even ideal tomorrow. 
De Beauvoir rejects all these evasions. They are all forms of 
facticity •. They do not resolve the antinomies of action. What then, 
to ask the Dostoivesky quesion, is to be done? Ambiguity is central to 
De Beauvoir's answer. This is not to be confused with the Sartrean 
concept of the absurd. This absurdity empties.existence of all 
possibility of meaning and leads Sartre to condemn man as a "useless 
64 
passi_on". Ambiguity in contrast does not deny meaning, but merely 
asserts that ·meaning is never fixed, or given. It can never be 
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assumed, but must be constantly ••won". This then does not deny an 
ethics - though it does deny a given; universal code. 
"Ethics does not fur.nish recipes any more than do science 
or art there must be a trial and a decision in each 
case." 66 
11The fact is that no behaviour is ever authorised to 
begin with, and one of the concrete consequences of 
existentialist ethics is the rejection of all previous 
justifications which might be drawn from the civilisation 
the age, and the culture;" 67 
This general propo•ition is illustrated as follows: 
"Out of disappointment in love a young girl takes an 
overdose of pheno-barbital; in the morning friends 
find her dying, they call a.doctor, she is saved; 
later.on she becomes a happy mother of a family; her 
friends were right in considering her suicide as a 
hasty and· heedless .act and in putting her into a 
position to reject it or return to it freely. But in 
asylums,· one sees melancholic patients who have tried_ 
, to commit suicide twenty times, who devote their freedom 
to seeking the means of escaping their jailers and 
of putting an end to their intolerable anguish; the 
doctor who gives them a friendly pat on the shoulder 
is their·tyrant and their torturer." 68 
Though fundamentally corrnnitted to this ethics of contingency, De 
Beauvoir nevertheless affirms the individual as art end. 
To conclude, let De Beauvoir speak for herself once more: 
i•we can merely ask that {ethical) decisions are not taken 
hastily and lightly, and that, all things considered, 
the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is 
being forestalled." 
E~istential ethics involves: 
....:51-
II 
in each case, confronting the values realised with 





an action which waits to serve man ought to be care 
ful not to forget him on the way. 11 70 
4. Albert Camus: The Ethics of the Second Prize 
Our fourth perspective is that offered by the life and writings of 
Albert Camus. Camus was born iri 1913 in Algeria of a French father and 
Spanish mother. His schooling and univers{ty education took placed in 
that country (Algeria). In 1940, he moved to Paris, joining the French 
Resistance in 1941. He served the Resistance as a journalist 
contributing the editorials of the underground publication Combat. 
Camus is more writer and playwright than philosopher -.though all of 
his literary works have a philosophical quality. His writings also 
include important works of non-fiction. In particular, two works 
71 
examine the philosophical (and ethical) legitimacy of suicide 
72 
and of 
murder • Camus was awarded the Nobel prize for Literature in 1957. 
73 
He was killed in a motor accident in France in 1960, at the age of 57. 
In this sect.ion, we will not be examining Camus' major philosophical 
writings on suicide and murder, as these deal more with an intensely 
personal ethics: the response of the individual to reality as he 
experiences it; Instead, we wish to look more at his ethical writings 
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of a more directly political nature. For this we are using a 
selection of essays spanning some twenty years of his life, selected 
75 
for publication in English by Camus in the last year of his life. 
The essays cover a wide spectrum of Camus' political concerns: 
- Nazi Germany; 
- Spain; 
- Algeria; and 
- Hungary; 
as areas of political conflict. They also covered his beliefs about 




- courage; and 
- the role of the artist.· 
We shall trace some of these concerns with both territories and ideas 
as they add ari essential fourth dimension to our conception of ethics 
in this century. 
Freedom and Justice 
Camus understood well the antinomies of ethical action. Having joined 
the Communist Party in Algeria in 1934, he parted company with the 
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76 
Marxists shortly after the war. Thereafter, he inhabited a barren 
no-man's land between the politics of the left and of the right. in 
this lonely, and generally thankless position, Camus was occupying an 
essentially liberal position. 
In essence, Camus refused to sacrifice freedom on the altar of justice. 
77 
He understood freedom in connnon with his fellow existentialists, as 
constituting the very essence of man as man. Camus did not see freedom 
78 
in some ideal or absolute way. He also noted that: 
II freedom is not made up principally of privileges; 
it is made up especially of duties." 79 
80 
It was these onerous duties that caused many to reject it. Freedom 
had to be chosen constantly by the individual. These repeated choices 
demanded that the individual -choose often between bad alternatives.-
Often it demanded a choice between ironic alternatives: to choose, as 
Camus often put it, neither to suffer terror, nor to inflict it. 
Justice is a value honoured b~ Camus. Yet he notes its potential 
conflict with freedom. Indeed he notes: 
" the great event of the twentieth century was the 
foresaking of the values of freedom by the revolutionary 
movement, the progressive retreat of socialism based on 
freedom before the attacks of a Caesarian and military 
socialism." 81 
Noting that after Marx freedom had been viewed as a bourgeois hoax, 
Camus asserts an error: 
-54-
"For it should have been said merely that bourgeois 
freedom was a hoax - ••• that bourgeois freedom was not 
freedom or, in the best of cases, was not yet freedom." 82 
But this was not said. Rather: 
"The contention was that we needed justice first and 
·that we would come to freedom later on ••• 11 ·s3 
Algeria 
The antinomy between freedom and justice takes on a very concrete form 
in Camus' writings about Algeria. This is a country he knows well and 
to which he is is deeply committed. He ha,d encountered the realities 
of Arab poverty and injustice there in his youth. He is bound on the 
other hand to the French Algerian community by his mother and brother 
who continued to live.there until his death. Torn between these two 
commitments, he walks a dghtrope which could only be escaped by 
84 
eschewing the subject altogether. ihis he c6uld not do. 
So Camus was caught between the torture of the French authorities and 
the terror of the Arab rebels. He condemned both and persisted in 
seeking a. third option which would reconcile the legitimate.· demands of 
the 9 million Arab inhabitants of Algeria and the 1,2 million French 
settlers, many of whose roots went back for more than a century. His 
efforts to do this raise parallels with the political dilemmas of South 
Africa which are altog~ther remarkable: 
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We have already noted that Camus rejects the tactics of both 
torture and terror. He notes the terrible interaction of the two: 
"To justify himself, each (that is both torturer and 
terrorist) relies on the other 1 s crime.".85 
Yet some way must be found to break this "infernal circle" of 
violence, for " the question is not how to die separately but 
86 
rather how to live together." 
Thereafter Camus, in association with other French and Arab 
moderates appeals for a civilian truce, in which, for the duration 
of the fighting, the civilian population will not be the conscious 
87 
target of either side •. 
Camus persists in hoping for, and working towards a "third 
option"~ one which involved neither the defeat of the French 
authorities, nor of the Arab rebels, but a reconciliation of both 
the Arab and French inhabitants of Alge~ia: 
II the French in Algeria (who) if they have no 
right to oppress anyone, do have the right not to 
oppressed themselves and to be their own masters 
in the land of their birth. There are other ways 
of re-establishing the necessary justice than 
.substituting one injustice·for another." 88· 
be 
In calling for this third way, Camus noted that a major obstacle 
was popular fatalism: 
-56-
"I know that the great tragedies of history often 
fascinate men with approaching horror. · Paralysed, 
they cannot make up their minds to do anything but 
wait. So they wait and one day the Gorgon devours 
them •••• They are too ready to believe that, after 
all, nothing but bloodshed makes progress and that 
stronger always progresses at the expense of the 
weaker." 89 
For the politics of the third way, Camus looks to the Swiss 
confederation, and a particular French/Algerian adaptation of it. 
This adaptation would certainly be labelled consociational today 
and involves a rejection of. the principle of one-man, one-vote in 
a unitary state which principle derives,as Camus note.s., from 1789 
91 
and which he notes "now deserves to be called Ancien Regime." 
Ethical Modesty 
Camus is not a political campaigner blinded by the realities of his 
time. He is well aware that the causes he champions are unpopular 
90 
. 92 
(though he derives neither pleasure, nor justification from this fact). 
He is alsb well aware of the possibility of defeat, and of the 
93 
debilitatory effects of defeat. Camus is not able to overcome this 
defeat by recourse to some faith in another reality or some 
transcendant metaphysics. It is this defeat that creates .the 
absurdity, isolation and alienation which are the mark of his novels 
94 
and plays. Yet in the midst of this absurdity, neither suicide, nor 
murder is permitted to man. 
-57-
What then can be hoped for? The ethics of the second prize: 
"If, after all, men cannot always make history have a 
meaning, they can always act so that their own l{fe has 
one." 95 
In terms of man's political actions, this means that: 
"Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a 
world in which children are tortured. But we can 
reduce the number of tortured children." 96 
5. Drawing Together The Threads 
What then can we say about ethics in' our century? Firstly, with the 
Engli~h moral philoso~ers, we must note that ethical options can be 
an~wered neither from pure experience, nor from pure reason. Whilst 
ethical debate is not, outside experience or reason, it is not reducible 
to either of these. Ethics involves man in choices choices· which he 
al one can make and which he cannot subordinate ei t-her to fact, or to 
logic. 
Secondly; we ndte with Weber that these choices can be ap~roached from 
the perspective of_ conscience, or from th~ per~pective of conseq~ence. 
Responsible ethics must emb~ac~ both; holding in tension both inner 
·conviction and an assessment of the consequences of one's actions in 
tension. 
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Thirdly, with De Beauvoir we must accept the antinomies of ~ction, and 
the fundamental ambiguity of all ethical questions. These means, inter 
alia, that no ethical question can be considered outside of the unique 
set of historic circumstances in which it occurs. 
Finally, with Camus we must note the further contradiction between 
freedom on the one hand and justice on the other: of the impossibility 
of reconciling perfectly the freedom of one group with justice for 
another. More importantly, we must accept an ethical modesty. Human 
society is ~uch that we will not achieve the first prize we seek. And 
yet our ideals are not worthless. Our striving for their inevitably 
partial fulfilment is constitutive of our own authentic individual 
existence, and the only repository of hope for the survival of m~nkind. 
CHAPTER TWO 'I 
'--~~~~~~--' 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER'S ETHICAL MODEL 
"Hitler's originality lay in his realisation that effective 
revolutions in modern circumstances are carried out with, 
and not against; the power of the State." 
Allan Bullock 
"There are no more.private citizens." 
Robert Ley 
"Mutiny and revolution are words which do not exist in the· 
vocabulary of a German Officer." 
General Ludwig Beck 
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"Bring me certain evidence that England is prepared to go to 
war over Czechsolvakia and I will put an end to this regime." 
General Ludwig Beck 
"The ultimate responsible question is not how I might emerge 
from this affair heroically, but rather how the coming 
generation shall (best) live on." 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
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In Chapter One we examined four twentieth century approaches to ethics. In 
this chapter we shall be looking at what the writer believes is a model of 
a liberal ethics of_responsibility. This model is to be found in the 
thought and actions of Dietrich Bonhoeffer understood in the context of the 
military conspiracy against Adolf Hitler. 
That a model of liberal ethics is. seen in the context of Nazi Germany is 
not meant to suggest direct parallels betweeri circumstances there and then 
1 
and modern day South Africa. If parallels do exist, they are very broad 
in nature. Both societies have experienced deep, fundamental and even 
primordial conflict; both exhibit high degrees of injustice; both allow 
very limited and morally ambiguous avenues of ethical action. The German 
model is studied here, however, because it is a contemporary, concrete 
situation in which ethical actions can be matched against ethical 
propositions. In ~his respect, the ~itect participation of the ethical 
thinker, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in the·active·ni.ilitary conspiracy to remove 
Hitler is particularly valuable. 
In this chapter, we will firstly try to sketch the enviroment in which the 
conspiracy was conceived and developed; then we will sketch its nature and 
effect; finally we will examine Bonhoeffer's writing on ethics against 
this background. 
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1. Nazi Germany 1933 to 1938 · 
Germany is one of Europe's youngest nations and has enjoyed the most 
tempestuous of paths through its short history as a unified territory. 
It has been the centre (and also in the ejei of many, the cause) of .the 
two wars modern man has designated as woild wars. 
Why is this so? One notable commentator, A J P Taylor, has asked and 
answered the question: 
"I was anxious to discover why a nation so highly 
civilized in most ways should have failed to develop 
political balance." 2 
His answer is given as follows: 
."The key to Germany's past is to be found in her relations 
with her neighbours - predominantly defensive towards the 
West, always aggressive towards the East." 3 
Germany, Taylor contends writing 1.n 1946, has failed to find her proper 
place in Europe. Existing on the ethnic edge of "Western Europe", 
confronted by some two hundred and fifty million peoples of slavic race 
to the East, Germany's insecurity and consequent aggression is to be 
4 
expected, he contends. 
As this is.the case, Germany's division after the war is "the kindest 
policy towards the Germans themselves," for: 
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"A re-united Germany would cease to be free: either it would 
become a militaristic state in order to resume the march towards 
European domination, or its power would be compulsorily reduced 
by foreign intervention, if the former allies had the sense to 
come together again in time." 5 
Taylor's view is quoted here not because the writer shares it, but 
because of its focus on the fundamental· geo-political tension of 
Germany. It is a tension analagous to that of South Africa as the only 
·white ruled territory on a predominantly black continent. 
, 
Germany in 1933 
The events from the end of the second world war up until Hitler's· 
assumption of office in 1933 are well-known. What is attempted here is 
a description of the society which created Hitler and which in turn he 
formed in the years of his peacetim~ administration. 
A fi~st important observation is that Hitler's accession to the highest 
political office in Germany was both constitutional and legitimate. 
Hitler at the time w<is the leader of the largest political party 
6· 
represented in the Reichstag. Hindenberg, the Reich's President under 
the (liberal) Weimar Constitution invited Hitler to attempt to form a 
government which would command a Parliamentary majority. Hitler 
succeeded in this through the coalitions he struck firstly with 
Hugenberg's Nationalists and secondly with the Catholic-oriented 
Centre Party. As Bullock notes: 
II 
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Hitler's originality lay in his realization that 
effective revolutions in modern conditions are carried 
out with, and not against, the power of the State: the 
correct order of events was first to secure access to 
that power and then begin the revolution. Hitler never 
abandoned his cloak of legality; he recognised the 
enormous value of having the law on his side. Instead 
he turned the law inside out and made illegality legal." 7 
.Jhe legitimacy of Hitler's coming to power and of his subsequent 
actions in dealing with his opponents was to pose important problems 
for the German resistance. 
The Coming of the Totalitarian State: 
Politics 
It is important to describe Hitler's ever widening circle of control, 
as it was this increasingly centrally directed social reality which 
defined the options for those seeking to oppose him. The political 
process under the Weimar Republic can be described as vibrant and 
8. 
unhealthy. Grunberger has suggested causes for the fundamental 
political instability of this period: 
II retarded unification (and therefore nationhood), 
capitalism maturing in a late.feudal society and~ 
national p~eference for KONFLIKTLOSE SYNTHESIS ••• " 
A fuil parliamentary democracy was more or less imposed on a defeated 
nation by its conquerors. Many of the leading figures of the new 
Republic were fundamentally unacceptable to large and influential 
groups within German societ~: 
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FRIEDRICH EBERT, first Weimar President, was a Master Saddler 
and a Social Democrat ("vagabonds without a Fatherland" , as 
9 
Bismarck had called them). 
PREUSS, chief architect of the Weimar constitution, was 
Jewish, as was the first Foreign Minister, RATHENAU. 
Notwithstand{ng the unpropitious beginning the Weimar period had its 
successes. There was a golden period in the late twenties. 
10 
·significant advances were achieved in the labour field. There were 
11 
also achievements in the field of economic development. However, 
this progress was more than destroyed by the world economi~ depr~ssion 
commencing with the 1929 Wall Street crash. 
What of the political process? Weimar politics were fragmented and 
fractious: 
on the LEFT deep divisions divided the Communists and the Social 
Democrats, divisions that were so deep that not even a massive 
common enemy (the Nazis) caused them to combine, even tactically. 
the CENTRE of the political spectrum was dominated by the 
Catholic-oriented Centre Party, led at this time by.BRUENING, but 
also included the People's Party. 
on the RIGHT two major groupings competed for support: 
HUGENBERG'S Nationalists and HITLER'S National Socialists. 
12 
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When Hitler was invited to become Chancellor with the Nazis as supposed 
junior partner in a coalition with "independents" and the German 
Nationalists, he moved quickly to put an end to the multiparty political 
process. As Fest puts it, this took the form of "a dynamic programme 
13 
of surprise attacks" a sort of political blitzkrieg. 
Hitler took office on 30th January 1933. On 1st February he read his 
"proclamation to the German People" setting out his intended programme, 
couched in terms of legality and replete with appeals for national 
unity. This proclamation, however, did include a vicious attack on 
14 
Marxism. Three days later the decree "For the Protection of the 
German People" was issued, allowing the Government to ban political 
meetings and newspapers. Two days later the Prussian Provincial 
Parliament was dissolved, with GOERING taking over the key MiniEtry of 
. . 
t~e Interior of this important Province, ~ontrolling Berlin. Now the 
police in this Province (and soon in other~) co-operated with the 
paramilitary fo~ces of the Righ~ (SSSA and the Nationalists' Stahlhelm) 
and launched .attack after attack on the Left. The campaign of both 
official and· "s·treet" harassment continued throughout the campaign for 
~he election held on 5th March i933. The Reichstag fire of the 28th 
February - just five days before this election - gave Hitler the 
- 15 
opportunity he was seeking to move directly. 4000 political 
functionaries (mostly Communist) were arrested that day, including all 
16 
of that Party's Parliamentary· representatives.· Two further emergency 
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decrees "for the protection of the people and the State" and "against 
betrayal of the German people and treasonous machinations" were issued. 
These three decrees: 
II replaced a constitutional goverment by a permanent·state 
of emergency. • • • provided the legal ha.sis for the regime 
••• provided the sham of a legal basis for persecution, 
totalitarian terroris~ and the repression of the German 
resistance right up to 20th July 1944. 11 17 
In the light of these most favourable circumstances the outcome of the 
March election was disappointing to Hitler. Whilst the Nazis won 288 
seats, and the German Nationalist allies 52, the moderate Centre Party 
. . . 
held its 73 seats, the Sociai Democrats 120 and the Communists retained 
81 of a previous 100. Thus the combined opposition was a healthy 274 
·to the ruling coalition's 340. Clearly even more direct action was 
called for: 
On 26th May, the Communist Party was formerly proscribed. The 
newly-elected deputies had never even taken up their seats; 
On 22nd June, the Soc.ial Democrats were banned "as an enemy to 
the People and the State;" 
- ·On 4th July, t;he. (Bavarian) Peoples Party dissolved.its elf after 
·its offices had been occupied a few days earlier, and its allied 
Centre Party did the same on July 5th. 
This latter fact did not.prevent the conclusion of the Concordat 
between Hitler and the Vatican just a few days later. Now that -the 
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opponents had been dealt with it was the turn of Hitler's allies. On 
21st June, the offices of the German Nationalist Party of Hugenberg 
were occupied and the Party dissolved itself one week later. On 14th 
July, Germany officially became a one Party-State, when Hitler issued a 
decree declaring the National Socialists to be the only legal political 
formation. However both official and street harassment had rendered the 
decree almost redundant. 
The Economy 
Hitler wasted no more time in smashing the independent institutions of 
the economy than he had in taking control of the politicai parties. 
Fest's words describe the demise of the unions succinctly and starkly: 
"When Hitler took over an old demand of the labour move-
ment and declared lSt May a national holiday, the union. 
leadership called upon the ~ank and file to participate 
in the demonstrations (organised by the State) 
They listened bitterly to the speeches of Nazi functionaries 
but were nevertheless forced to applaud ••• 
This confusing experience contributed more than anything 
to the shattering of the will to resist of a movement 
numbering millions ••• on 2nd May the SA and SS occupied 
union headquarters throughout Germany. 11 18 
Employers organisati6ns suffered the same fate during the month of 
May. 
In place of these two forms of organisation vital to the management of 
a plural society the Nazis.created the Labour Front; 1ed by Robert Ley. 
This amazing organisation combined owners, managers and workers of all -
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kinds into a single organisation. This integration reflects the 
romantic desire for "konfliktlose synthesis" mentioned earlier. Former 
divisions were resolved into a single new distinction: within the 
enterprise there was a "leader" (normally the managing director, but 
sometimes joined by a leading worker) and the rest were "followers". 
19 
This synthesis was part of the Nazis' programme of "Gleichschaltung", 
or the creation of an organic state. 
The Labour Front was a pleni-potentiary economic octopus, everywhere 
active. Its internal organisation comprised a division into geographic 
areas ('eichsgruppe) and economic sectors (Fachsgruppe). It ran labour 
bureaux, controlled vocational guidance, technical training and trade 
testing. It also created and controlled the Labour Service. This at 
first voluntary and then compulsory service for the unemployed helped 
direct and control the flow of labour as determined by the economic 
goals of the regime. 
A further major attivity of the Labour Front was the Strength through 
·Joy programme designed to provide for employees' leisure time. The 
"KRAFT DURCH FREUDE" (KdF) programme soon included subsidized theatre 
performances and concerts, exhibitions, sport, hiking groups, dances, 
20 
folk dancing, films and adult education courses. 
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Yet its most publicised activity was that of a heavily subsidised 
tourist.organisation promoting worker holidays. 
All of these programmes had as their aim the control of the employee's 
every activity. 
''Only sleep was a private affair. Ley wrote: 'There 
are no more private citizens. The time when anybody 
could do or not do what he pleased is past. 111 21 
The Labour Front also propagated a Nazi work ethos. This ethos is 
captured partially by the slogans which abounded at the time: 
ARBEIT ADELT - work ennobles; and ARBEIT MACHT FREI - work liberates. 
The ethos aimed at a status ~quality between management and workers, 
between the ~killed and the unskilled, between the ''worker of the head 
22 . - . . . 
and the hand~ 11 The legal and State enforced distinction between 
blue and white collar employees was ignored. The holidays organised by 
the KdF were "one class" affairs attended by DIREKTOR and ARBEITER 
alike. A morning rally was advocated to avoid the necessity for some 
employees-to ~unch .clock cards whilst others did not. ·The rally of 
course also p~ovided a good propoganda opportunity. 
The National Organisation of Labour Act of 1934 dissolved all 
independent economic organisations such as unions and employer 
·.associations (already dissolved) and the Works Council. The central 
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unit of industrial relations (though the term hardly has meaning here) 
became the workshop connnunity or BETRIEBSGEMEINSCHAFT, divided into the 
leader (BETRIEBSFUERHER) and his followers (GEFOLGSCHAFT); a 
VERTRAUENSRAT was elected to advise the leader; Reich Trustees of 
Labour were appointed to resolve conflict and direct economic planning, 
"Courts of honour" were created to prosecute those stepping out of 
line. 
Capital fared little better than labour under the impact of Hitler's 
revolution after power. Although a petty bourgeoisie class of 
independent craftsmen and traders had been a critical base of support 
for the Nazis, they received little benefit from the new regime. After 
initial attacks on "big busiriess" in the retail trade, i. e ~ ·the 
Departmen_t Store chains such as HERTIE and KARSTADT, and the 
co-operative movement, the Nazi sta·te came to an acconnnodation with 
these big organisations, leaving the small trader in the lurch. In 
industry whilst many large companies benefitted significantly from the 
re-armament campaign, few achieved any real influence with the new 
23 
power holders. As Schoenbaum connnents: 
"The voice of business lapsed quickly from a tone of 
expectation, to. one of frustration, then shadowy 
allusion and finally to effective silence." 24 
The Universities, The Church and The Army 
The extent to which the National Socialists succeeded in gaining almost 
total control of both the political and economic dimensions of German 
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society has been described. In the area of education the Nazis found 
that they had well prepared soil. German universities have long 
enjoyed a complex relationship wit~ nationalism and militarism, as is 
dem6nstrated by student shooting and duelling clubs. Laqueur bas 
noted that the universities had never been "won" for the Weimar 
25 
Republic. Now they became easy prey for the New Order. As 
Gruenberger notes: 
"With the onset of the depression student opinion showed 
itself twice as susceptible to the appeal of Nazism as 
public opinion in general. Early in 1931 about 60% of 
all undergraduates supported the Nazis' student organisation 
••• In that year anti-semitic riots erupted at the 
universities of Berlin, Cologne, Grafswald, Halle, Hamburg, 
Breslau, Kiel, Konigsberg, Munich and Vienna." 26 
After the seizure of power the Na~i Student Organisation became the 
student body, and the teaching_ staff cif the universities were similarly 
organised. What was taught at the universities now became subject to 
the imprimatur of the Party. 
The Churches fared little better. Catholic subordination was ensured 
by the Concordat with Rome and pressure on that church's national 
leadership. The Protestant Church was infiltrated by "German 
Christians".· This split the Church into a compliant half and a 
Confessing Church. The non-collaborationist Confessing Church, after 
many brave actions in which people such as Martin Niemoller ari.d 
·Dietrich Bori.hoeffer featured prominently, was dissi~ated both by 
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internal divisions as well as by the conflicting pressures of its 
protest and pastoral duties. For the latter the Church was dependent, 
27 
at least in some measure, on the State. 
We turn finally to.the Army. This proved to be that area of social 
organisation that was ~ost resistant to incorporation in the Nazi New 
Order. The Armed forces (and the Army in particular) were in a unique 
position. They enjoyed a tradition and degree of internal organisation 
and.autonomy rivalled by no other social formation in pre-Hitler 
Germany. Furthermore, their continued effective existence was vital 
for Hitler. 
The first challenge came from Ernst Rohm' s STURM ABTEILING (SA) ·- the 
para-military wing of the Nazi Party. Rohm wanted an integration of 
the Army and the SA under his leadership. Hitler opposed this; both 
betause he saw in Rohm a dangerous potential rival, and beca~se he 
realised that continuing strife between the SA and the Army would 
weaken and delay his military dreams. Rohm was removed in the purge of 
SA leadership which took place on 30th June 1933. Hitler now promised· 
28 
the Army a monopoly on the right to bear arms ~ a promise never kept. 
In return Hitler demanded total allegiance in the form of an oath of 
p·ersonal loyalty that every officer was required to swear to Hitler. 
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When military resistance to Hitler's war plans continued he next trie~ 
to bully· the Army leadership into compliance. When this .failed he 
removed successive waves of leadership, removing his first War Minister, 
Blomberg, on the pretext of an inappropriate marriage (which he had 
previouslx sanctioned); than his logical successor, Army Commander 
29 
Fritsch, on a false charge of homosexuality. Hitler then took over 
the merged posts of War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces. 
General Ludwig Beck continued the pattern of resistance to Hitler's 
plans, resigning as Chief of the Army in 1938, having failed to 
mobilise the Generals into common action against Hitler. Although 
replaced by the more compliant Kietel, the resistance to Hitler's will 
continued.· Indeed the remarkable extent to which the Generals 
questioned and resisted Hitler created a war time situation in.which 
the leadership of the organisation most vital to his war effort was the 
least loyal: 
"The thorough process of Nazification to which - (Hi tLer) 
had subjected the institutions of Germany, from the 
Reichstag to the Law Courts, from the trade unions to 
the universities, had destroyed, he believed, the basis 
for.organised opposition. The process was not, however, 
complete •••. It was natural, therefore, that those few 
Germans who ventured to think of taking action· against 
Hitler should continue to look with expectation to the 
Army ••• " 30 
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2. The Military Conspiracy Against Hitler 
As the Nazi revolution embraced ever widening circles of German society 
the Army emerged as the only organisation able to maintain a meaningful 
degree of autonomy. For this reason it became a place of refuge for a 
31 
number of Hitler's opponents. 
As has already been noted the Army was in no sense impregnable: it was 
32 
long the object of Hitler's suspicion and scorn; these suspicions 
were constantly encouraged and promoted by Heinrich Himmler's SS, who 
were locked in a mortal conflict with Military Inteliigence (the 
Abwehr) throughout the period 1933 - 1944. A further threat to both 
the coherence and capacity of the opposition leadership in the Army was 
the Army's_explosive expansion during this period. Army leadeiship at 
the Major General level and above numbered 44 in 1932, 275 in 1938 and 
33 
over 1000 by 1943. Nevertheless, the opposition found key leadership 
support as well as vital organisational resources in the Army. Though 
both brave and often heroic resistance did occur in other areas of 
34 
German society, the Army-based conspiracy alone posed a real threat 
to the_Regime. 
What was the nature of this conspiracy? Who led it? What was its 
~utpose? Row did it act? 
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The Conspiracy's Leaders 
The key leadership was located in the Army's professional ranks. A 
large number of senior officers were involved· by the .time the 
conspiracy reached its climax in the 20th July 1944 assassination 
attempt. However, it is here worth ske~ching the backgrounds of a few 
of the leadership figures persistently involved from 1938 onwards. 
General Ludwig Beck, army Chief-of-Staff until the Munich cr1s1.s of 
1938, after which he reiigned, was always a key element in the 
resistance plans, featuring prominently in the July 20th, 1944 attempt. 
Van Beck was not brought easily to active opposition to Hitler. In 
response to an early appeal to him to act against Hitler he replied: 
•. 
"Mutiny and. revolution are words which do not exist in the vocabulary 
35 
of a German Officer;" However, by late 1938 his attitudes had 
changed dramatically: "Bring me c~rtain evidence that England is 
prepared to go to war over Czechoslovakia and I will put an end to this 
36 
regime." 
Beck was a liberal in thi sense that much ~f his strategic action 
flowed from a belief in the efficacy of reason and rational analysis. 
38 
37 
He was also politically naive. Furthermore, h{s resignation in 1938 
(flowing from what Weber would have identified as an ethic of inner 
conviction) significantly reduced- the influence h~ could bring to bear 
on subsequent events. 
L 
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Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was head of military intelligence from 1935 
until 1944, at which time this organisation (the Abwehr) was absorbed 
by the SS. He had commanded a U-boat in the first world war with 
distinction. The son of a Westphalian industrialist, Canaris was 
politically conservative and also often indicated apparent enthusiasm 
for the Hitler regime. In fact, however, he was the very backbone of 
the resistance. Without him and his organisation of some 13 000 people 
39 
the resistance would simply not have been viable. 
Dr Carl Goerdeler was the leading politician involved in the 
conspiracy. Trained as a jurist, Goerdeler served as a senior official 
in Bruening's administration, declining a Cabinet Post, however, in 
preference for his position as Lord Mayor of Leipzig. Bruening 
suggested Goerdeler as his successor. .President Hindenberg instead 
40 
chose van Papen, who in turn was. fo.l lowed by Hitler. After Hitler's 
. . 
access to power Goerdeler became a centre of resistance, refusing to 
fly the Swastika over the Leipzig City Hall and giving refuge to Jewish 
41 
colleagues being attacked by the SA. 
Goerdeler's politics were also conservative. Though he resigned his. 
membership of Hugenburg's German Nationalists (later Hitler's.brief 
partners in power) he retained basically conservative views. He was 
well-known outside Germany and was.the conspirator's choice to become 
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Chancellor in the eve~t of a successful coup in 1944. 
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We describe only three leading figures here. We sh~ll meet others 
later in this section. These three are good representatives of 
essential elements within the conspiracy: the Army Chief-of-Staffs, 
without whose active support a coup was unimaginable; the Abwher, who 
provided the organisational engine house of the conspiracy, and the 
resources needed to plan and.develop it; the civilian/political 
dimension important in foreign liaison and which would play a critical 
role in the new dispensati-on once Hitler had been removed. 
Their Intentions 
The intentions of those active in the conspiracy were very diverse, and 
changed over time. The conspiracy.brought together some very strange 
bedfellows~ Often its members were united more by negative than by 
positive goals. In the early activities a clear and overwelming 
objective was to prevent the outbreak of a war thought by the Army to 
be unwinnable. This objective involved a terrible "catch 22" 
situation: - for Beck to motivate h{s colleagues to act against Hitler 
he had to persuade them that a major war was the inevitable outcome of 
Hitler's actions. The pattern of appeasement practised by_ the West 
throughout the 1930's militated very strongly against this~ 
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Chamberlain's Munich agreement-in November was a fatal blow. Later 
the- objective became to end the war on an honourable basis. This 
objective was also trapped in irony: whilst Germany was militarily 
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triumphant it seemed irrelevant; when the tide turned the Allied 
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powers, perhaps understandably, wanted unconditional surrender. 
As the war developed a third type o"f objective emerged. This simply 
was to put an end to Hitler. This may be described as a moral rather 
than a strategic objective, well illustrated by Gener~! Franz Halder's 
contemplated, but never realised, attempts to mu~de~ Hitler himself by 
a single-handed and dramatic deed. Halder, who had succeeded Beck as 
Army Chief-of-Staff, carried a loaded pistol with him on several visits 
to Hitler in the Autumn of 1939 with the intention of shooting him. He 
repeated this behaviour in the summer of 1942, again without 
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consequence. This desire to destroy Hitler seems to have developed 
both out of a sense that he was the lynch pin whose removal would cause 
the Nazi State to fall (an almost certainly naive belief) as well as 
out of a slowly increasing abhorrence of the evil of his actions. The 
evidence of these actions abounded: from the open and brutal 
persecution of Nazi opponents in Germany during the 1930's, to the 
equally ruthless treatment of former allies (e.g. the SA) in the same 
decade, to the more secret (but still widely known within the Army)-
programmes of extermination, especially in captured territories such as 
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_Poland. Events during the Polish cam~aign in the first months of th~ 
:war revealed the bestiality of Nazi programmes in their·fullness. One 
of the persistent activites of the resistance was to gather information-
47 
and documentation o~ such activities. 
L_ 
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What of the conspiracy's political objectives? These seem particularly 
di~erse, ranging from Christian Socialism to conservative German 
Nationalism. They are probably mos·t usefully revealed_ 1.n the various 
cons~ituttons prepared by various oppcisition groupings in anticipation 
of a successful coup •. Of the many plans produced, three deserve 
mention here: 




that of Goerdeler; 
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that of the Kreisau Group led by von Moltke and Gerstenmaier. 
Whilst these three sets of proposals differ significantly, they also 
demonstrate some important common features: - all three sought both to 
undo and prevent a recurrence of the present Nazi abuse of power; 
equally, however, none of these three had any appetite for a return to 
the republican multi-party deciocracy of Weimar; - instead all three 
have elements of what might be termed "organic democracy 0 where power 
was to be exercised by classes (Standen) or interest groups, rather 
than by individuals organised into political parties. Partly this 
preference for organic rather than individualistic democracy indicated 
a fear of a repeat of the ideological civil war of Weimar, but also it 
reflected the romantic hankering for the "konfliktlose synthesis'' 
mentioned earlier; - this same hankering gave rise to the repeated 





The Actions of the Conspiracy 
How did the conspirators act? Their actions were of necessity clothed 
in secrecy and because of their ultimate failure, our knowledge of them 
remains highly fragmentary. However, the two major attempts at a 
planned seizure of power.are well-documented, as are some 6f the more 
individualistic assassination plots., It is these we shall briefly 
describe here. 
The 1938 Plan 
Once it became clear that Hitler was indeed intent on a military 
occupation of Czechoslovakia, and that this further act of aggression 
would eventually drive the West into a state of war with Germany, a war 
which in the long run Germany could not win, planning began in earnest 
51. 
for a military coup. The three major architects of the plan were: 
General Hans Oster, head of the Central D~partment of the Abwehr 
~nd one of Canaris' chief subordinates; 
Dr Hans Bernd Gisevius, a lawyer by training and former member of 
the Gestapo, but at this time a middle· order official in the 
Department of the Interior, which department controlled the 
police; 
Hjalmar Schachti .a previous president of the Reichsbank and orie 
time Minister of Finance in a Hitler Cabinet. 
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The plan had been commissioned by General Beck's successor as Army 
Chief-of-Staff, GENERAL HALDER. The moment war broke out General Von 
Witzleben, military commander of the.Berlin defence district, would 
take control of key government posts in Berlin, arresting Hitler and 
his leading functionaries in the process. Hitler was then to be tried; 
accused both of a series of criminal acts as documented in Von 
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Dohnanyi's "Chronicle of Shame" and of being mentally unfit to govern. 
The police in Berlin were involved in.the plot. Everything was 
prepared in the greatest detail: 
first, securing all the pol{ce stations in Berlin; 
then, occupying radio, telephone and telex communication posts; 
then, ~eizing the Chancellery and also key ministrie~. 
Plans were also fully developed for ensuring control of the provinces. 
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As Fest comments: 
"Thus everything was prepared, more thoroughly and with 
seemingly greater chances of success than ever again 
••• Halder had announced that the signal to strike 
would be given the moment Hitler issued the marching 
order against Czechoslovakia. Everyone was waiting." 
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· Then came Chamberlain·' s Munich conference _and the 'peaceful' resolution 
of the Czech question. This postponement of the inevitable struck a 
body blow to the conspiracy from which it was never fully to recover. 
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Walkure - July,1944 
From a year before the war began we move to within a year of its end 
and to a plot named Walkure. The four years between these. two .attempts 
were full of conspiratorial activity, including several failed 
assassination attempts. It was not until July 1944, however, that a 
plot on the scale of the 1938 attempt could be mounted. 
That such a comprehensive plan was mounted for a second time is 
testament to the persistence and courage of the military based 
opposition. The Abwehr was under fierce attack now. Heydrich, head of 
the Gestapo's intelligence organisation had long campaigned for the 
incorporation of Cariaris' Abwehr into his organisation and under his 
leadership. He had long believed the Abwehr to be a centre of. 
treacherous activity. In April 1943, the Gestapo arrested three key 
agents of both the Abwehr and the resistance, von Dohnanyi, Mueller and 
Bonhoeffer. This weakened a key centre of the resistance, but the 
planning continued. 
The July 1944 plan involved the assassination of Hitler. This was to 
be effected by Lt. Colrinel Claus von Stauffenberg and was to be 
followed by a coup. For the latter purposes units of the Home Guard 
were to be used. Support for the plan was carefully canvassed in Home 
Guard units, and well as other military' formations, throughout the 
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Reich and occupired territories. As in 1938 the preparations were 
thorough. An alternative government was prepared; media broadcasts 
were ready. 
Von Stauffenberg placed his bomb. Unlike several previous attempts, 
the bomb detonated. However, the conference which provided Von 
Stauffenberg with his opportunity was held in a barracks, rather than 
an underground bunker as had been planned. This dissipated the effects 
of the explosion. Hitler survived. 
This need not have caused the plot to fail. Von Stauffenberg left 
Hitler's east German headquarters, Rastenburg, convinced that he had 
succeeded. He gave the signal to ~erlin for Operation Walkute to 
begin. Incomprehensibly key figures in Berlin delayed. General 
Olbricht wanted confirmation that Hitler was actually dead. Two 
precious hours were lost. 
Even after Von Stauffenberg arrived back in Berlin, the coup could 
still have succeeded but the will to act failed key troop commanders. 
Once the news of Hitler's su~vival reached Berlin the coup dissolved. 
Now instead of the conspirators arresting the loyalists the reverse 
occurred. Order was quickly re-established and the search for the 
traitors commenced. This search was ended only by the victory of the 
Allied powers some nine months later. 
L_ _____ _ 
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The Assassination Attempts 
Though not on the same scale as the two major attempts to seize power, 
a number of serious attempts to end Hitler's life were undertaken by 
members of the resistance. 
We have already noted the intention of Heinz to kill Hitler during the 
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course of the 19j8 coup attempt. One year later, Dr Erich Kordt, a 
senior official in the Foreign Affairs Department was to detonate a 
bomb in Hitler's presence on 17th November 1939. This became 
impossible because of attempts three days earlier by George Elser to 
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kill Hitler in Munich. In 1940 Gerstenmaier and Schulenberg 
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attempted to assassinate Hitler in Paris. In February 1943, Von 
Tresckow placed a bomb in an aircraft carrying Hitler, which bomb 
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failed to-detonate. Later that same year Gersdorf attempted to kill 
Hitler with a bomb attached to his body at a military inspection. 
Hitler changed his schedule at the last moment and the attempt had to 
60 
be aborted. 
Consorting With The Enemy 
In addition to the actions described above, members o-f the conspiracy 
sought to warn if not assist Germariy's present or future enemies. 
Poland was warned of the date an~ place of its invasion, which warning 
was ignored. Similar warnings were given to Belgium and Holland. 
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Though less well documented, evidence does suggest that Canaris and his 
Why Did The Conspiracy Fail? 
In the end the conspirators failed to achieve any of their major goals. 
One reason which may be emphatically rejected is that its members 
lacked serious intent. Of an almost certainly incomplete list -0f 154 
persons who paid with their lives for their involvement in the 20th 
July 1944 coup attempt: 
. 2 are Field Marshalls (Von Witzleben and Rommel); 
13 are Generals; 
29 are Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels; 
9 are Majors .• 
These men clearly had serious intent, and paid the highest possible 
price. 
Others have argued that the conspiracy lacked popular support: that it 
was peopled by intellectual staff officers, and that it lacked men of· 
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action to convert its in.tentions ·into deeds. This contention is at 
best partially true. Both the many assassination attempts as well as 
the two major attempted coups confound this. argument. In the course of 
the "coup" plans, officers with direct troop commands were part of the 
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conspiracy, such as Von Witzleben and Von Hase. "Line" support existed 
throughout Germany as well as in the occupied territories. 
It is true that key figures were often disastrously indecisive: 
Beck before 1938; Halder in the pre-war months; Fromm and Ohlbricht 
in 1944. If some of the decisiveness demonstrated by the younger and 
more junior officers such as Von Stauffenberg, Schulenberg, Gersdorf 
and Von Tresckow had been matched by the.se key figures, events might 
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have unfolded quite differently. 
Other historians have noted how unlucky the conspirators were: from 
the quite unanticipated Munich detente, to changed schedules, changed 
venues and failed fuses, their actions appeared to be dogged by 
i 11-fortune. 
However, ~much more fundamental reason can be detected for their 
failure - and it lies in the area of both internal and international 
politics, or, to be more precise, in the interaction of these two 
areas·. 
"While throughout the European Resistance,.· national and 
moral duty coincided, in Germany, these norms clashed 
sharply and for a good many of tbose who opposed the 
regime the contradiction was insoluble." 64 
This clash of duties led to dilemmas of a most concrete kind. In 
planning revolt how did one act against Hitler without acting against 
Germany? The remov.al of an evil leader was one thing, an act of 
national suicide or capitulation another. 
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This leads us directly to the international arena. From 1938 onwards, 
senior members of the conspiracy sought an understanding with the 
Allied powers that if Hitler were to be removed then a "peace with 
honour" would be possible. Sadly such an understanding was never 
achieved. Though Allied reservations are understandable in the context 
of the military events of the time, the failure to establish any 
serious liaison with an opposition group of this strength and 
significance must rank as one of this war's greatest missed 
opportunities. It gives rise· to a series of "might have beens" that 
could have literally tranformed ~he face of the twentieth century. 
The critical years of lost opportunity were from 1~38 to 1941. During 
this time a "Catch 22" situation existed. The Allies appear to have 
resolved_ not to take the conspiracy seriously until they actually did 
something (i.e. removed Hitler). Yet without the prospect of an 
honourable accommodation with the Allies in a post-Hitler situation 
Hitler's removal beca-me at best a risky act and at worst some sort of 
act of absolution rather than a step towards_ a better politica_i order 
in Germany. 
Once the Soviet Union had been invaded and had joined the Allied Powers 
an "honourable accommodation" between non-Nazi Germany and the Allies 
became much more difficult for both the conspirat6rs and the Allies. 
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From the British and American point of view any contact between 
themselves and the Conspirators now raised the possible fear from their 
Soviet partners of a separate peace. In Germany, there was much 
greate~ enthusiasm ~or a settlement with the West than there was for 
any accommodation including the East. 
After the Allied conference in Casablanca in January 1943, where a 
policy of unconditional surrender was proclaimed, any hope of an 
honourable settlement vanished. That the resistance continued at all 
after this point bears eloquent testimony to the depth of courage of 
its members. Churchill and Roosevelt must, therefore, bear a measure 
of responsibility for the -failure of the German resistance, and thereby 
the prolongation of the war. 
3. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics 
A family of opportunity 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was born in 1906 intci a prominent Berlin family: 
Dietrich's father, Karl Bonhoeffer, was one of Germany's leading 
psychiatrists an6 the Director of a psychiatric hospital in Berlin; He 
had featured in the abort~ve 1938 coup attempt as the medical authority 
who was to find Hitler unfit to goverfi. His mother (Karl's wife) was a 
member of the illustrious von Hase family, and a cousin of General Paul 
von Hase who replaced von Witzleben in 1938 as the military commander 
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of Berlin. von Hase remained in this position until 1944, when he was 
centrally involved in the July attempted coup, and was executed 
thereafter. Of Dietrich's two brothers, Karl Friedrich was a professor 
of Physics, who was given the opportunity to leave Germany and work in 
the United States (at the same time as Dietrich left to go to the 
States in·l939). Both decided to return to Germany in July 1939 and 
shared the return boat trip. Klaus was the legal counsel of the German 
national airline and probably the member of the family with the 
earliest involvement in the resistance. He was an important member of 
the Wirmer, Bauer, van Halen and Harnack circle withiri the resistance. 
Surviving the collapse of the Abwehr in 1943, he was importantly 
involved in the July 1944 coup attempt, paying for this with his life. 
Dietrich's three sisters further extended the.opportunities for 
Dietrich to become involved in "Germany's destiny". Christine, the 
elder sister, married Hans von Dohnanyi, a lawyer employed first in 
the Ministry of the Interior, in which capacity he·became involved in 
the trial of Chief of the Army General Fritsch. Here Dohnanyi met 
Canaris and transferred to the Abwehr where he played a pivotal role 
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th~oughout the years of the resistance. He was arrested with 
Dietrich in 1943 and executed in April 1943. Sabine, Dietrich's.twin 
sister, married an academic lawyer, Gerhard Leibholz, whose combination 
of political activity and Jewish ancestry caused the couple to emigrate 
to Britain in 1938, where Leibholz took up a teaching post at Magdalen 
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College, Oxford and from which base he played a small, though not 
insignificant, role in the conspiracy's attempt to find Allied support. 
Finally, Susanne, Dietrich's younger sister, married theologian Walter 
Dress, who took over Martin Niemoller's Confessing Church in Dahelm, 
Berlin, after Niemoller's arrest and imprisonment. Ursula, the eldest 
sister, married Ruediger Schleicher, a lawyer employed in the Airforce 
legal department, who was also involved in the conspiracy. He was 
arrested after the failure of the July 1944 coup attempt and executed 
on 22nd April 1945. 
Thus this one ~amily lost two sons~ two sons-in-law and had a daughter 
emigrate. The breadth and depth of the Bonhoeffer family involvement 
in "Germany's destiny" is an essential context within whichDietrich 
Bonhoeffer's ethics and actions must.be viewed. 
Apprenticeship For Resistance 
.Tri the opportunities inherent in the Bonhoeffer family, Dietrich added 
valuable activities of his own. Most valuable in this context were his 
international Church contacts. These international contacts· began with 
the ti.me Bonhoeffer spent in America from September 1930 to July 1931, 
attending the Uni.on Theological Semi.nary in New York. This period 
produced some important American and European acquaintances: foremost 
amongst the American contacts was.the theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr. 
Two key European friendships struck a~ this time were with the Swiss 
Erwin Sutz and the Frenchman Jean Lassere. 
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The next important step was Bonhoeffer's election as one of three youth 
secretaries of the World Alliance of C~urches (predecessor to the World 
Council of Churches) at the Alliance's assembly held in Cambridge in 
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September 1931. This election was somewhat of a surprise to 
Bonhoeffer as well as to his colleagues. It placed him on the Council 
of the World Alliance, allowing him to attend important Alliance 
meetings in Geneva (several times) and at Fano, Denmark, in 1934. 
These activities provided the Conspiracy with it's most important 
conduit to the Allied Powers: Ge6rge Bell, the Bish6~ of Chichester. 
Bonhoeffer first met Bell at an Alliance meeting in Geneva in 1932. 
Their friendship and collaboration continued to the end - Bell 
preached at a memorial service held for Bonhoeffer in 1945. 
Bonhoeffer's links with Bell were strengthened thrciugh extensive 
contact during the period he spent in London as Pastor to two German 
communities in 1933/34. The_ third dimension of Bonhoeffer's 
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international contacts was his link with the Vatican. - Here he played a 
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much less important role, acting as a second fiddle to Joseph Mueller. 
Bonhoeffer The Spy 
When Bonhoeffer returned from his aborted second visit to America, he 
joined hi~ brother-in-law, Hans von Dohnanyi, in the employ of the 
Abwehr, or militaiy intelligence. He was employed as a V-Mann 
(Vertrauensmann) or age_nt. This move was known only to very few of his 
friends and cdlleagues. 
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Bonhoeffer's employment with the Abwehr served to prevent his 
conscription elsewhere and left him free to pursue some of his 
Confessing Church activities. More importantly however it was a clear 
and concrete ·act by means of which he became a member of the inner 
circle of the military conspiracy against Hitler. This decison was 
evident in both Bonhoeffer's actions and his writing. He gave the 
Hitler salute. He became critical of approaches of former friends and 
colleagues in the Confessing Church, criticising not only those who had 
made their peace with Hitler's regime, but also those committed to an· 
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"apocalyptic" form of opposition and protest. 
His active role in the conspiracy was a minor though not insignificant 
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one. Apart from his international liaison work Bonhoeffer's role 
withi~ the conspiracy was that of philosopher, visionary and dedicated 
optimist. He was significantly involved in. the planning which went on 
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within the conspiracy for the post-Hitler Germany. 
Bonhoeffer's employment in the Abwehr created the opportunity for 
several acts of mercy, such as helping Jews to flee Germany. It was 
just such an act of mercy - or the currency infringement it involved -
which occasioned his arrest in April 1943. Much more serious crimes 
were to cause his execution two years later - his active role l.n 
planning the Operation Walkure. 
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Bonhoeffer's Ethics 
Bonhoeffer's most important writing on ethics came in the last years of 
his life, from the time he entered the conspiracy in 1938 until -his 
execution in 1945. _The writings are in const~nt interaction with his 
action in the conspiracy. Bonhoe-ffer was a banned writer during the 
period, proscribed by law from publishing. When arrested much of his 
writing was seized, and has been lost. His prison writings are only 
paitially preserved. Once in prison his ability to reflect on his and 
his comrades' actions in the conspiracy was severely limited. The 
cross references between thought and action became highly obscure. The 
ethical model we have then is fragmentary ~nd incomplete. However, it 
is rich enough for our purposes here. 
Ethical Action In The Context Of History 
The first building block 1n Bonhoeffer's model is the essential unity 
~f ethics and action. 
"It is evident that the only appropriate conduct of men 
before God is doing his will." 72 
"The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all 
ethical reflection." 73 -
Yet for Bonhoeffer it is not knowledge he seeks but action His 
Christology demands a response, a deed. "The irreconcilable opposite 
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of action is judgemenL" Man, his actions and the ethical 
reflection tion which both precedes and flows f~ofu his actions, cannot 
-94-
be detached from this historical context within which he exists at any 
given moment in time. Bonhoeffer's insistence on seeing ethical choice 
(between different courses of action) in the context of an historical 
situation leads him to reject universalism, and thus Karitian, but also 
rationalist, ethics. II it is impossible to establish for all times 
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and places what is good ••• " 
This emphasis on ·historical context should not be mistaken for a form 
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of situational or relativist ethics. The difference between 
Bonhoeffer and other modernists is his commitment to a source.of 
ultimate value, set in his faith and his conception of God arid Jesus 
Christ. These absolute beliefs, such as his belief in the sanctity of 
life, do have to be realised in concrete ~ction. Nevertheless, they 
exist, and serve to differentiate him. from approaches such as those of 
the existentialists. This difference is well illustrated by his 
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discussion of the issues of euthanasia and suicide. 
Ethics In a World Come of Age 
If the key question is not "what is good, now and forever" but rather 
"what must I do here and today", this question arises from Bonhoeffer's 
understanding bf twentieth century man's contemporary world. The 
renaissance, the reformation and the consequent process of secularisa-
tion shattered the foundations of the "old ·world". 
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"The cult of reason, the deification of nature, faith in 
progress and a critical approach to civilization, the 
revolt of the bourgeoisie and the revolt of the masses, 
nationalism and anti-clericalism, the rights of man and 
dictatorial terror ·- all this together erupted chaotically 
as something new in.the Western World." 79 
And whilst these forces were recreating Western man's social reality: 
"Emancipated reason.acquired a mastery over creation and 
so led to the triumph of technical science. The age of 
technology is a genuine heritage of our Western History." 80 
The French revolution is the dawn of the modern era. It is also the 
origin of modern conflict: 
"Technology, mass movement and nationalism are the 
inheritance of the (French) revolution ••• yet at 
the same time (these three forces) are sharply 
opposed. The masses and nationalismare hostile 
to reason. Technology and the masses are hostile· 
to nationalism.. Nationalism and technology are 
hostile to the masses." 81 
And in the new articles of faith of this new era, the seeds of decay 
are already evident: 
"The emanicipation of the masses leads to the reign of 
terror of the guillotine. Nationalism leads inevitably 
to war~ The liberation of man as an absolute ideal leads 
only to mass self-destruction. At the end of the path 
which was first.trodden in the French Revolution there 
is nihilism." 82 
Notwithstanding these new conflicts and ironies Bonhoeffer welcomes 
this world com.e of age. He welcomes the liberation of reason, and the 
destruction of blind authority and unquestioned credos. He rejects, 




has come in its wake. The value of man remains. In a world come of 
age this value has to be won again each day and in every situation. It 
cannot be assumed, nor defended as a general principle. 
It is this context - the absence of universal, necessary, a priori or 
g1_ven structures of meaning - that requ1_res man to create his own 
meaning. It was in this context that Bonhoeffer spoke about man living 
before God in a world without God; of religionless Christianity and 
the non-religous interpretation of biblical concepts. Far from 
eiempting man from ethical responsibility ~ if God is dead, said 
Dostoievsky, everything is permitted - this world come of age creates a 
·situation where man must take responsibility not only for his actions 
but also for the ethical goals and values which his actions seek to 
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realise. 
The Limits Of Reason 
If Bonhoeffer rejoices in the world come of age, he also notes the 
limits of reason. We have already noted his criticism of relati~ist, 
utilitarian and situational ethics. The absence of pre-given moral 
codes does not exempt modern man from responsibility for choosing his 
own moral values. Bonhoeffer also notes the naivete of much-
rationalism: 




its under-estimation.of the role that power and interests play 
and its over-emphasis on rational analysis as a strategy for 
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achieving desired obje~tives; 
"One is distressed by the failure of reasonable people to 
perceive either the depths .of evil, and the depths of the holy. 
With the best intentions they believe that a little reason 
will suffice them to clamp together the parting timbers of 
the building. They are so blind in their desire to see justice 
done to both sides they are crushed between the two clashing 
forces and end by achieving nothing. Bitterly disappointed 
at the unreasonableness of the world, they see that their 
efforts must remain fruitless and they withdraw resignedly 
from the scene or yield unresisting to the stronger party." 86 
These failures often cause the rationalist to retreat fro~ concrete 
action into moral analysis: 
" the stubborn effortto prolong the discussion of the 
ethical beyond its proper time springs from an unsatisfied 
desire for an extension of influence on the part of those 
who possess effective opinions but who are themselves 
ineffectual in life ••• a moralisation of life arises 
from fear of the fullness of everyday life and from an 
awareness of incapacity for life;· it is a flight into 
a position from which one can only view life at .a 
distance with an eye which is at the sa~e time arrogant 
and ·envious." 87 
Responsible Action 
Without doubt Bonhoeffer's most important contribution to the ethical 
· debate is his concept of responsible action. This must be seen in the 
context of his rejection of the universal, in a world come of age, 
rejoicing in the emancipation ~f reason, but going beyond reason's 
limits. 
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"Since we are not concerned with the realization of an 
unrestricted principle, it is necessary in the given 
situation to observe, to weigh., to assess and to decide, 
always within the limitations of human knowledge 
in general. One must.risk looking into the immediate 
future, one must devote earnest thought to the 
consequences of one's actions; and one must endeavour 
to examine one's own motives and one's own heart. 
One's task is .not to turn the world upside down, 
but to do what is necessary at the given place and 
with a due consideration of reality.. At the same time 
one must ask what .are the actual possibilities; it is 
not always feasible to take the final step at once. 
Responsible action must try not to be blind." 88 
Whilsi the responsible actor is required to look to the likely 
consequences of his action he·is not called upon to play God in th~ 
sense of delivering up a "final judgement" on the mo~al worth of his 
own or other's actions. 
"When the deed is performed with a responsible weighing 
up of all the personal and objective circumstances ••• 
then the deed is. delivered up solely to God at the 
moment of its performance. Ultimate ignorance of one's 
own good and evil, and with it a complete reliance on 
grace, is an essential property of responsible 
historical action." 89 
This limitation to responsibility (as to final consequences) is matched 
by a limitation as to one's own role and opportunity. That is it takes 
the responsibility of the other seriously. The question to be asked is 
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what should I do, not what should he do, or what should we all do. 
Responsible action involves an acceptance of guilt for the evil which 
exists in society. 
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"If any man tries to escape guilt in responsibility, he 
detaches himself from the ultimate reality of human 
existence and what is more he cuts himself off from 
the redeeming mystery of Christ's bearing guilt without 
sin, and he has no share in the divine j~stif{cation 
which lies upon this event. He sets his own personal 
innocence above his responsibility for men, ••• he is 
also blind to the fact that real innocence shows itself 
in a man's entering into the fellowship of guilt for the· 
sake of other men." 91 
Responsible action can find no guide in general principies or moral 
codes: 
''It has not to decide. simply between right and wrong, and 
between good and evil, but between right and right and 
wrong and wrong." 92 
Responsible action implies tension between obedience (or duty) on the 
one hand and freedom on the other: 
"To make obedience independent of freed.om leads only to 
the Kantian ethic of duty, and to make freedom independent 
of obedience leads only to the ethic of irresponsible 
genius." 93 
Bonho~ffer's Model 
Step One: Ethics Ls About Action 
Ethics is about how we act in the world not how we discuss, analyse or 
judge ourselves, others or our world. 
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Step Two: No Ready.Made Moral· Codes 
In concert to his twentieth century contemporaries de Beauvoir and 
Camus, Bonhoeffer rejects a deontological or universal approach to 
ethics, in which concrete choices are matched against a moral code. 
The values which must underlie a choice between morally significant 
alternative courses of action must be themselves chosen by the 
individual actor, who mu~t take full responsibility for this choice. 
Step Three: Emancipated Man In A World Come Of Age. 
By extension (and again 1.n concert with de Beauvoir and Camus) 
twentieth century man· is emancipated from previous external structures 
of moral authority such as the Church, the State,.Nationality and 
conc.epts such as human nature. He lives in a world where intellect, 
the individual, reason and free choice have come of age. His 
responsibility to choose and to act cannot be rendered up to other 
institutions or forces in his world. 
Step Four: Beyond Reason 
Whilst reason and logic are important elements of modern man's world, 
and whilst they must form a part of his response to the world as he 
finds it, power, reality, evil are elements of at least equal weight. 
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Step Five: Neither Simply Motives Nor Consequences 
"The question o~ good must not be reduced to an examination 
of the motives or consequences by applying to them some 
ready-made ethical yardstick· •• ~ just as the question of· 
motivation of action is in the end lost in inextricable 
complexities .of the past, so, too does the question of 
its consequences finally disappear from view in the mists 
of the future." 94 
Step Six: Accepting Guilt 
Because ethics is as much about acting as about judging a sense of 
personal innocence cannot be placed above an opportunity to act. 
Step Seven: Combining Freedom And Duty 
Ethical action results from the holding in tension of the sense of "I 
must" and "I choose to". 
Step Eight: Acting Responsibly 
One must be ready to act in a way which demonstrates a careful concern 
for the foreseeable consequences of one'.s action. This arises from 
weighing of alternative courses, an acceptance of half measures, 
compromise and guilt by association - though within the limits, of 
95 
personal integrity~ and accepting responsiblity for one's own 
actions, whilst not playing God. 
Finally, some of the characteristics of ethically responsible action as 
drawn from both Bbnhoeffer'.s writings and actions are: 
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- the ethically responsible actor retains his sense of humour and 
96 
hi~ ability to laugh at the world and for the world; 
he does not lose his common humanity in the emotions of contempt 
97 
or hatred; 
he never loses his faith either in the ultimate triumph of the 
98 
good, nor in God at work in history; 
99 
he is an optimist; 
though loving life, yet death can "no longer take him by 
100 
surprise"; 
also;: though of necessity a witness to evil, an actor in ambiguous 
situations, made cynical "through many unbearable conflicts," he 
never loses his belief in himself as an instrument of God's will 
101 
and purpose. He believes that he can still be ~sed. 
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SECTION T W 0 
LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LIBERAL THOUGHT AND ACTION SINCE 1948: AN OVERVIEW 
"The coming of the English ••• opened the door peculiarly wide 
to the men of the Emancipation movement, the London Missionary 
Society ••• " 
C.W. de Kiewet 
"As Smuts was chiefly responsible for making the Constitution, 
he must bear a proportionate share of the blame for planning 
an omnipotent Parliament in the hands of the reactionary 
forces who found it a perfect instrument for their purpose." 
Bernard Friedman 
"The founders of the Liberal Party were without an adequate 
appreciation of the part that political power plays in 
politics." 
Patrick Duncan 
"I fear that, like many liberals in many countries, we 
were over-optimistic about the reasonableness of our 
fellow men." 
Edgar Brookes 
"The problem facing us is not only what the best 'solution' 
may be in theoretical terms, but also bow the transition 
from the present political situations with its special 




This chapter constitutes the first of three attempts to examine liberal 
ethics in the light of the ethical models developed in the first section. 
Here this is attempted by means of a literature survey of liberal thought 
and action from .the (Afrikaner) Nationalist victory in 1948. 
Whilst liberal literature is extensive during this period, literature of an 
analytical nature is limited. The works of Robertson and Rich have been 
particularly helpful. Both of these authors, however, concentrate more 
heavily on earlier periods, as opposed to the last three decades which are 
this writer's concern. 
Beyond the works of the. above, a reasonably extensive literature has been 
consulted. Biographical and autobiographical material has been 
particularly helpful. 
1. Liberalism's Origins In South Africa 
l The role of liberalism in South Africa has been shaped by this 
country's colonial history. 
For the first 150 years of colonial occupation, South Africa (or the 
Cape, more accurately) was ruled as a chartered company. It was 
neither a state, nor a colony. Conflicts about power, rights and 
duties were defined in the context, at first, of the Company versus its 
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servants, and later the company versus the relatively small group of 
free farmers. 
The Nap_oleonic conquest of Holland and the creation of the Batavian 
1 
Republic brought important constitutional and legal changes. However, 
2 
the rule of the Batavian Administrators at the Cape was very short. 
When the British assumed control of the Cape in 1806, the ideology of 
their government was characterised more by imperialism than liberalism. 
How~ver, an important consequence of British control was the 
counnencement in earnest of British evangelical and missionary activity. 
It was through this that liberal philosophies where brought most 
·.forcefully and effecti~ely onto these shores. 
The link between Judeo-Christian ethics, particularly in their post 
reformation understandihg, .and liberal political philosophy is well 
documented in societies outside South Africa. Calvin's Geneva was in 
many important respects a liberal state. Protestant ethics· were 
strongly represented in both the American revolution as well as the 
subsequent political development of that country. In Europe Spinoza, a 
philosophical contemporary of Locke, based his demand for government by 
consent of the governed as his understanding and exegesis of scripture, 




The activities pa~ticularly of the English missionaries were an 
important bridge between the revolutionary/reactionary, liberal/ 
conservative political turmoil of the metropole, and the colonies. The 
British administration strongly promoted the activities of the-
missionaries. These intrepid_explorers brought enlightened 
philosophies to the Cape shores. Central to these riew philosophies was 
the concept of fundamental equality of all men, irrespective of race or 
4 
"level of civilisation:." It is most difficult to deny the common 
humanity (and essential equality) of the objects of your own missionary 
endeavours. The difficulty is currently manifesting itself in the 
missionary offspring of the Dutch Reformed.Church. 
Of course, the fundamental equality of black and white inhabitants 
proclaimed by these liberal missionaries created a reaction amongst a 
part of the white settler society, and is normally cited as one of the 
key causes of the Great Trek, leading to the creation of the two 
Afrikaner Republics. _The debate· and struggle between the British-
controlled colonies and the Afrikaner republics culminated in the 
National Con~ention and a Constitution for the new Union of South 
Africa~ combining all four territories in a new central authority. 
In a sense, this was a debate between liberalism and a form of 
feudalism; between a political philosophy which acknowledged the 
fundamental equality of all the territories' inhabitant~ under law and 
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policies whose very ~oundations were vested on the principle of no 
equality in church or state. It was a struggle between universalism 
5 
and exclusivism. 
The struggle took its most concrete form 1n the debate about the nature 
of the franchise for this South Africa. Cape liberals argued for the 
extension of the non-racial, qualified franchise that had been a 
feature of that territory since the creation of representative 
government in 1856. Against this, the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
argued for a franchise limited to whites. Natal stood somewhere 
. between these poles. The result was compromise which had historic 
consequences. In essence, the territories agreed to differ: the Cape 
was to retain its inclusive franchise while in the Transvaal and Free 
State retained their whites-only voters rolls, with Natal operating a 
franchise which ·was de jure non-racial, but de facto exclusivist. 
Clearly this compromise between two radically different approaches to 
citizenship and government caused concern amongst some at the 
convention. The -constitution which emerged had only two entrenched 
clauses: one guaranteed equality 6f treatment for South Africa's two 
official langua~es - English and Dutch; the bther guaranteed the 
6 
retention of the "Cape Franchise". 
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Friedman in his critical biogra~hy of Jan Smuts has noted that Smuts, 
by failing to resolve this conflict at this time, comp~omised both the 
nation and himself in a way which was to haunt both. The compromise 
was also to characterise his long and illustrious subsequent career. 
He had failed to face up to the single most important issue of his 
7 
time. 
So the liberal political heritage became enshrined in the conundrums of 
race. Locke had argued that the labouring classes were not capable _of 
rational thought, and, therefore, could not be part of responsible 
government. Those political liberals, like Merriman, wh-o took the Cape 
into the Union would have had to argue in the same way about ail who 
were not white_ (outside the Cape) in South Africa. 
2. Liberalism and Power in the Thirties and For~ies 
South Africa has never had a liberal government no~ a liberal Prime 
Minister. The closest it-has come to liberal leadership is the period 
during which Jan Hofmeyr was either deputy or Acting Prime Minister. 
This extraordinary man who matriculated at the age of 12, held a 
variety of high offices normally at astonishingly young ages. At the 
age of 22, he became a professor, at 25 the Principal of what was soon -
to become the University of the Witwatersrand. At the age of 30, he 
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was made the Administrator of the Transvaal. He went to parliament at 
the age of 35, and soon became one of Smut's key advisors in the 
negotiations which led to the creation of the United Party in 1933 out 
8 
of the previous National and South African parties~ 
Hertzog (leader of the new party) made Hofmeyr Minister of Education, 
the Interior and Public Health. In 1936, the portfolios of Mines and 
Labour replaced that of the Interior. 
Despite Hofmeyr' s increasing liberalism which clearly conflicted with 
the broad direction of the Government, Hertzog kept Hofmeyer in the 
Cabinet. _In 1938, Hofmeyr left of his own accord, in protest at the 
appointment of A.P.J. Fourie ~s a Senator for Native Affairs. In 1939) 
he resigned from the United Party caucus in protest against the 
Asiatics (Transvaal Land and Trading) Bill. (The so-called 'Pegging 
Act'). 
World War Two split the government and parliament, and led to Smuts 
taking over the reigns of power. Hofmeyr returned to the United Party 
ranks and to the ~abinet, being appointed Minister of Finance and 
Education. 
When Smuts was out of the country, which as a member of the British war 
cabinet and Allied High Command was more often than not, he generally 
~--~-------~ -----------------~ -- ------ -
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appointed Hofmeyr .as Acting Prime Minister. This acting capacity was 
confirmed in 1948 when he was officially created Deputy Prime Minister. 
That Hofmeyr was a liberal is beyond debate. His own views, and the 
9 
judgements of both his friends and enemies confirm this. Hofmeyr's 
position of power often brought him into conflict with his liberal 
convictions, as well as those of his liberal fellows. The "crises of 
conscience" which took Hofmeyr out. of the Cabinet, and then out of the 
cauctis of his party have already been mentioned. Many other conflicts 
had to be confronted. 
When the African Mine Workers Union struck in 1947, Hofmeyr had to turn 
down·the plea of the Anglican Synod (amongst others) that they should 
be recognised and negotiated with, though his own views would almost 
10 
certainly have endorsed this action. 
When, in September of the same year, the police raided the office~ of 
the Communist Party, the Congresses and t.he South Africa Legion, 
Hofmeyr said he was taken by surprise. When challenged by his liberal 
colleague, Leo Marquard~ to get out of the United Party, and lead a 
true liberal movement he prevaricated, indicating he could do more from 
11 
within the party in power. 
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Perhaps the most telling conflict of all came when Hofmeyr had to 
respond on behalf of the Smuts government to a resolution of the Native 
Representative Council calling for the immediate repeal of all 
discriminatory legislation. This Council had been created as a vehicle 
for the articulation of black aspirations when in 1936 blacks 
(Africans) were removed from the common roll franchise in the Gape and 
Natal. It was peopled by a prestigous group of intellectuals: 
Z.K. Matthews, Thema, Moroka. 
Hofmeyrrs negative, albeit apologetic, response led to the tollapse of 
the council. As Paton comments, "How could one be simultaneously both 
12 
gov.ernor and crusader." 
Increasingly; the very vehicle for Hofmeyer's irifluence, the United 
Party Government beca~e at odds with his deepl~ held liberal values. 
His role as Smut's selt-appointed successor made the situation worse. 
"In my owri mind, there is a growing unsettlement. 
It would be difficult for me, if Smuts were to fall away, 
to lead the United Party, without either doing violence 
to my conscience or '.taking a· line which would split the 
party." 13 
Hofmeyr consulted two close friends and advisors, John Cope and 
Edgar Brookes to whether it was better to compromise his conscience and 
save the party or the reverse. Cope counselled against compromise 
arguing in Paton's wcirds again, that: 
"the danger of a Nationalist accession was not as great 
as to justify a compromise, in any case, if. the 
Nationalists wer·e destined to get in the sooner the 
prospect was faced, the better," 14 
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Brookes took the opposite view. The Nationalist victory in the 1948 
election, and Hofmeyr's death (preceding that of Smut's) rendered the 
dilemma academic. Thus South Africa lost her most powerful liberal 
15 
politician. 
3. The Decade of Struggle: The Fifties 
Smut's defeat took the nation (and the world) by surprise. It even 
surprised his successor. Yet the warning signals were there, and many 
have argued that Smuts was immensely inept in not seeing these and 
16 
taking action to counter them. 
Friedman has argued that Smuts "had committeed the unpardonable sin 
power was -within his grasp, but.he let it slip through his fingers." 
Smuts had failed to de-load rural constituencies, thus allowing his 
opponent to win a plurality of seats· although· Smuts obtained ten per 
cent more of the popular vote, indeed achieving an outright majority. 
Friedman argues further that Smuts' failure to take the Nationalist 
17 
campaign on race seriously, as was indicated by his failure to produce 
a clear and unambiguous "race policy" as an alternative to Apartheid, 
compounded his demise. His failure to reach even a transitory 
accorrnnodation with the immensely moderate black leadership of his day 




Others have suggested that both b~fore and after the election Smuts 
could have struck an alliance with Havenga's Afrikaner Party which in 
18 
fact held the balance of power. But Smuts would not contemplate 
this, just as Hofmeyr would not contemplate taking electoral 
19 
considerations into account in the formulation of his 1948 budget. 
Thus the fragile access to power liberals had in the Thirties and 
Forties disappeared - and the decade of struggle cqmmenced. 
Nationalist Action 
The Nationalists commenced their rule with a type of legislative. 
blitzkrieg. Indeed, seldom can a new government have moved so quickly 
to transform so many areas of society so fundamentally. 
Being people who understood power well, they began with the political: 
In 1948 (the year they came to office), they repealed legislation 
passed but not yet promulgated, which provided for communal 
representation for Indian South Africans in Parliament; 
In 1950 they turned to the question of the coloured Franchise. 
Significant numbers of coloureds enjoyed a common role franchise 
with whites in the Cape Province, with much smaller numbers 1n 
Natal. Given the precarious hold on power enjoyed by the 
Nationalists and the small chance of the coloured.s supporting 
them, these voters had to be removed. Thus connnenced a 
constitutional crisis which was to last until 1956. 
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In the first move, the Nationalists simply introduced and passed 
through Parliament by a simple majority legislation stripping Cape 
and Natal coloureds of their conunon roll representation and 
providing instead some conununal (separate roll) representation as 
well as a separate "coloured" council. This was struck down by 
the Supreme Court as conflicting with the 1910 Union Constitution 
which had provided that the coloured franchise could only be 
changed by a two-thirds majority of Pa~liament. 
Undeterred, in 1952, Malan, the Nationalist Premier, introduc~d 
the High Court of Parliament Act which, in essence, enabled 
Parliament to overr~le the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Constitution. This too was opposed by the Court, and the 
government backed down. 
If the courts were displaying a valiant devotion to constitutional , 
process, however, the electorate was unmoved. In the General 
Election of 1953, the 1948 margin whereby the governing parties 
enjoyed a mere eight seat margin over their opponents, widened to 
thirty three seats. 
Malan, however, still did.not have the two-thirds majority he 
needed to disenfranchise the coloured voter~. In 1954, Malan 
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retired and was replaced by an even more dogmatic racial 
separatist - Strijdom. In 1955, legislation was introduced to 
increase the size of the Senate from the forty eight members it 
~resently com~rised to eighty nine - the exact number ne~ded to 
give the government its two-thirds majority. This time the courts 
lost their courage and in 1956 ruled that this device ~as 
constitutional. The common voters role thus became purely white. 
Africans had communal (separate roll) representation. The 
Nationalists moved more slowly, and initial!~ in a different way, 
against the communal representatives of Africans in both the House 
of Assembly and the Senate.. After the NP contested the 1948 
elections for the African Representatives and was roundly 
defeated, legislation was introduced in 1950 providing fo~ the 
Suppression of Conmninism Act.· Amongst other provisions (including 
90 days detention without trial) this legislation prohibited 
Communists as listed under this Act from taking seats in 
Parliament. The first person to fall foul of this provision was 
Mr Sam Kahn, a prominent member of the now proscribed South 
African Communist Party, who was elected by the African voters of 
the Transkei. His membership of Parliament was terminated in this 
way in 1952. Brian Bunting and the trade union leader, 
Ray Alexander, were to fall foul of the same provisions. An 
ironic situation was created in which African voters .kept electing 
(white) representatives whom the Government and Parliament refused 
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to accept. African representation was finally abolished 
altogether in 1960. (The Native Representative Council was 
abolished in 1950). 
However, Nationalist segregationist activity was in noway limited to 
the political sphere: 
In 1948, they ordered the segregation of trains in the Western 
Cape,· the only area in which coloured/white mixing was possible; 
In 1950, the Population Registration Act classified every South 
African into one of four race groups, splitting families and in 
the process attaching a dogmatic significance to race last seen in 
. the legislation of Nazi Germany; 
In that same year, another cornerstone of Apartheid, the Group 
Areas Act, which zoned land by race, was put on the Statute Book; 
In 1953, the Government rejected the findings of its own com-
mission of enquiry into trade union rights for blacks, and .created 
21 
instead, works .connnittees. 
In 1954, the Government took control of black education, removing 
this from the hands of the Churches and the Provinces, and 
imposing an education which would prepare blacks for their. proper 
station in South African society, in the form of Bantu Education; 
In 1956, the Government extended the pass system to black women; 
In the same year, it prohibited mixed trade unions and introduced 
statutory job reservation outside the mining industry; 
In 1958, against a background of tremendous black and liberal 
resistance to the measures described above, the Nationalists 
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increased their governing majority in the general election of that 
year from thirty three to fifty; 
Finally, in 1959 the Government enacted l~gislation to close the 
English-speaking universities to students who were not white. 
This is by no means a complete catalogue of Nationalist actions 
during the Fifties aimed at producing an all-white South African 
reality, but it is indicative of the breadth and scope of their 
activities. 
Black Response? 
Black reaction was c~-ordinated throughout the Fifties by the African 
National Congress (ANC). In 1949, the Congress, under its newly 
elected President..:.General, Dr James Moroka, formulated its Progrannne 
of Action. This programme demanded fundamental change, laying 
particular emphasis on the franchise. It also addressed itself to new 
methods: "Representations were done with. Demonstrations on a 
country-wide scale, strike action and civil disobedience were to· 
22 
replace words", as Luthuli put it. 
On 26th June 1950 a one-day stayaway was stag~d to oppose the 
Group Areas and Suppression of Communism Bills. 
In May 1951 a strike protested the proposed re~oval of coloureds 
from the common roll. 
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However, the major Defiance Campaign was launched in June 1952. 
This campaign was planned and executed jointly by both the African 
and Indian Congresses. This involved the deliberate breaking of 
Apartheid laws by Congress supporters, who intended to be arrested 
and go to jail. The campaign was initially very successful. 
Thousands of blacks, Indians, coloureds and· a ha·ndful of whites 
23 
went to jail However, in late October of that year a riot 
broke out in Port Elizabeth after a white policeman had fired 
shots in trying to arrest two alleged thieves. This was followed 
by riots in Johannesburg, Kimberley and East London. Thes~ riots 
broke the back of the Defiance Campaign. In Luthuli's view the 
24 
government was involved in their instigation. 
Government reaction to the Defiance Campaign was to strengthen 
public order legislation enabling them to outlaw m~etings, marches 
and demonstrations and to take administrative actions against the 
leaders of the campaign. So ANC leaders such as Dr Njongwe and a 
little later Luthuli himself were isstied with b~nning orders 
controlling both their movement and activities. 
·In 1953 the Congress of Democrats was formed, uniting the ANC with 
the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured 
People's Party and the Congress of Trade Unions. This body 
planned and executed the Congress of the People which took place 
in Sophiatown in 1955 and they adopted the Freedom Charter, a 
document of continuing political significance. 
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In August 1956 some twenty thousand women - the majority of whom 
were black - marched on the Union Buildings in Pretoria to protest 
25 
the extension of the pass system to black women; 
Again the Government responded, arresting fifty six South Africans· 
of all races and ch.arging them with High Treason. All were · 
acquitted aft~r a trial lasting several years; 
In 1957, the.Ale~andra Bus Boycott began, lasted several months, 
and resulted in a victory for the boycotters; 
In 1958 resistance campaigns amongst African women continued; 
In 1959 both the ANC and its breakaway Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) pla~ned resistance campaigns. 
Liberal Dilemmas 
It was against this avalanche of Afrikaner Nationalist action and 
(broadly speaking) African nationalist reaction that liberals had to 
chart.their course. 
Parliamentary Politics 
Inside the United Party, the liberal cause was not prospering. Jan 
Hofmeyr, was removed by his early death in 1948. The party staggered 
from defeat to defeat. Smuts died in 1950 and in a sense the party 
died with him. Neither of his su~cessors, Strauss or Graaf, succeeded 
in re-establishing the national mandate Smuts had enjoyed for -so long. 
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But it was not only leadership that the party lacked: it also lacked 
policies on the critical issues of the day. 
The United Party was born out of the unification of Hertzog's National 
Party and ·the original South African Party of Botha and Smuts. These 
parties united essentially.around the issues of English/Afrikaans 
relations as ~ell as an uneasy compromise (broken by the war) on South 
Africa's relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth. The victory 
of the Nationalists in 1948 had brought the issue of black/white 
relations to the fore. The United Party had no clear answer to the 
Apartheid slo~ans and the Apartheid policies which dominated the 
Fifties. Separa-tion, separation and more separation was what the 
Nationalists wanted. What did the United Party want? The Fifties did 
bring a new cadre of young able politicians who strengthened the 
liberal wing of the party. The 195.3 election saw Helen Suzmari., Zach de 
Beer; Be-rnard Friedman, Ray Swart enter parliament. They were joined 
by Colin Eglin in 1958. 
This liberal wing came into increasing c~nfict with two groups of 
conservatives: firstly the "bloedsappe", mainly Afrikaans-speaking· 
supporters drawn from rural areas in the Cape, Transvaal and Free State 
and dedicated to the increasingly forlorn task of reconquering these 
areas for Smut's old party; secondly the Natal English. This second 
group had a long history of maverick conservative behaviour. 
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It was a clash particularly with this second group which led thirteen 
members of the United Party caucus to resign from the party and form 
the Progressive Party under the leadership of Jan Steytler in 1959~ 
Their fate will be discussed in the next section. 
Extra-Parliamentary Politics: The Liberal Party 
The Liberal Party was formed in May 1953 in the face of the 
Nationalist's second successive General Election triumph. The Party, 
whos_e first leader, the Native Representative in Parliament for the 
Eastern Cape Constituency, Margaret Ballinger, was committed to a 
non-racial franchise on a common roll and the abolition of the colour 
26 
bar iri all areas of society. The party_was never to wiri a white 
Parliamentary seat though it was able to claim the allegiance of four 
27 
Native R~presentatives in Parliament. 
From its beginnings, it was plagued with the tensions of white 
electoral politics on the one hand and the demands of South Africa's 
28 
larger .society on the other. This tension caused the Party's first 
leader to remark much later that: 
"Indeed, early in the history of the Party, the passion 
for justice which inspired it carried it a good deal 
further than even many of its first members were 
prepared to go ••• and many of the more conservative 
liberals came to-feel that there was still more to be 
done for their cause by working outside the Party, 
and even inside the offical Opposition" 29-
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Patrick Duncan, who was to join the Party two years later and to become 
one of its most prominent members commented in the. year of its creation 
that its founders were ''without an adequ~te appreciation of the part 
30 
that political power plays in politics." 
If the Liberal Party suffered repeated rejection at the hands of the 
white electorate, its relations with the Congress of Democrats, the 
non-racial alliance of the ANC, SAIC and white "Democrats" was also 
conflict-ridden. The Party refused to attend the 1955 Congress of the 
People, inter alia, because·of the role of white Communists in 
organising the Congress. As a Party committed .to participating in the 
parliamentary process, it could not endorse the Defiance and Re~istance 
campaigns, although its sympathies were clearly with these, and 
although some of its prominent me~bers, such as ~atrick Duncan, 
participated in them. 
It was a multi-racial party, but the tension between the two target 
audiences, white and black, seemed to give pre-eminence to neither. 
The Torch Commando 
Another extra-parliamentary movement active in the liberal cause in the 
1950's was the Torch Commando. This movement, founded essentially from 
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within the ranks of the United Party by one of World War II's most 
successful and famous fighter pilots, Sailor Malan was dedicated to the 
defence of the Constitution and particularly the C6loured Franchise. 
When the Nationalists succeeded in removing the coloureds from the 
Common Roll the organisation died. 
The Black Sash 
An organisation started for the same purpose but with a longer life was 
the Defence of the Constitution League, founded almost accidentally in 
1958. This remarkable organisation of white women succeeded in 
collecting almost 100 000 signatures in opposition to the "packed 
senate" legislation. (See Rogers 1956 for an account of this). The 
failure of this petition to stop the removal bf the ~oloured Franchise 
did not deter the organisation, though towards the end of the decade 
its support had begun to dwindle. 
4. In The Wilderness: The Sixties 
Sharpeville and the Republic 
The Sixties o~ened with a series of dramatic events. Firstly, the Pan 
Africanist Congress led by Robert Sobukwe announced a "progranune of 
positive action" aimed at the Pass laws, which was to commence on 21st 
March 1960. On that day, a large but unarmed and apparently friendly 
crowd of onlookers convened outside the Sharpeville Police Station near 
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Vereeniging. The crowd had gathered to watch a very small group of 
PAC supporters present themselves to the police without their passes, 
demanding to be arrested. 
Shortly after midday, the police fired into the crowd (apparently in· 
panic - no order was given to shoot); Sixty nine peopl~ were killed 
and eighty injured. This incident more or less ended the campaign in 
the Transvaal. In January, there was violence in the Cato Manor 
township outside Durban. The unrest continued in March in the black 
townships of Nyanga and Langa. 
The State's response was swift and predictable. On 28th March, 
legislation was introduced in Parliament making both the ANG and the 
PAC illegal.organisations. On 30th ~arch, a state of emergency was 
proclaimed, which was to be lifted some six months later. 
The second dramatic event occurred on 20th January when Str.ijdom' s · 
succ~ssor, ~.F. Verwoerd, announced a referendum to test the now 
all-white voters roll as to whether the nation wished to become a 
Republic •. The referendum occurred on 5th October and produced a modest 
majority for a Republic (52,82 per cent in favour to 47,9 per cent 
against). The results emphasised the strong regionality of South 
African politics. The pro-Republic vote enjoyed· strong majorities in 
the provinces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State~ a narrow 
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majority in the Cape, and was roundly defeated in Natal. 
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Although Verwoerd had fought the referendum on the basis that the South 
African republic would remain in the British Corrimonweaith, this proved 
to be an impossibility. In the face of demands from the newly 
independent former British colonies (many themselves Republics) 
supported by Canada, that South Africa would either have to renounce 
Apartheid or lose her Commonwealth statu-s, Verwoerd chose the latter. 
This was probably a relief-for Verwoerd and certainly pleased many of 
his supporters, as his reception on his return to South Africa 
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indicated. 
Likewise the judgement of the electorate was equally positi~e as the 
results of the October 1961 election indicated._ This was the fir.st 
early elec~i6n called by th~ Nationalists - a phenomenon which was to 
become the pattern in later years - ~ sign of a party confident in 
power. 
The Liberal Response 
How did the liberals respond to these dram~tic events? In a sense, 
Sharpeville and the Referendum well symbolise a dilerrnna which has 
constantly confrodted liberalism in South Africa. As we have noted 
earlier during the Fifties, black organisations turned their backs on 
the politics of petitions and deputations. Freedom would be won only 
.iby more courageous and dramatic action-. In the late Fifties and early 
\.\)sixties, this took the form of Ghandi-like passive or non-violent 
\ -
resistance - the orderly and non-violent defiance of the law. 
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This defiance posed liberals with a major dilemma. Their credo 
inclined them to support an acknowledgement of the law - even where 
they believed the laws concerned to be unjust. The fact that campaigns 
which commenced non-violently often ended in bloodshed also produced a 
liberal "distance" - a sympathy in principle, but a disapproval of the 
apparent consequences. 
Equally difficult was the fact that if one was to support the 
Africanist organisations, one would have to make common purpose with 
uncomfortable allies. The main divide was between the ANC and its 
allied organisations such as the Congress of Democrats (or Chartists 
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as they became known) and the PAC (or Africanists). The Chartists 
appeared to many liberals to be heavily influenced by members of the 
former South African Communist Party. This was (and still is) a 
strongly Moscow-oriented Party with its own agenda of objectives. The 
Pan-Africanists on the other hand had split from the ANC to get away 
from white influence as much as from Communist influence. Many 
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liberals.perceived Sobukwe's PAC as black racist. This split made 
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the choice of allies difficult. The referendum was, in its turn, an 
almost exclusively white affair. Black organisations showed an 
indifference to the relationship between South Africa and Britain. 
They had learnt through bitter experience from 1910 onwards that appeal 
to the British Crown and Parliament had little effect. It was, 
however, an issue of major concern for the ~hite e.lectorate. To the 
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extent that liberals shared "this concern, they found themselves playing 
second fiddle to the main white opposition party, the United Party, in 
the campaign to oppose the Republic. 
Liberals had to accept these two political approaches being comfortable 
with neither. Patrick Duncan, the National Organiser of the Liberal 
Party was to play an important, some would say vital, ·role in 
"managing" police and protester relations in the two marches undertaken 
by blacks in Cape Town in 1960. Duncan did this much more as an 
individual than a~ a representative of the Liberal Party, at least 
nationally. Furthermore, it can be argu~d that his more or less 
explicit association with the PAC cost him dearly in his (admittedly 
sporadic) attempts to win white support for himself and for the Liberal 
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Party. 
If the liberal relations with black& remained uneasy, their relations 
with the white community remained characterised by rejection. This was 
evidenced by the fate of the newly-formed Progressive Party i_n the 
October 1961 General Election. 
This -Party was born with considerable promise. After all, its ranks 
included eleven members of the United Party caucus, including the 
leader of the United Party in the Cape Province, Jan Steytler. It won 
the support of the United Party's major financial backer and key 
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industrialist, Harry Oppenheimer, as well as the support of Smut's 
former Minister of Justice, Harry Lawrence. It also enjoyed 
considerable support from the English-language press. 
However, the judgement of the electorate was negative. In the 1961 
election, all but one of the eleven Prog MP's lost their seats. Whilst 
it is true that many of the defeats were by narrow margins (as was its 
one success), and that the Party mustered a very re~pectable 69 000 
votes (in comparison to.the Liberal total of 2 945 and the UP total of 
302 875),_ the results were nonetheless disastrous. Many of the 
brightest and best of the Prog leadership had their political careers 
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smashed and had to turn away from politics to build new careers. 
The message of this defeat was not lost on the white electorate and in 
particular on the United Party, who now purged of their-left proceeded 
vigorously in their attempts to imitate and emulate the Naticinalists. 
Nor was the failure lost on the black connnunity. These white liberals 
were nice people without power. 
The Qui~scent Years 
The middle Sixties were devoted to the continued repression of t~e 
populist African movements on the one hand, as well as the development 
of so-call.ed "Positive Apartheid" on the other. 
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The legislation declaring both t~e PAC and ANC illegal organisations in 
1960 forced a change of tactics amongst black resistors. Just as the 
Fifties witnessed a change from petitions to passive resistance, .so 
too, the Sixties witnessed a change from passive resistance to 
sabotage. 
A series of pa~a-military underground organisations were created: 
Umkhonto weSizwe from the ranks of ANC supporters, -POQO from the ranks 
of the PAC, and the Africa Resistance Movement (ARM) from the ranks of 
(dissident) liberals. From 1961 onwards, a campaign of sabotage 
commenced. Sabotage was carefully defined by ANC leader, Nelson_ 
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Mandela, in his speech before the Court of the Rivionia trial~ as the 
violent destruction of property without the loss of life; POQO was 
less emphatic in its disa~proval of personal violence. Ironically, it 
was ARM, and in particular the almost-certainly idiosyncratic actions 
of liberal John Harris, that was responsible for the most dramatic act-
of violence in this period - the 1964 Johannesburg Station Bomb Blast. 
This event, which killed a white woman and maimed a white child, 
polarised the white- community and almost certainly destroyed any 
chances of electorai success the Liberal Party might ever have had. 
This occurred notwithstanding that Party's strong condemnation of all 
acts of violence. -
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This violent resistance occasioned, and in many white minds, justified 
increasingly dracoriian security legislation. 180 days detention 
replaced 90 days. More and more people were banned and detained. The 
descent into authoritarianism reached its height in 1967 with the 
adoption by Parliament of the Terrorism Act. This legislation provided 
for indefinite detention without trial, and also provided for an 
extraordinarily braod definition of terrorism and terrorist activities, 
introdu~ing a ty~e of thought crime into South African society. 
On security issuesi the United Party consistently sided with the 
- Government, terrified no doubt of being portrayed by them as being soft 
on communism or soft of terrorism. The lone representative of the 
Progressive Party, Helen Suzman, on the 6ther hand consistently opposed 
these measures. Indeed, it was her stand throughout this decade- and 
. 
into the next that won her a place in the hearts of many if not most 
black South Africans. It was the coincidence of issues of civil 
liberty and the well-being of populist African leaders, such as Nelson 
Mandela and Robert Sobukwe, as evidenced by' Suzman's regular visits to 
these l~aders incarcerated on Robben Island, that demonstrated the 
relevance of liberal values. 
This, however~ did not enhance the standing of the Progs at the 
hustings~ The 1966 General Election, influenced as it was by 
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and Suzman ~nd other 
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Prog leaders' controversial views thereon, saw the electoral fortunes 
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of thi~ party decline still further. 
With regard to "Positive Apartheid" Dr Verwoerd had announced_ a 
progrannne in 1959 whereby black South Africans were to be provided with 
a process of constitutional development "in their own areas" - i.e. the 
Bantustans. These areas (the original 13,6 pe~ cent of South Africa 
demarcated as black reserves in 1913 and 1936) were to be developed 
economically to the point where they would house and employ a majority 
of their "citizens". They were also to·be developed constitutionally 
to a point of sovereign independence, whereupon they could join in a 
South African Commonwealth of-Nations together with "white" South 
Africa. Those blacks in South Africa would be treated as temporary 
sojourners, like the Gastarbeiter·s in Germany and Switzerland. This 
was Verwoerd's "Positive Apartheid" programme or Separate Development. 
If the increasingly violent-and unlawfui opposition of black 
organisations posed liberals one kind of problem, Verwoerd's "Positive 
Apartheid" posed another. The dilemma took the form of the question: 
is half a loaf better than nothing? Or; put differently, should one 
view the tiny footholds of power created by Separate Development as a 
platform to campaign for further change or a further step away from a 
common society? It was an issue ~f this nature which caused the Prog 
MP's to break away from the United Party (UP). It was the UP's refusal 
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to support additional transfer of land to the "Bantu homelands" that 
caused the long standing tensions to become a split. 
It was these homelands which were to-be developed into sovereign nation 
states, one for each of the eight major "ethnic" groups into which the 
ruling Nationalists divided that sixty seven per cent of the population 
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that was black. By this statistical/constitutional device, a country 
with a large black majority and small white, colciured and Asian 
minorities, became a constellation of minority groups. 
In one of the many ambiguities of South African politics, this 
homelands policy ca~e to be opposed by groups to the right and to the 
left of the government. Albert Hertzog, who split from the governing 
party in 1969 and formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), opposed 
giving white-controlled land into black lands. In the late Sixties, 
the United Party began to oppose th~ homeland policy on the grounds 
that it was creating potential launching pads for a communist attack on 
South Africa. It displayed posters-with a red, dripping hand reaching 
forth from the Bantustans. On the left, many black ~roups opposed the 
homelands because they were.the symbols of black denationalisation in 
the land of their birth - South Africa. The liberals were often 
somewhere in between. Radical partition had long been an option which 
liberals had considered; Hoernle had discu£sed it repeatedly. 
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However, the greatest dileinma of the decade was without doubt 
introduced by the Improper Interference Act, introduced in 1967. This 
Act prohibited racially mixed political partie~. Since the South 
African Communist Party, the African National Congress and the Pan 
Africanist Congress had already been proscribed and the Congress of 
Democrats -had disappeared, the dilemma existed for the two remaining 
multi-racial political organisations, the Liberal and Progressive 
Parties. 
The Liberal Party decided in 1968 to disband rather than become 
uni-racial. This decision was sad but predictable. The majority or 
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near majority of its membership was .black. _Furthermore, it had never 
found a real place in "white" politics. 
The decision for the Progs was more difficult. Although their 
representation in Parliament remained the lone voice of Helen Suzman 
throughout the Sixties, they nevertheless had built up and retained a 
national political machine, and had won a ·respectable share of the 
pbpular vote in the general election~ of 1961 and 1967. Perhaps 
r crucially, the Party had been founded by politicians committed to the 
\ political process, whereas the Liberals were led by writers, academics 
and clerics. Nevertheless, continued existence as a political party 
contesting white elections meant that the Party would have to shed its 
non:..white· membership. Though this was not as numerically significant 
as it wa£ for the Liberals, it did contain significant leadership 
-135-
figures4 The youth movement of the party voted to disband (this 
formation of the party was particularly multi-racial) but.the Party as· 
~ whole decided to continue as an all-white organisation. Conscience 
and consequence were forced into opposition. 
As the decade drew to its close, liberals were a small b~ttered 
contingent of nomads living in a hot and windy desert. Repeatedly 
rejected by the white electorate and increasingly uncomfortable with 
the tactics of black opposition, they clung to core liberal values. 
They were cheered by the occasional encouraging contact with the 
Western World, such as the visit in 1967 by Robert Kennedy. They were. 
repeatedly s.ubjected to abuse and threat not only from the Government, 
but from the white community at large. Many emigrated. Others 
drifted into apblitical roles. Yet a sufficient core ~ in a variety of 
organisations such as the Progressive .Party, The Institute of Race. 
Relations, The Christian Institute, The Council of Churches, The Black 
Sash, The National Union of South African Students, carri.ed on in a 
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kind of "internal exile." 
5. Regrouping and Review: The Seventies 
Parliamentary Politics 
In 1970, John Vorster, Prime Minister since the assassination in 
Parliament of Dr Verwoerd, called an early election. Though the 
~-----------------------------~ -------
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Government lost some ground to the now very conservative United Party, 
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again, only Helen Suzman was elected for the Progs. The Party had 
been in the wilderness for .a decade. How much longer could it. survive? 
In the year after its defeat it began a process of reorganisation.and 
new direction. At its National Congrees it changed leaders replacing. 
its original leader, Dr Jan Steytler with Colin Eglin. Steytler was a 
man of remarkable courage.· An Afrikaner farmer and medical doctor, he 
had been the Cape leader of the United Party at the time of the split 
in 1959. His decision to join the renegades was both a costly and 
courageous one. He was, however, more a prophet than a politician. 
Colin Egiin was a modern politician in every sense. He had studied ~nd 
employed Americai=i electioneering techniques in his 1970 campaign in the 
Sea Point consitutency, bringing him agonisingly close to victory. 
Eglin moved quickly to revitalise the Party. He r~ised extra funds, 
appointed political staff with a new approach (i~cluding a former young 
liberal, Neil Ross, who is today widely recognised as South Africa's 
primary political professional). He sought to broaden the image of the 
party, adding new elements to its policy in areas less immediately 
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threatening to the typical white voter. 
He began to travel widely (often with Suzman) and especially in Africa, 
being careful to claim that he travelled o.n the passport of the 
Progressive Party. 
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When Vorster called another early election in 1974, Eglin moved quietly 
to recruit celebrity candidates. He recruited an international rugby 
star (Gordon Waddell), a newspaper editor (Rene D~ Villiers), and a 
young charismatic Afrikaans academic (Van Zyl Slabbert). The 1974 
campaign wa~ run by ihe Progs on the quality of their candidates, 
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rather than of their policies. 
It worked - no less than six Progs were returned to Parliament. This 
was the election which destroyed the United Party. The coup was 
complete when in a·by-election just three months after the general 
election, Alex Boraine, a church. leader, won a surprise vie tory and 
gained a seventh Prog seat. 
A ferment was now taking place in the ranks of the United Patty. A 
group of young turks, under the leadership of Harry Sc~warz, had gained 
_control of much of the party machine in the Transvaal. Eglin now 
worked feverishly to do a deal with thi~ group of ~eformists as they 
became known. A merger took place and the ranks of Progressive Reform 
members swelled to thirteen. A further merger was negotiated with what 
remained of liberal rump of the United Party and the name of.the Progs 
changed again to the Progressive Federal Party or PFP. 
Eglin's wheeling and dealing was no sign of political illiberalism. 
Indeed whilst he was busy strengthening the party, both by electoral 
( 
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growth and acquisition, he also succeeded in modernising its policies, 
revising the blueprint laid down by the Party's Molteno Commission in 
1960. This·time Eglin appointed·a Commission chaired by sociologist 
parliamentarian, Van Zyl Slabbert. This commission recommended the 
dropping of the Party's qualified franchise, and i~s replacement with a 
universal franchise in a consociational constitutional framework~ This 
was a move to the left. 
And yet in the next (early) election in 1977, the Progs continued to 
grow, gaining twenty four seats, and seventeen per cent of the popular 
. vote, thus becoming the offici~l opposition. 
Just a· few years later, Eglin was a victim of his own creation - the 
Superstar politician. He was replaced as ieader by Van Zyl Slabbert. 
The Party's fortunes continued to prosper. In the next (early) 
election, it increased its number of seats to twenty seven and its 
share of the popular vote to nineteen per cent. A quarter of a million 
whites had voted for fundamental power sharing in this election. 
The Churches 
What was happening to the Progs was also happening to other parts of 
the liberal community. In 1967, the English Protestant Churches had 
drafted a "Message to the people of South Africa". This message called 
on South Africari Christians (constitut~ng the.majority of every race 
group except the Indians) to reflect on the basic structures of South 
African society in the light of the demands of the Christian Gospel. 
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In 1969, the Churches launched the Study Project on Christianity on 
·Apartheid Society (SPROCAS). This consisted. of six Commissions who 
we~e charged with drawing up a~ alternative Christian vision for 
society in the areas of economics, education, law, politics, society 
and the church. The reports of this commission must constitute the· 
most comprehensive statement of liberal value and liberal itrategy ever 
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developed in this society. 
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The political commission report is a most 
remarkable document. It commences by endorsing and defining core 
Christian liberal values, namely equality, freedom, justice, lo~e and 
responsibility. From these "primary ethical concepts" as the report 
calls them, it derives three key political ideals: 
the rule of law; 
guaranteed civil rights; and 
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effective·political participation. 
Next, the Commission Report calls into question a whole range of 
lib~ral holy cows. In discussing long-term goals and the problems of 
transition, .it links ethical acceptability with practical feasibility, 
arguing that: 
"The problem facing us is not only what the best 
'solution' may be in theoretical terms, but also 
how the transition from the present political 
situation, with its special difficulties and 
.limitations, is to be achieved." 49 
Thirdly, it criticises what it calls liberal constitutionalism, arguing 
inter-alia that this body of political though is inadequate in that: 
It is individualistic and atomistic, faili~g to take seriously the 
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reality of groups; 
That it defines politics "in terms of a basic opposition between 
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the individual and the state"; 
That it consequently ignores or underestimates the valency of 
group loyalties, and that the extension of the franchise to 
qualified individuals alone is too tenuous a way to build a 
52 
democratic government in a divided or plural society. 
Finally (and crucially) the Report makes a set of proposals divided 
into a first stage of transitional proposals, and a second and more 
permanent stage. The proposals are discussed in some detail below both 
in order to show how significantly they depart from the more 
traditional liberal prescriptions, and also because they provide a very 
reliable basis for the evaluation of fu~ure liberal strategies to be 
suggested in the concluding chapter of this thesis~ 
Sprocas: The Poiitical Proposals: 
The First Stage 
The proposals in this section are not predicated on a change in the 
existing· political system. 
In the socio-economic area, the Cormnission proposed the following: 
Education: 
* increased total spending on education; 
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* the gradual equivalence of per capita spending by race group; 
* official encouragement of private bursary schemei; 
* special literacy and other "bridging" educational programmes; 
* increased autonomy and desegregation of educational 
institutions. 
Economic Development: 
* Increased industrial decentralisation and economic 
development in poor and over-populated areas, including the 
homelands; 
* Regionally differentiated, ~nnually adjusted minimum wages; 
* Rate for the job; 
* Maximum employment creation; 
* Increased mobility and "a progressive revision of the system 
.of influx control of Africans in order to provide full 
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settlement rights"; 
* Phasing out of the migrant labour system; 
* Increased upward mobility for blacks; 
* Increased participation for coloureds and Indians in trade 
unions; 
·* Expansion of works committees as a step towards trade um.on 
rights. 
* Extension of these rights to blacks "at the earliest 
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opportunity"; 
* Reform of the collective bargaining and wage regulating 
machinery to.cope with black needs; 
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Social Security and Welfare: 
* Extension of socia~ services (housing, heaith, transport) and 
transfer of their control and administration to properly 
funded communal_ and regional authorities; 
* Creation and extension of comprehensive and non-racial 
welfare programmes in areas such as medical aid, pensions and 
unemployment insurance; 
* A progressive reform of ownership rights for blacks; 
* Development of both freehold (individual) and communal tenure 
in the homelands; 
* Non-racial access to- land both in and outside _the homelands; 
* Occupation, lease and ownership rights for_ "qualified" urban 
blacks; 
* Progressive creation of "open areas" outside existing group 
areas. 
In the political area,_ the Commission proposes: 
* the co-operation of police·and government in allowing publfc 
demonstrations; 
* the recognition that dissenters should not be treated as 
common criminals; 
* the reform of the current security laws by inter alia: 
+ narrowing key definitions such as sabotage and terrorism; 
+ appointing a Judicial Detention Review Board; 
+ restoring certain procedural rights to Security Law 
offenders; 
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Ensuring the freedom of the Press by preventing State control or 
private monopolisation of the Press; 
Reforming of the censorship system by vesting it in independent 
boards representative of all population groups; 
Encouraging ~oluntary association by: 
* relaxing official enforcement of laws such as race 
classification and the Immorality Act; 
·* decentralising decision-making on the desegregation of 
facilities; 
* desegregation of these facilities; 
* returning university autonomy; 
Encouraging public participation by: 
·*·making statutory bodies more representative of all population 
groups; 
* promoting "public collective bargaining"; 
* involving public participation in the drafting and discu~sion 
of legislation; 
In the area of defence, the following are proposed: 
* the complete abolition or. severe circumscripti-on of 
compulsory military service; 
* the drastic reduction of the standing army or its increasing 
involvement in "domestic" programmes; 
* the progressive opening of defence training to all_ population 
groups. 
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In the area of representative government, the following are 
proposed: 
* Maximum devolution of power (including the right to levy 
ta~es) to fully elected regional c~uncils; 
* Property, residential and 'citizenship' rights to be 
controlled by these councils, and to be ratially inclusive at 
their discretion. 
Developmeni Corporations should be responsible to these Regional 
Councils: 
* That fully-elected local government bodies should be created 
for those race groups presently excluded, which bodies should 
have an independent financial competence; 
* That communal councils for Indians and blacks in_ the "common 
area" (i.e. outside the homelands) be created; 
* That these -councils be recognised as the legitimate 
representatives and spoke~men for their respective groups; 
* That they have the powers to control_ "matters mainly 
affecting the communal group: education, cultural affairs, 
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health and welfare services, community development etc." 
* That they should-have an independent fiscal competence; 
* That regional planning and co-ordinating committees should be 
created representing all population and interest groups. 
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The Commission then makes a series of proposals for what it calls 
"Transitional Political Change" : 
* that administrative positions in government be opened to 
persons other than whites; 
* that the powers of those Government departments mainly 
serving one population group be increasingly controlled by 
the representative bodies of that Group; 
* that wherever possible, government services should be 
functionally differentiated instead of being defined along 
racial lines; 
* that ad hoc representative bodies should increasingly be give 
control over key national issues such as influx control; 
* that the independence of the Judiciary should b~ 
strengthened; 
* that political consultation and negotiation should become a 
regular feature of government; 
* that a multi-racial coniultative body should be created; 
* that a round of constitutional conferences should be held; 
* that a new National Convention should be called. 
The Second Stage: 
Here the Commission proposes: 
that a federal government_ responsible to a non-racial legislative 
assembly be created; 
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that both civil liberties and minority rights be entrenched; 
that security legislation be reformed; 
that communal authorities be created for whites on lines similar 
to those created for other race groups; 
that the present prescriptive system of race classification be 
replaced with a voluntary system; 
that open Group areas be established; 
that all commercial centres of cities and town become 'Common 
Areas'; 
that all state-funded services be desegregated; 
that l~cally and privately controlled services have the option to 
remain segregated. 
These departures from traditiorial liberalism proved too much for two of 
the Commissioners. 
Edgar Brookes (the long~time African Representative in the Senate) 
rejects the Group bias in the.Report commenting: 
"Those of us who have intimate African, Coloured and Indian 
friendships know well that there are no group differences 
which divide us as much as friendship and common humanity 
unite us." 56 . 
Oscar Wolheim, the former Coloured Representative on the Cape 
Provincial Council,. though he signs the report notes~ 
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"I do not agree with the majority report in its trend to 
lay emphasis on the group especially where such groups 
are based on artif:lcial lines of colour and not on 
common .. interest." 57 
This more pragmatic review had an organisational effect in another area 
of society. In the late Sixties, liberal students at the English 
Language universities formed Wages Commissions in order to study the 
wages and working conditions of black workers. In the early Seventies, 
these students formed working associations with liberal trade unionists 
such as Harriet Bolton in Natal in order to create more permanent 
worker organisation. The 1973 Durban strikes gav_e impetus to this 
movement. 
Of course, the re-emergence of black unions cannot be seen as a 
consequence of liberal action. In the first place, it was the actions 
and attitudes of black workers themselves.who made this-possible. 
Furth~rmore, many of the students who entered the movement and are 
making significant contributions operate more from a Nee-Marxist than a 
liberal perspective. But key liberals were and are involved in 
important support roles. Figures such as Schlemmer and Douwes Dekker 
represent a- broadly liberal perspective, as do Francis Wilson .and John 
Dugard. 
Furthermore, the positive response (at least at the level of rhetoric) 
of industrialists such as Oppenheimer, Bloom and others helped to 





POLICIES - A LIBERAL DOCUMENTS REVIEW IN THREE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXTS 
" it is no longer a question of gathering facts ••• 
now the problem of the Institute (of Race Relations) will 
to discover sound methods and techniques of getting these· 
accumulations of knowledge across to the generality of 
South Africans in a form which will.convince them ••• " 
Dr Alfred Hoernle 
be 
"South Africa.is an ethically plural, culturally diverse, 
racially manifold country in which the central political 
problem is that of group domination, the central economic 
problem one of structural inequality among groups of people 
and the central social problem one of segmentation and 
division." 
Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert 
"We have to believe, and by our practice demonstrate, that 
the pursuit of business ef~iciency and the search for a 
free and just society are not contradictory objectives, 
but two aspects of the same thing." 
Harry Oppenheimer 
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1. The Process of Documents Review 
This chapter constitutes the second attempt to investigate liberal 
ethics in South Africa. The methodology described in the Introduction 
(pages 18 to 23) has again been attempted here: 
Firstly, an attempt to let the data speak for itself: this is 
done here by means of a review of some seventy five policy 
documents of two liberal organisations and one liberal individual; 
Secondly, the delineation of the structure of liberal ethics, as 
revealed by "confronting" the data with ideal-typical ethical 
models. Elements of the model developed from Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer's writings have been used bere (pages 98 to 101). 
Specifically, his coriceptions of: 
ethics and actiori; 
reason, power and interests; 
responsible action; 
hope and optimism; 
have been tested against the documents reviewed. 
In addition, the use of both threats and promises in liberal advocacy 
has been examined. 
2. The Organisations and Individuals Chosen 
Two organisations and one individual have been selected for 
examination. In all three cases, the organisations and the individual 
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can be regarded as significant standard bearers of liberal values. 
They have also articulated and propag~ted liberal values in diverse 
arenas of social reality: 
The S.A. Institute of Race Relations has been a source· of liberal 
analysis and connnentary on South African affairs for over fifty 
years. Its modus operandi could be described as the politics of 
·information and analysis; 
The Progressive Federal Party has been the voice of liberal values 
in the (all white) Parliament for two-and-a-half decades. 
Throughout that period, it has beert in a role of political 
powerlessness, and its "politics" can be seen as the politics of 
opposition; 
Harry Oppenheimer and the business organisations he has led, has 
been the primary economic suppp6rter of liberal values, 
organisations and activities in South Africa. Whi1st the degree 
of political power available to him is a much debated and complex 
question, that he has been able exercise power or at least 
influence in this society- for some twenty five years he has been 
at the helm of the Anglo American and De Beers groups of companies 
is beyond contest. 
Of course, there are other liberal institutions (NUSAS, the Churches, 
the 11beral media) who have helped shape liberal ethics. As in all 
research, it was necessary to select. In so doi-ng, an attempt has been 
made to select three different organisational contexts: 
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extra-parliamentary "lobby" politics (the Institute); 
parlia~entary politics (the PFP); and 
the economy (Oppenheimer and Anglo). 
They have been chosen precisely for the diversity of their contexts, 
- . 
_though this complicates the application of common (Bonhoefferian) 
concepts. 
3. The Institute of Race Relations 
Th~ Institute was founded in 1929 a~ the first national multi:racial 
organisation in South.Africa, and one of this country's earliest 
national liberal associations. Its objectives as stated in t~e 1932 
Constitution were: 
"To work for peace, _goodwill and practical co-operation 
between the various sections of the populations of South 
Africa. -
To initiate, support, assist and encourage investigations 
that may le~d to greater knowledge and understanding of the 
.racial grciups and of the relations that subsist or should 
subsist between them." 
The Institute's antecedents are to be found in the Native Welfare 
Societies established in the early years of the century, and the Joint 
1 
Council Movement of the 1920's and 1930's. Indeed, the Institute 




The direction and strategy pursued by the Institute has been most , 
effectively captured in the words of one of its mbst distinguished 
members and office bearers, Ellen Hellmann: 
"It (the Institute) believed iti the pursuit of truth as 
a value in itself. It believed that the systematic 
seeking out of facts relating to the conditions which 
determine the quality of life of the disadvantaged groups 
in South Africa would increase public awareness and 
promote inter-raciil understanding, an understanding 
without which there could be no peaceful future. It 
recognised the ii:J.her.ent worth and dignity of every human 
being and his right to the full development of his inate 
potential. It affirmed the values of democratic society, 
with its accepted rights and duties, together with respect 
for the rule of law and the safeguarding of individual 
liberty. It pledged itself to pay due regard to opposing 
views." 3 
Given this credo the Institute has acted chiefly by means of rational 
analysis and research. The Annual .Survey, published from 1947, has 
become a central reference work for all concerned with race relations 
~nd indeed South African affairs in gerieral. Institute publications 
have a reputation for careful research and objective analysis which has 
4 
enabled them to largely evade the South African censorship system. It 
has succesfully developed the Parliamentary tjuestion system as valuable 
5 
information source, and has become an important agency- for connnent to 




In addition to researching and propagating "the truth" in a.11 aspects 
of social reality with a race-relations bearirig, during the Seventies, 
in particular, the Institute has beco~e iniiiator and sustainer of a 
number of "actio.n programmes". Amongst the earliest were the Bureau 
7 
of Literacy and the Institute's Youth Programme. 
8 
There followed its 
Domestic Workers and Employers Project, the Education Information 
9 10 
Centre, and the Human Awareness Progranune • Most recently the 
Institute has become involved in a substantial famine relief programme, 
Operation Hunger. 
The membership of the Institute has been overwelmingly white and 
English speaking. Though to a somewhat lesser degree, this is also 
11 
true of the Institute's leadership. Here the Institute has been 
remarkably fortunate in terms of the continuity of both its officers 
and office bearers. In the fifty five years of its existencei it has 
had five Directors, three serving long periods of office: 
J.D. Rheinalt Jones - eighteen years (1929 - 1947); 
Quinton Wh~te - twenty three years (1947 - 1970); 
Fred van Wyk - twelve years (1970 - 1982)~ 
Van Wyk was succeeded by John Rees, former General Secretary of the SA 
Council of Churches. His term of office ended with his prosecution on 
12 
a charge of fraud in 1983. John Kane-Berman was appointed to replace 
in the same year. The Institute's Chief Researcher, first appointed in 
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13 
1949, served for a remarkable twenty eight years. In the early years 
of the Institute, there was also a considerable consistency amongst its 
14 
elected office bearers. 
Though Institute membership has grown over the years, its resources, 
especially financial, have always been inadequate and precarious. It 
has experienced repeated financial crises and its continued existence 
15 
has often been at stake. 
Regrettably, this important liberal organisation lacks adequate 
historical ·record and evaluation. Ellen Hellman has written a short 
16 
and largely uncritical history. More recently, Paul Rich devotes 
considerable attention to the Institute and its leading figures 
17 
(especially in its pre-war years). 
Rich's account, however, claims simultaneously too little and too much 
for the Institute itself and liberalism more generally. His definition 
of liberalism (given in his conclusion) is stated as follows: 
II political expression of a small body of white 
educationalists, philanthropists~ missionaries and 
social workers who have been concerned to alleviate 
the harsh economic and social cons.equences of 
industrialisation in a racially divided society." 18 
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This definition is altogether too restrictive, both in respect of who 
19 
has espoused .liberal values, 
20 
as well as the context of liberal 
concerns. 
Rich concludes (correctly in this writer's view) that: 
II (liberalism) has been unsuccessful in translating 
(its values) into a political programme that had real 
impact on the body politic." 
Instead, Rich maintains: 
" liberal political discourse from Union was 
increasingly defined by the alternative ideologial 
concept of white settler segregationalism ••• " .21 
Further, Rich argues that liberalism has influenced these 
segregationalist policies up to, but also after 1948, and is broadly 
responsible for the absence of "pure racism" or biological racism in 
22 
this policy. 
These assertions are extensively based on Rich's analysis of the 
writings of key liberal figures in the 1920's and 1930's, especially 
Rheinalt-Jones, Hoernle and Edgar Brookes. Rich's treatment of 
Brookes well'-illustrates the fragility of his argument. Rich makes 
several important references to Brookes early activities and writings. 
At this point; Brookes was clearly an advocate -0f segregation and a 
supporter of Hertzog's Pact Government. However, at no stage in at 
least twenty five references he makes to Brookes, does he acknowledge 
24 
Brookes' complete repudiation of these early activities. The 
discontinuity of the early Brookes (during the Twenties) and the later 
23 
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Brookes (Brookes from the Thirties onwards) is not only noted in 
Brookes' autobiograph~, but even more so- by his actions and writings in 
the remaining five decades of his life. Perhaps the- clearest 
indi~ation of his subsequent repudiatibn of segregation, ethni~ity, or 
what Rich calls the anthropological approach to liberalism is given in 
25 
Brookes repudiation of the Sprocas report on political alternatives. 
In the light of these clear repudiations, Rich's continual referrals to 
26 
these early writings is highly misleading. 
If Rich's contention that traditional liberal values had been "defined" 
by segregationalist thinktng is dubious, hi~ consequential assertion 
that "anthropological" liberalism, in its turn, significantly 
influenced segregationalist policy, is equally unconvincing. 
Whilst a clear case can be made for the influence of Brookes, 
Rheinalt-Jones and others on the Smuts-Hofmeyr regime, it is very 
difficult to argue that this influence promoted, or even influenced 
segregation. In contrast, liberal figures opposed segregation 
repeatedly. After 1948, liberal inf!uence on (indeed even access to) 
government policy was almost non-existent. 
27 
Both Rich and another historian of liberalism, Janet Robertson, are 
correct in reflecting a confusion of liberal tactics, which often 
oscillated between an assertion of "pure" principle and the advocacy of 
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actions, which because of th~ realities of power, invol~ed significant 
values compromise. In this respect, Robertson's description of liberal 
attitudes towards the Uni~ed Party in the period 1948-1959 (~nd Rich's 
descripti.on of early periods' i.e. 1933-1948) are important. 
Finally, H~llman in her assessm~nt notes somewhat poignantly: 
"The essence of the Institute's work, the striving to 
influence the minds of men, is by its very nature 
imponderable. Many of us believe that the effort 
has been meaningful ••• One belief we all shar~: 
and that .is.the certainty that, given a different 
direction in the post-war years, South Africa would 
have progressed immeasurably further in realising 
the potential of her rich human and natural resources." 28 
Ethics and Action 
One of the key elements in Bonhoeffer's conception of ethics as we have 
29 
seen in an earlier Chapter was his conviction of the identity of 
ethics and action: ethical choice is the choice of the deed. The deed 
is only .chosen when it is executed •. The Institute' s objectives and 
activiiies are analytical b~ definition. The essence of this lies in 
the gathering and dissemi~ation of information (not that this is not 
action!). This must give rise to the temptation to judge reality 
rather than participate in it. This danger was certainly recognised by 
Institute leaders throughout the decades: 
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"It may almost be said that now it is no longer a question 
of gathering facts, unravelling the skein of South Africa's 
problems. Rather now the problem of the Institute will be 
to discover sound methods and techniques of getting these 
accumulations of knowledge across to the generality of 
South Africans in a form which will convince them ••• " 30 
Ten years later 0. D. Screiner observed the distinction between 
31 
description and prescription and connnitted himself to the latter. In 
1965, Archbish~p Hurley returned to this theme, noting the 
disadvantages of the types of people who typically found themselves in 
Institute ledership positions in respect of what he termed "direct 
action": 
11 · academic and ecclesiastical persons are a little 
short on that instructive grasp of realities, that 
feel of the situation, that subconscious assessment 
of possibilities so necessary to the soldier, the 
policeman and the politician." 
Hurley nevertheless notes that though ill-equipped for direct action 
the Institute must be senstitve to reality: 
II if we are to be teachers and guides we have got to 
give our teaching .realistic and concrete expression. 11 32 
The tension between analysis and action is ever present in the 
Institute's writings, and is reflected in the rather inspecific or even 
abstract way the Institute has sought to evaluate its own actions, as 
indicated in the Hellmann .assessme,nt quoted above. 
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The Role of Reason 
We have noted Bonhoeffer'B limits to ~eason. Whilst he welcomed a 
11world come of age", he warned against underestimating the role of 
factors other than reason, and in particular, of evil, power and 
33 
interests. We have noted above the centrality of rational analysis 
in the nature of the Institute's activities. ThiB centrality is 
reflected in the Presidential Addresses studied. 
II we can stand firm by the vision 
over the years by careful study and 
that the nature of human excellence 
that we have gained 
test experience, 
common to the whole 
of humanity and the old ideal remains the same, 'a 
world of free minds in free societies'". 34 
and again: 
"This involves unremitting efforts to educate White 
public opinion and also practical co-operation with 
the non-white leadership. 11 35 
However, Institute leadership has not been blind to the limits of 
reason: 
111 do not have to.be told that such an equitable sharing 
of power would be the wisest course and probably save a 
lot of misery and probably even bloodshed in the long 
run. I want to know how one gets this across to the people 
involved. 11 36 
and then, beginning to go beyond reason alone: 
"Moral re-education involves not only the mind but also 
the emotions and, in fact, the emotions more than the 
mind. South Africa's crisis is, in fact, a crisis of 
love, and by what methods do you teach love? 11 37 
Another President writes in a similar vein: 
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"Possibly the first thing to do is to accept the fact that, 
irrational or not~ race prejudice exists and will not be 
eliminated by wishful thinking." 38 
Another concedes the limits yet asserts reason's centrality: 
"In the past, we in the 
thinking men and women 
reason than they are. 
altogether is surely a 
Institute may have erred in 
more subject to persuasion by 
But to discount reason 
counsel of despair.h 39 
Finally, one President concedes these limits, yet sees these in a 
context of circumstance: 
"A long experience of public affairs has taught me that 
reason and persuasion have a less decisive influence on 
public opinion than the force o-f circumstance. This 
does not mean that reason is impotent; it means that 
men will not yield to reason until the pressure of 
circumstance opens their minds to its .influence. 
Has that fateful moment not come?" 40 
The Role of Power 
In going beyond the limits of reason Institute leadership have focussed 
on the role power plays in social reality. There is a clear and 
repeated indication of the role of power: 
"In an utopian and rationally ordered world, there would 
be no need for a defensive or aggressive foreign policy. 
The people of one-nation would not feel th~ir very 
existence threatened by those of-another; there would 
be enough fruits of the earth to satisfy all needs; 
and no one would want to go to war to-compel others to 
become Christians or Muslims, Communists or Fascists. 
For the time being, however, the world is nationally, 
and not rationally, ordered ••• " 41 (own emphasis) 
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Although in the early decades the Institute attempted a "non-political" 
- 42 
approach to the issues of race in South Africa, it increasingly 
realised that political power created the context within which racial 
interaction took place. This led the Institute to consider the 
realities of party politics: 
"Party politics ••• is iri fact a harsh struggle for the 
possession of political power ••• The succesful party 
in this political power struggle is obliged by the 
logic of our democratic system to follow two quite 
simple but very fundamental rules - one, to implement. 
or enforce by acts of Parliament theCollective will 
of the party as embodied in the party programme, and 
two, to strengthen and consolidate its hold on the levers 
of political power by increasing its parliamentary 
representation." 43 
Presidential addresses are replete with observations about the nature 
of political power. -Often general truths about political power have 
been-aptly ~pplied to South African circumstances: 
"The chief defence of liberty (in Europe) against arbitary 
power lay in the balance-of forces between corporate 
institutions and the state ••• before Hitler ~otild destrriy 
liberty in Germany he had to undermine the great 
corporation institutions - the churches, the universities, 
trade associations, and local authorities." 
"In thefrontier societies that grew up in the colonies 
no dictator was required to undermine corporate institutions 
In an environment in which rugged individualism 
was the most important quality necessary for survival, 
corporate institution~ were disregarded or, at best, 
failed to strike deep roots." 44 
One Hoernle Memorial Lecturer took the political analysis one step 
further speaking of Rhodesia, not South Africa: 
"The dilemma is an agonising one - how to satisfy black 
aspirations without destroying white confidence .... 
The Problem is ••• how to switch from white minority 
rule to black majority rule. Multi-racialism and 
non-discrimination are secondary issues ••.• Will moral 
considerations, moderation, common sense and humanism· 
on both sides coat the pill's unpalatability and coax 
the whites into swallowing it, or will emotionalism 
and heroics take over? I wish I knew the answer - I 
hope for the one just as r·fear the other. 11 45 
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Institute leaders took cold comfort from their analysis of political 
power. Their assessment led 
46 
ther to a retreat into the realm of 
dogged optimism, or to an evacauation of the central ground, and a 
I 
focus on "lesser" issues: 
"Power lies with the White electorate. The White electorate 
by a majority of nine to one, or more, is violently opposed 
to participation of all races in a single society ••• ~ 
Those who have it within their power to promote the· 
mo~al change (which must precede a political change) 
have got to think this matter through. Should they 
continue to devote so much of their energy to opposing 
and criticising what seems so obviously wrong in the 
present regime, knowing that they have no alternative 
plan to offer with any hope of political acceptance? 
Or should they, like wise. generals, realise when 
conventional strategy is futile and concentrate on 
something more subtle and consequently more difficult 
of conception, more exacting in execution and far less. 
dramatic. in immediate impact." 4 7. 
Economic Interests 
In addition to a political analysis, Institute leaders have focussed on 
the role of economic interests in shaping South African reality. 
However, references to this factor are surprisingly scarce - only seven 
direct references in the twenty seven documents, or 550 pages studied. 
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Of these seven references, furthermore, only two suggested the 
centrality of economic considerations: 
and:. 
"What actually precipated the calling of the national 
convention to consider unification were the economic 
difficulties the four self-governing Colonies were 
experiencing in relation to the railways arid custom 
duties." 48 
"In this country we are experiencing the repetition of 
an historic process. A primitive feudalism is being 
replaced by the system we describe as capitalism. 
·This process is now far advanced. Our industrial 
revolution - a change in.the method.of production 
has already to a large extent transformed the Africans 
from a primitive peasantry into an industrial working 
class. Our Black workers constitute a new emergent 
class who are acquiring economic power. They constitute 
·the great bulk of our labour force. They hold the keys 
or production in their hands.. They are becoming conscious 
of their vital role in our expanding economy. They are 
!.earning to use their economic power to enforce their 
claim to a larger share of the wealth to which they make 
an indispensable contribution. In due course they will 
learn to use their economic power to enforce their claim 
to political rights without which they are powerless to 
·advance their interests or protect themselves against 
discriminatory legislation." 49 
In contrast to the above analysis, two of the remaining five references 
50 
are incidental, and the final three assert the primacy of·psychologi-
cal and political factors over the economic. 
" ••• we must conclude that both employer and labourer 
sub-consciously seek other than purely economic 
satisfaction from the relationship; that, in 
fact, the psychological relationship plays bigger 
part than it does in Europe · 11 51 
and 
"It is interesting to observe the difficulty which is 
being experienced in raising non-White wages ••• 
If suitably qualified non-Whites had votes and, if, 
consequently, non~White workers had effective trade 
union support., a solution to the problem of raising 
non-White wages would certainly be found." 52 
-164-
and again: 
"It is when we are confronted with the problems of 
promoting the economic advance of the under-privileged 
that the importance of their lack of political rights 
becomes evident. Politicians have to sell their 
policies. to a white electorate, and it is only when the 
interests of that electorate are seriously threatened 
that the privileged are likely voluntarily to abandon 
a protected position." 53 
Of Optimism and Hope 
A final dimension of Bonhoeffer's ethical model from which useful 
compa~isons may be drawn lies in the area of future expectations, 
optimism and pe.Ssimism. Bonhoeffer's ethical thought and action was 
characterised by a combination of transcendent hope and practical 
optimism. ·The one element informed the other. His transcendent hope 
was based on a profound belief in what he termed "imminent justice": 
"It is one of the most astounding, but nevertheless 
undeniable truths of experience.that evil men show 
themselves, and often most surprisingly ~ui~kly, 
to be stupid and ineffective." 54 
and also in his faith in a God active in the affairs of men: 
"I believe that it is God's will to bring good out of 
every situation, even the most terrible. God can also 
do this. For this, however, he needs people." 55 
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Practical optimism is what Bonhoeffer describes as "a will for the 
56 
future." This "will" issued itself in practical plans. It was not 
just a blind faith that "alles sal regkom", but hope in a particular 
plan. Specific, serious plans characterised Bonhoeffer's activities 
from the moment he joined the conspiracy 1n 1938 unt11 the failure of 
Walkure in July, 1944. 
Institute writings are full of transcendent hope, but have few examples 
of practical optimism. The following words well represent the 
Institute's transcendent hope: 
"For myself, I remain, in the face of all the odds, a 
prisoner of hope, because I believe in the end the 
people will make the right choice." 57 
Such hope is certainly a necessary condition for effective action, but 
is it sufticient?. A Hoernle Memorial lecturer offers a pithy warning 
about some basic attitudes towards South Africa's affairs: 
"In trying to understand today's complex and turbulent 
Africa, a word of caution must be s.poken against easy 
optimism, harsh scepticism and facile analogies." 58 
in th~ absence of spetific plans of action can optimism be anything 
other than "easy optimism"? Some of the words of Insitituteleaders 
are not encouragirig: 
"Perhaps it is already too late, but deep in my heart 
I do believe that if we start today and go forward 
in faith we shall.overcome some day." 59 
"We do not know that peaceful methods will win, but at 
least we do not know that they will fail." 60 
"I don't know what will work best,.but we must go on 
speaking out against oppression and injustice because 
silence will be taken as consent." 61 
4. The Progressive Federal Party 
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The second organisational setting 1n which_ liberal writings have be 
examined is that of the Progressive Federal Party. The activities of 
62 
this party have been described in more detail in Chapter Three. The 
Party was born when eleven United Party Members of Parliament iesigned 
from that Party after its 1959 Central Conference and formed the 
Progressive Party (PP). Ten years later, in 1975, the Progressives 
63 
merged with a further United Party breakaway group, to form the 
64 
Progressive Reform Party (PRP). Two. years later, another merger, 
took place to create the Progr~ssive Federal Party (PF~). The PFP took 
over from the UP as official opposition in the 1977 election. 
The documents studied here have consisted of Xhe PP, PRP and PFP's 
chief speaker's contribution to the annual no confidence debate 1n 
Parliament from 1960 to 1984. tor the first two years, the PP 
spokesman, was its first leader, Dr Jan Steytler. From 1962 to 1974; 
its standard bearer was its solitary representati~e~ Mrs Helen Suzman. 
65 
From 1974, until 1979 its chief spokesman was its second national 
leader, Mr. Colin Eglin. From 1980 until 1984, this became Dr Van Zjl 
66 
Slabbert, the Party's third national leader. 
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Of course, a Parlimentary no confidence speech is very different from 
a presidential address delivered at a Race Relations Annual Council 
meeting. It is by nature more adversial, and fully steeped in both 
Parliamentary and party political conventions. Neverthe_less, they 
contribute a source of value statements, and in these an indication of 
the ethics of this organisation can be found. 
Of Ethics and Action 
The role of an opposition party in a Parliament is one of analysis and 
critique. A government may be measured by its deeds, an opposition can 
be measured only by its statements of intent. The role of the 
re~resentation of a liberal parliamentarian espousing the values of a 
. . . . . 
fully democratic multi-racial society, yet elected by a white 
67 
electorate is further complicated. 
PFP ethics have been further shaped by their minority party r~le for 
the first seventeen years of their existence. This minority role is 
~ithily captured in Suzman's description of h~r po~ition in the House 
in 1970. 
"I have no confidence in the government; I have no 
respect for the Official Opposition; and I have no 
time for the Herstigtes." 68 
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Indeed the years between 1961 and 1974 can be characteiised as years 1n 
the ~ilderness. · Time and time again, the PFP spokesman was called upon 
to take a solitary stand in defence of liberal values - a stand which 
carried little hope of influencing .events. During these years, Helen 
69 
Suzman had no opportunity to move her own amendment to the Official 
opposition's motion of no confidence. With the re-emergence of 
Progressive representation in some strength from 1974 onwards, the 
Party's spokesman was able to move an amendment to the motion of no 
confidence. From 1978 from which year the PFP became the official 
opposition, the motion was itself moved by PFP spokesmen. 
The reasons offered by the PFP over time for their lack of confidence 
in the government are suggestive of the ethical basis of their 
70 
critique. ~hese reasons can be grouped as follows: 
lack Df effective leadership and the failure to provide clear 
policies (1961, 1974, 1977, .1981, 1982, 1984). 
failure to remov~ racial discriminatioin and the consequent 
exacerbation of race relations (1974, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 
1983). 
failur~ to i~volve all races in planning for SA's future (1979, 
1980, 1981, 1983, 1984). 
economic ineptitude (1974, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1984). 
illiberal government,· in the sense of the repression of dissent 
(1978, · 1982). 
military and foreign affairs issues (1976, 1978, 1983 and 1984). 
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Equally interesting are those occasions when PFP spokesman urged 
71 
specific proposals on the government. These can be broadly 
grouped~ 
perhaps the appeal most frequently made was that for negotiation, 
the sharing of political power and responsibility 0962, 1974, 
1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984). 
the second most corrnnon appeal, especially prominent after 1977 is 
that for voluntary rather than prescribed group association and 
the linked concept of measur~s to prevent group domination (1979, 
1980, 1981, 1982, 1984). 
a third c0Im11on plea has been for the removal of discrimination 
(1974~ 1977, 1982). 
a fourth has been the appeal for the removal of the political 
constraints on economic growth (1974, 1982, 1984). 
finally, a further repeated appeal was that for a return to the 
72 
rule of law (1980, 1981). 
A third area in which the ethical premises and priorities of the PFP 
are revealed is to be found in descriptions of the PFP role. Here the 
most explicit outline of this _role has been given by Dr ~rederick Van 
Zyl Slabbert in the 1984 No Confidence Debate: 
"(i) keeping alive the idea of constitutional government and 
opposition alive; 
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(ii) preventing racial polarisation and intergroup conflict; 
(iii) fighting for civil liberties and particularly 
re-establishing the rule of law in our land; 
(iv) speaking up for the underdog and underprivileged; 
(v) formulating viable constitutional alternatives for the 
dead-ends into which this Government so often leads us; 
and 
(vi) keeping this government on its toes and being a watchdog 
for corruption, unnecessary red_ tape and bureaucracy and 
look1ng after the public interest." 73 
The Nature of Political Power 
One would expect the leadership of a political party to display a 
_well-developed sense of the realities of party political power. The 
ppp- leadership do not disappoint in this respect. From the earliest 
time of its existence, it correctly identified the.nature of South 
Africa's political problems: 
. . 
"The Hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development 
said 'Anybody who believes that the Bantu people 
will forever be subservient to other people in South 
Africa is living in a fool's paradise.' Therefore, the 
Nationalist Party advances the concept of Bantustan. 
Mr Speaker, we have no quarrel with the Nationalist 
Party ••• in their search for a basis of non-discrimination 
on which political rights and privileges are accorded 
to the individuals in South Africa. But we reject 
completely the Bantustan cult because we believe it can 
never be brought into practice in South Africa." 74 
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This is Jan,Steytler speaking in 1960. Twenty four years later, 
Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert gives a more academically sophisiicated, but 
essentially similar definition on the problem. 
"South Africa is an ethnically plural, culturaly diverse, 
racially manifold country in which the central political 
problem is that of group domination, the central economic 
problem one of structural inequality among groups of 
people, and the central social problem one of 
segmentation and division." 75 
There are also repeated instances in which PFP leaders demonstrate 
understanding of the political process. This is well-evidenced by 
Colin Eglin's analysis of South Africa's Angolan intervention 1n 
November/December 1975. He commences his critique by noting: 
II we do not cast doubt on the Government's intentions, 




II we say its judgement in this matter wrong II 77 
" the Government has underestimated the extent to 
which South Africa's involvement could be used to 
cloud the issue of Russia's intervention ••• " 78 
"Secondly ••• the Government overestimated Western 
European response to (this involvement)." 79 
and thirdly: 
" ••• the manner (of South Africa's involvement) determined 
and decided.upon by the Government was not sufficient 
to produce either a military or political result ••• 
the struggle for power in Angola still goes on ••• 
and the probable result will be a MPLA victory." 80 
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This analysis clearly prbcee~s from a realpolitik perspective and 
arrives at conclusions which are both apposite and topical: 
" even at a time when we claimed that we were fighting 
the cause of the free world, we could not count on a 
single active participating ally in the West ••• " 81 
and, therefore, 
"It is appropriate for us to seek.to enter into formal 
treaty agreements for mutual assistance with South 
African states which share our desire to see that this 
part of Africa does not become the victim of big power 
politics or big power imperialism." 82 
Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert has also repeatedly demonstrated the ability 
to employ realpolitik vocabulary for basic liberal v~lues: 
"When you use coercive control, you lose control o.n your 
society. Why?· Because you stifle information. Any 
society that cannot act rationally on the available 
information to cope with the challenges and problems 
that confront it is in difficulty. •i 83 
And this combination of realpolitik and liberal principle was often 
effectively combined to demonstrate the underlying dilemma of the 
present government: 
II being able to win an election is one thing; being 
able to govern a country properly is quite another ••• 
Pressures come not only from those who have the vote, 
but also from those who do not have the vote." 84 
This is Eglin speaking in 1978. Slabbert engaged the same sort of 
logic in his criticism of the new (1983) constitution: 
" 
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the Government has ••• built in a crisis of legitimacy 
into the new constitutional guidelines right from the 
outset ••• Firstly, because the Government formulated its 
own set of proposals •. Then it had ·them endorsed by its 
own party congresses. ·subsequently, it tried to sell 
them to other interested parties. What are the dangers 
of such an approach? Firstly, it excludes parties from 
the initial bargaining process right from the outset. 
Secondly, the Government is then bound by the congresses 
to sell a policy rather than to negotiate in terms of .a 
mandate." 85 
Finally, it is Slabbert who coins a pithy yet essential insight about 
the problems of the current Prime Minister: 
"He inherited a traditional party which has to meet modern 
demands." 86 
The Forte of Economic Interests 
The documents reviewed also displayed a significant reliance on the 
nature of economic forces and interests, as a key determinant of 
political ·reality. Indeed this forms as one of the basic avenues of 
87 
attack on Government policy. 
"I must say that to me it is astonishing that we should 
spend so much time discussing this imaginary South 
Africa consisting of Bantustan on the one hand and 
White South Africa on the other.· The real South Africa 
is, always has been and always will be a multi-racial 
country. If all the apartheid legislation which has been 
put on the Statute Book over the past fourteen years can 
only achieve these things, that there are nearly 1 000 000 
more Africans in the urban areas than Whites, more than 
three times as many Africans in the urban_ areas than 
there were ten.years ago~ and three times as many Africans 
as Whites employed in all the major industries in our 
urban areas, and i.n only three of our principal cities 
do White outnumber Blacks, then I say we are wasting 
our time on pipe dreams discussing a South.Africa 
consisting on the one hand of Bantustans and of White 
South Africans on th.e other. Nothing but nothing can 
possibly happen in the next fifteen years which can 
alter this." 88 · 
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PFP spokesmen have frequently noted the political constraints the 
policies of Apartheid have placed on South Africa's potential for 
89 
economic growth. They have sought to emphasise the coincidence irt 
the area of the economy of liberal sentiment and group self-interest, 
as ·the following quotation indicates: 
"I hope the Hon. the Prime Minister will have the courage to 
get off the back of the tiger that the Nationalist Party 
has been riding for the.last twenty five years and that 
he will re-:educate his own supporters to understand that 
white prosperity and non-white advancement are not mutually 
exclusive but that they are synonymous, that admitting 
the thousands of non-white persons who are banging at · 
the doors of our economy, anxious, willing and able to 
be absorbed by the intensified demands of a sophisticated 
industrialised society, as the best guarantee for the 
continued full employment. of white people in this 
country." 90 
They have. also w.arned of the dangers of the economic participation on 
the one hand and political exclusion on the other of blacks in South 
91 
Africa. 
· They have not advanced a coherent or comprehensive economic philosophy· 
or programme, in contrast to that of the government. Whilst clear on 
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certain aspects of economic policy, such as the need to remove racial 
discrimination in the economy and to give trade union rights to black 
92 
workers,· PFP attitudes towards "free enterprise" ~nd laissez faire 
economics has been both hesitant and critical, perhaps particularly 
93 
since ~he advent of Slabbert's leadership. 
Threat or Promise 
Normally, in a multi-party political system, the central objective. of a 
political party is to gain power. Such a political nbjective could 
never be realisticaly entertained by the PFP. A second common role for 
minority or small parties is to participate in the exercise of· 
political power by becoming a coalition partner of a major party. Thus 
the Liberal Party in Britain formed the Lib~Lab pact in the late 
Seventies. Over a longer period, the FDP in Germany has parti·cipated 
94 
in Government, occupying significant ministries, first with the 
Social Democrats and currently with the Christian Democrats. Again, 
this prospect has never been available to the PFP both beca~se the 
95 
g~verning party has never been in need of a coalition partner, and 
.also because philosophies on what can be described as primordial 
political issues h~ve been so divergent. 
Such a situation.creates a difficulty for a political party: neither 
in power, nor with the short or medium term prospect of coming to 
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power, dr participating in a coalition. In such a situation, a party 
is forced to derive both its optimism and its role from long-term 
96 
considerations. They are also likely to see motivation (theirs and 
others) in th~ light of long-term considerations. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that niuch PFP comment at 
the motivational level has been of this long-term motive. Most of it 
has also held the form of prediction of future negative events. A 
typical example is that of Steytler in 1961: 
'' it should be apparent to everybody in South Africa 
·that one extreme nationalism will stimulate other 
extreme nationalisms ••• unless we take out the 
extremism in nationalism, whether that applies to 
Europeans or non-Europeans, a conflict between various 
nationalisms is inevitable in South Africa." 97 
and Suzman in 1963: 
'' ••• no country can afford to have racial discrimination 
because racial discrimination breeds frustration and 
frustration breeds bitterness and eventually, it will 
breed a blood-bath in this country." 98 
and again in 1965: 
"Otherwise we are sewing a legacy of hatred which we may 
be able to weather but which I can assure the House our 
children will certainly not be able to-weather." 99 
and Eglin in 1977: (commenting on the Soweto riots and their 
aftermath) 
"That decision to 1Ileet confrontation head-on by shooting 
and by banning was, I believe, a fateful one for all of 
us in South •frica because it changed confrontation intri 
conflict. It incurred the risk of converting a protest 
movement into a revolutionary movement. ••• " 100 
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and again in 1979: 
"The harsh reality is that, seen against the broad sweep 
of history, the options for peaceful co-existence in 
South Africa are narrowing and the prospects for violence 
increasing." 101 
and Slabbert in 1981: 
"The sand in the hour-glass is rapidly running out and 
our_ children are watching us and wanting to know what_ 
we are doing." 102--
The extent to which South Africa is a fundamentally unstable society on 
the road to a bloody revolution, as well as the wisdom or urging ~hange 
on this basis will be reviewed in the conclusion. 
PFP leaders have sought to motivate chang~ by means of promise as well 
as (implied) threat, as indicated by Ejlin~ for exampl~, in 1976: 
"We on these benches will be discharged our responsibilities 
by being critical of the government ••• but we 
- will also support the Government every time it takes. 
courage in its hands and does move away from discrimination." 103 
and Slabbert, in 1980: 
"I want to assure him (the Prime Minister) for every concrete 
step he takes to remove .any form of statutory 
discrimination, he will have the overwhelming majority 
- of people in this land behind him, supporting him, 
thri~ing on new hope and showing new enthusiasm ·for the 
cause of our country_." 104 
_However, the threats outnumber the promises quite substantially in the 
documents reviewed. 
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3. Harry Oppenheimer and the Anglo American Corporation 
The third area in which liberal writings are reviewed focuses on an 
individual rather than an orgariisation - although this individual must 
be seen in the context of an organisation. The Anglo American 
Corporation cannot itself be seen as a liberal organisation - at least 
not in the same way as Race Relations and the PFP are liberal 
organisations. 
Whereas the primary purpose of the latter two organisations is the 
progation of liberal values, that of Anglo American is the production 
of goods and provision of services, and thereby the generation of 
profits for its shareho.lders. However Anglo's leadership has been 
throughly d6minated, through the sixty seven years of its existen~es, 
by the Oppenheimers, Sir Ernest and Harry. Their .liberal values have 
had a profound influence on the way in which profits have been 
generated and distributed, and on the attendent social arid political 
influences that have flowed from Anglo'a business activities. 
~ 
That Harry Oppenheimer is a liberal in the sense that this term is used 
in this thesis is beyon~ question. He describes himself in these 
105 
terms. ·His views and values conform closely to the tenets of 
106 
liberalism as articulated by Leatt. What gives especial interest to 
these liberal values and views is the leading role Harry Oppenheimer 
has played in the associated Anglo, De Beers and Minorco groups. 
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Over the twenty five years Oppenheimer has been chairman of Anglo its 
after tax attribtitable profits have risen from £5 254 546 in 1957 to 
R554 100 000 (or R800 200 000 bn an equity accounting basis) in 1983. 
-Anglo's market value in 1983 was R9.9 billion. It employs some 250 000 
people producing roughly forty per cent of South Africa's gold and 
.thirty per cent of her coal. Through the Anglo American Industrial 
Corporation it is engaged in a wide range of industrial, commercial 
and firiancial services activities. De Beers produces a significant 
part of the world's diamonds, and through the Central Selling 
Organisation markets eighty per cent of _woild diamonds. Its after tax 
profits have risen during the period of Oppenheimer's chairmanship from 
£17 739 048 to R530 200 000 in 1983. Minorco, the recently 
re-organised vehicle for the "greater _group's" international business, 
in_ 1983 earned profits of some $105 000 00~, with a net asset value of 
$2,6 billion, forty three per cent of which was deployed in Europe, 
thirty five per cent in North America and the balance in Africa, Asian 
107 
and Australasia. 
All of this makes the Anglo/De Beers/Minorco grouping one of the 
world's largest mining and mineral trading groupings. It is certainly 
the largest business venture in South Africa, and indeed on the Afric~n 
108 
continent. This has created for Oppenheimer areas of autonomous 
activity, which in turn create opportunities for direct and indirect 
social and politi~al influence. 
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The e~tent and natu~e of this influence is a matter of considerable 
dispute. Two of his recent fiercest critics have described Oppenheimer 
109 
as "one of the worlds most powerful men." Oppenheimer himself has 
consistently disputed the equation of size, wealth and power: the idea 
that top industrialists enjoy a degree of influence in which they can 





Indeed he co~nts himself as a failure in the 
It would be hard to deny that an organisation as large as Anglo 
American did not.exercise considerable influence over the social 
context of its operations. Power o~ influence? This describes the 
parameters of -the debate. This debate has been be-devilled by the lack 
112 
of· clear meaning or definition of terms. David Yudelman, in a 
well-re~earched, well-reasoned work argues that the state and capital 
have enjoyed a symbiotic, essentially co-operative relationship since 
the earliest phase of industrialisation. In terms of this 
relationship, the state and capital co~operated iri order to incorporate 
a radical labour movement (white in the Twenties, black in the 
Eighties). This co-operation also involves state assistance with 
capital accumulation and capital assistance with achieving economic 
growth,- and thereby creating/co-opting a labour elite. 
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This line of reasoning does not answer the question as to how much 
power, and in what form, capital is able to exercise. (Neither, 
incidentally does it suggest some contradiction between the values and 
actions of liberal capitalists. Indeed Yudelman argues this is the 
normal pattern of relationship between capital and the state in 
capitalist development). Yudelman, in his only specific references to 
Oppenheimer and Anglo notes the limitations which exist on their 
113 
actions as well as strategies to overcome them. 
The critics cited above discuss Oppenheimer's political influence in 
terms of his undeniably reformist, essentially liberal values. 
-"The Vorster regime may not be all that Oppenheimer 
would like it to b~; it may not be moving as far 
or as fast towards reform as Oppenheimer or the 
Progressive Reform Party might want; but meanwhile 
it is-gu~rding the stability of the country and as 
long as it does that, Oppenheimer is unlikely- to make 
any serious attempt to displace iL" 114 
Rich argues firstly that "economic liberals" looked in the Sixties and 
Seventies not to party politics, but to the business sector, to advance 
their interests: 
"The emergence of a Verligte or 'enlightened' wing of the 
National Party in the 1970's led to a new political alliance 
being formed between the elite of the English-speaking 
industrialists, led by Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo American." 115 
Finally, the most extensive critical studj of Anglo yet produced is 
116 
regrettably silent on this issue. 
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A debate 6f such magnitude and complexity requires more analysis than 
is possible here. It cannot be simplisticaliy resolved. All we can do 
here is pose some questions for further debate. 
Does the coincidence of some interests, such as social stability 
and economic conditions conducive to private enterprise constitute 
an alliance? 
How are the clear areas of difference, such as Oppenheimer's 
consistent support for opposition groups such as the PFP and 
Buthelezi's Inkatha to be explained? 
Can an alliance exist between parties who have a minimum of 
per~on~l contact? Oppenheimer and Vorster did not meet in the 
thirteen years of Vorster's premiership. 
If Oppenheimer did wish to "displace" the Vorster regime· (and he 
has given every indication he would prefer another government), 
how can.he do so outside of the actions he has already taken? 
When people sp~ak of the p~wer of Anglo and Oppenheimer, to what 
type of power do they refer? And how do they perceive this power 
being exercised? 
Certainly Anglo's socio-economic and political influence cannot be 
denied. Three distinct avenues of such influence can be identified: 
Firstly, the business activities of Anglo American and De Beers. 
These businesses have been prominent in raising black wages, 
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calling for labour reforms and abolishing racial discrimination in 
117 
·the workplace; 
Secondly, the creation of The Urban Foundation in the wake of the 
1976 riots which commenced in Soweto, as agency at first for the 
improvement of the quality of urban life, and more recently for 
118 
"structural reform" in South Africa; 
Thirdly, the provision of financial support for a wide range of 
119 
liberal activities and organisations. 
The documents reviewed here are Oppenheimers twenty five Anglo American 
annual Chairman's Statements. Of interest is the articulation given to 
liberal values when discussing South Africa's economic, political and 
social problems. 
The Identity of Ethics and Action 
As with Bonhoeffer. Oppenheimer looks to the ethical content of action. 
The ethical consequences of business action feature as one of the most 
constant element in his thinking. When taking over the reins from his 
father in 1957 he quotes his father's 1954 dictum about Anglo's 
purpose: 
" ••• to earn profits, but to earn them in such a way as 
to make a real and permanent contribution to the well-being 
of the people and to the developement of Southern Africa." 120 
..... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--
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In his own f~rewell speech to the staff of Anglo 1n December 1982 he 
said that 1n working for Anglo: 
" ••• people must be able to feel that they are contributing 
to the establishment of better, fairer, more peaceful 
conditions in South Africa." 
We have to believe, and by our practice demonstrate, that 
the putsuit of business efficiency and the search for a 
free and just society are not contradictory objectives, 
but two aspects of the same ·thing." 121 
Oppenheimer repeatedly points to the social cons·equences of. economic. 
ac ti vi ties: 
"In measuring the achievements behind the establishment 
of these mines one must not think only in terms of so 
much copper and so much profit. Townships had to be 
built, standards of public .health and hygiene attained, 
roads, cotmnunications and railway extensions created in 
what was then a primitive area, and the Native population bad 
to be trained to take·its place in an industrial economy." 122 
and again: 
"The freedom of a country finds expression, not only 
through the activities of individuals, but through 
associations or teams. And business associations 
are of special importance because they generally 
dispose of the practical skill and material resources 
to carry through large projects. If such organisation 
do not actively respond to the needs of the community in 
which they work,· there is no alternative but increased 
regulation of life by government agencies. So that it 
is not too much to say that a sense of responsibilty in 
such matters on the part of private businessmen is part 
of the defence of freedom itself." 123 
A further indication of Oppenheimer's perception of the possible and 
necessary identity of business and ethical or moral considerations is 
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given in a a remark he made when referring to the consequences of 
Sharpeville in 1960: 
"The recent disturbances have affected these (capital) 
markets to a degree which is not generally appreciated 
in South Africa. Not only have they caused investors 
to fear for the safety of their holdings but they have 
evoked a wave of moral indignation against the present . 
South African racial policies." 124 
Oppenheimer again draws the consequences from moral positions in 
discussing the question of economic boycotts~ 
"I have little doubt that in practice the immediate 
effect of any such boycott would not be to cause the 
government to change course, but to tighten its.control 
of the flow of blacks.from rural areas to the towns for 
the reason that under-employment in rural ·areas is 
judged to be less likely to cause social unrest than 
massive unemployment in the cities. If a boycott did 
in the long run produce change in South Africa, it 
could only be violent change induced by the sufferings 
that it would have inflicted on black people. It is 
difficult to believe that any end could justify such 
mean:s " 125 
Power and Reality· 
As with the PFP, Oppenhiemer's writings repeatedly note the role that 
power plays in society. He makes repeated references to the political 
realities which define South Africa's political future options. White 
power is one of these realities: 
"The union and the Rhodesians have comparatively large 
European populations with no other homes. They are 
·determined to stay in Southern Africa and to create 
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conditions in which their children and grandchildren 
can stay there also. Any political approach which does 
not accept that fact is unrealistic and useless." 126 
A second reality is: 
" ••• that the question is not whether South Africa should 
be a multi-racial state, but rather how such a state 
should conduct its affairs." 127 
In 1959 he posited a third "reality" which proved to be quite false: 
"There has been some talk of eventual full independence 
for the African areas, but I do not believe that South 
Africans of any race or party would seriously contemplate 
the partition of the country." 128 
When, by 1982, it had become clear that (at least internally) 
independant and self-governing states had emerged, Oppenheimer 
acknowledged this: 
·"This is the crux of the political debate as it has now 
evolved. Are blacks to be recognised and treated as 
South Africans? Or is the government going to insist 
that their nationality and allegiance should lie ~olely 
with the indepedant black· sta.tes, or autonomous black 
territories which government policy has called into 
being? Plainly the government policy cannot now be 
reversed.· It is far too late for that. But could it 
perhaps be accomodated, as the Buthelezi Commission 
suggests, within ~ wider South African federal system 
one in which people of all races would enjoy an over-
riding South African nationality, carry South African 
passports and come perhaps in time to feel a common 
Sou th Africa patriotism." 129 
Responsible Action 
Oppenheimer displays concern with the consequences of action, as well 
as with the motives of the actors. Both allies and critics are called 
to take account of this: 
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International ~ritics: 
"No doubt there is much that is wrong in South Africa, 
and we would welcome the understanding and goodwill of 
the world outside to help us put it right. Too often 
we are met merely with indiscriminate condemnation, 
and thoughtless encouragement to every form of 
resistance to the existing system, without any· 
clear idea of what should be put in its place." 130 
Government: 
"Unless we can create conditions in which agitators 
are ineffective, not because of draconian legislatio~, 
but because people do not want to listen to them, 
the future of South Africa will be a gloomy one." 131 
"This policy of separate development has, however, 
been even less successful than the Rhodesian policy 
of partnership, either in satisfying African political 
aspirations, or in mollifying overseas critics." 132 
"It is no doubt the first duty of a Government to 
maintain order ••• The full economic developement of 
the country, however, will only be secured in 
circumstances in which the maintainence of law and 
order can be reconciled with freedom for the individual." 133 
Industry: 
Here he comments on the argument which calls for low wages and 
. full employment: 
"In.South African conditions such a policy would in 
practice be gravely unjust and dangerous for what it 
would involve i_s not a low wage structure for all 
workers, but a policy of maintaining high wages for· 
whites and low wages for blacks." 134 
Economic Forces 
A completely consistent, and insistent, argument throug-hout the period 
under review, is that relating political consequence and economic 
development: The vital principle in .this argument is succinctly stated 
as follows: 
- I 
" racial discrimination and free enterprise are 
basically incompatible, and ••• failure to eradicate 
one will ultimately result in the destruction of the 
othe.r." 135 
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This differs, it should be noted, from the economic determinism 
136 
attributed to O'Dowd, yet avers the importance of economic growth 
as a necessary though not sufficient condition for political progress 
and stability, and indeed vice versa. 
In advocating "African advancement", Oppenheimer notes, it is 
fallacious to argue that this will take place at the expense of the 
137 
white worker. He also acknowledges that presently (written in 1976) 
many blacks are excluded from the free.enterprise system. and its 
138 
benefits. 
Oppenheimer acknowledges also that the changes which must be made will 
have .a cost: 
''It will not be possible for all these change~ to be 
made without affecting profits. In virtually none of 
our enterprises can increased costs be passed onto the 
consumer because for the most part we are selling at 
world or controlled prices. While we believe that 
improvements in productivity will flow from most of 
what we are doing, there can be no guarantee that in 
all cases they will fully offset the costs of increased 
wages, and in any even·t wages are geQerally b·eing 
increased first while the improvements in productivity 
will only follow after an interval of time. I am 
confident, however, that shareholders will support us· 
in our decision to embark on these policies in the 
belief that they are essential to the long-term 




In contrast to many Race Relations and PFP statements, Oppenheimer 
demonstrates an unambiguous optimism. Writing in the shadow of the 
events of Sharpeville in 1960 he says: 
"It would be idle to pretend that Southern Africa is 
not subject to serious political risk. But there are 
very few parts of the world where there are not ~erious 
political risks of one kind or another. And in Southern 
Africa, in spite of all the problems and difficulties, 
there are solid grounds for optimism." 140 
Twenty one years later his optimism was just as strong: 
"Is it going to be possible to find a method of power 
sharing between all the peoples of South Africa on a 
fair and acceptable basis? I think it is clear that 
the government is honestly seeking such a solution: 
but it is equally.clear that it has not yet found it. 
To do -so needs courage, goodwill and faith such as 
has not been manifested by a previous South African 
government in my experience. But then perhaps South 
Africa as a whole has never been ripe for such change 
as new circumstance are now pressing upon us. In that 
last consideration there is, I believe, real ground 
for optimism." 141 
Yet Oppenheimer makes it clear that the future cannot be approached 
with complacency, and will not be without trauma: 
"We in South Africa are now embarking upon a period of 
change and development in our industrial structure, 
as our working people establish their bargaining 
positions and be~in to assert their wishes. Older 
industrialised societies have all passed through this 
phase of development, and have usually experienced 
unrest and anxiety in the process. Here, we must 
accomplish the adjustment in an environment greatly 
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complicated by the questions of race and colour and 
by political attitudes, not only within South Africa, 
but elsewhere~ It would be wrong to expect that we can 
do this without tension, but it would be an even greater 
~istake not to try." 142 
Threat or Promise 
This optimism causes Oppenheimer to approach problem areas more from a 
perspective of promise rather than that of threat. Talking of the 
shortage of skilled workers, for example, he says: 
"Leaders in all sections of industry are looking to the 
government to take appropriate steps to -remedy the 
shortage of skilled labour, and I feel sure that with 
goodwill and common sense it can be done." 143 
This positive approach has not meant that Oppenheimer has not be 
critical, even sharply critical, of the South African Government: 
"Certainly it would be idle to pretend that significant 
progress has yet been made toward realising the hopes 
that were then (Carlton Conference) raised." 144 
"Time is running dangerously short and if our problems 
are not faced now they will have to_ be faced in much 
aggravated form in the future." 145 
"Nothing is more dangerous than half-hearted reform." 146 
However, Oppenheimer consistently seeks to define his own role, and 
that of .the Anglo American Group, in positive terms: 
"The business community as a whole has in these 
circumstance a special contribution to make .and 
I believe that our Croup in particular, with the 
wide experience it has gained in African countries 
and overseas, can play a significant part in helping 
to solve the problems with which South Africa is now 
faced." 147 . 
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I CHAPTER FIVE 
LIBERAL VOICES AND THE DILEMMA OF THE 1983 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM 
"Realistically one cannot expect the white population to 
accept a sudden transformation from their present 
dominant role to a politically impotent one." 
Interview 13 
"I know what they (liberals) should do, but I don't know 
what the consequences will be." 
Interview 14 
"Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that will work. 
We have to go forward in faith doing what we can, where 
we can." 
Interview 11 
"Liberals don't plan strategically or effectively. 
Liberal values in themselves are not very powerful 
agents for organisation mobilisation." 
Interview 5 
"The problem is our powerlessness." 
Interview 12 
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This chapter examines how a group of South African liberals responded to a 
contemporary dilemma, the 1983 Constitutional Referendum. It is based on 
interviews conducted during September and October 1983 with fourteen 
individuals, each of whom may be regarded as a significant articulator of 
liberal val~es. The chapter constitutes a third attempt to expl~re the 
1 
questions raised in this thesis: 
- Are liberal ethics characterised by a sense of powerlessness? 
- Has this led to a concentration on pririciple, motive and inner 
conviction rather than the consequences of action? 
- How does this affect liberal action in a contemporary concrete dilemma? 
From a methodological point of view, the chapter again seeks to combine two 
2 
objectives: 
- In a phenomenological sense, the need to get close to the data and 
allow this data to speak for itself; and 
the need to illuminate the results of this phenomenological experience 
through the application of-ideal-type devices or techniques. Three of 
these are used here: 
(a) the Cardijn "see, judge; act" sequences of ethical analysis _(see 
page 198); 
(b) contepts dr~wn from the first section of the thesis, and in 
particular from Bonhoeffer's model, such as optimism and 
pessimism, the role of reason, guilt, power and evil as well as 
ethical ambiguity (de Beauvoir) and ethical modesty (Camus); 
-194-
(c) elements drawn from the thesis above, such as the concepts of 
powerlessness and an ethich of inner conviction (Weber) as opposed 
to consequences. 
Hopefully, these ideal-types have been used to test, delineate and 
illuminate, and not to distort or constrain. 
1. The Nature of the Research 
1.1 Sample: Those interviewed were selected against a s~t of 
criteria. 
Whites 
Firstly, as the dilennna in question posed problems most concretely 
for those who presently have the vote, only white liberals were 
interviewed for this chapter. This is in no way to suggest that 
only white South Africans are liberals. There is much evidence to 
3 
suggest that liberalism is one of the two major ideologies of 
those opposing Afrikaner Nationalism, whether white, black, 
4 
coloured or Indian; Positive ideological labels are not easy to 
apply to black political movements. Mobilisation has often 
occurred against specific measures (1913 Land Act, 1936 Hertzog 
Bills, Pass. Laws, etc.). However, it is clear that libera·l values 
5 
as defined by Leatt, enjoyed great support from generation to 
generation amongst black leaders and that liberalism exercised 
considerable effect on organised black politics throughout South 
6 
Africa's history. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the 
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history of black political organisation reveals a pattern of 
political liberalism and economic egalitarianism (though not 
7 
necessarily socialism). 
Both the Bergstrasser and Buthelezi opinion research indicates· 
significant black popular support for liberal values: 
strong support for the democratic process including the role 
of the opposition (but only a slight majority for multi-party 
8 
democracy); 
a rejection of all forms of racial discrimination, in~luding 
9 
a rejection of the tyranny of the majority; 
support for the role of the courts, freedom of speech and the 
10 
role of the press. 
English Speakers 
11 
Secondly, the group of liberals intereviewep has been largely 
restricted to English speaking liberals. Again, this is not to 
suggest .that liberalism is the exclusive preserve of the English 
speaking section of the white cormnunity. Some of South Africa
1
s 
most outstanding liberals have come from an Afrikaans background: 
Jan Hofmeyr, Hoernle~ Marquard, Jan Steytler for example. There 
12 
has always been an important Afrikaans liberal tradition. 
Furthermore, Afrikaner Nationalism has been importantly_influenced 
by liberal values. Attempts have been made from time to time to 
seek a reconciliation or compromise between the group centered and 
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charismatic values of pure nationalism and the more universal and 
egalitarian values present in culture and theology. One of the 
most important such attempts is represented by Van Wyk Louw's 
Liberale Nasionalisme which seeks ari equilib~ium between group 
13 
rights and human or individual rights. Another attempt arose 
14 
out of the failed Cottoesloe Consultation. More recently, 
tensions between basically liberal values and Afrikaner 
Nationalism have been evident at the Universities of Potchefstroom 
16 
and Stellenbosch. Finally, the 1982 split in the National Party 
may be seen at least in some small part as a debate between an 
15 
17 
exclusivist and universalist vision of society within that party. 
However, this thesis suggests that liberal ethics have been 
distorted and weakened ~y a prolonged exclusion from the exercise 
of power. Therefore, these interviews concentrate on the most 
clearly and unambiguously excluded group - the English speaking 
liberal~ This exclusion was based in the early period of 
Nationalist rule as much on the fact that the English speaker 
belonged to the wrong l~nguage group as on a clash of ideas. This 
was an inevitable consequence of the rise of Afrikaner 
Nation~lism. The National Party mobilised in the late Thirties 
and Forties around the concept of Afrikanerskap and of a political 
unity of all belonging to the Afrikaner Volk. No blurring of 
ethnic lines could be entertained at this time. This ethnic 
political mobilisation was emphaticaly coupled to a profoundly 
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18 
illiberal ideology. English liberals were, therefore, 
disqualified on two scores. 
Societal Roles 
The group interviewed included liberals in a range of occupations 
and based in the three major metropolitan areas: 
The group included two present (Helen Suzman, Colin Eglin) 
progressive Members -0f Parliament; as well as three former 
MP's (Harry Oppenehimer, Zach De Beer and Rene De Villiers); 
It included two businessmen (Harry Oppenheimer and Zach De 
Beer); 
Two leading Churchmen (Archbishop Hurley and Rob Robertson); 
A former newspaper editor (Rene De Villiers); 
A writer and former leader of the Liberal Party (Alan 
Paton): 
The.several times national leader of the Black Sash (Sheena 
. Duncan); 
The director of the Human.Awareness Programme (Marion Nell) 
and 
Four liberal academics: economist (Francis Wilson) law 
(Pr6.fessors John Dugard and Tony Mathews) and. Professor of 
Comparative African Government (David Welsh). 
Six of those interviewed l.ive and work in Johannesburg, four in 
Cape Town and four in Natal (Durban and Pieter.maritzburg). 
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With the exception of Marion Nell, the interviewees are all in a 
mature phase of their careers. In retrospect, it would have been 
valuable to include more younger liberal spokesmen. The short 
time period during which these interviews had to be conducted made 
this difficult. 
More detailed biographical sketches of the interviewees are 
provided in Annexure Two, pages 410-415. 
1.2 The Nature of the Interview 
The interviews were all conducted in the months of September and 
October 1983. This time period was chosen as it was the height of 
the Referendum campaign but before the outcome of the referendum 
was known.· 
The interviews had a duration of between forty five minutes and 
two-and a-half hours. This time was spent asking a series of six 
questions, three of which dealt with the Referendum, whilst the 
remaining three questions were of a more general nature. In both 
cases the "see, judge, act" methodology developed by Cardinal 
Cardijn, and used in the Young Christian Workers and Young 
Christian Students movements, was used. Interviewees were first 
asked to describe the new constitution and present day South 
Africa (how do you ~ it); then to pass judgement on it (how do 
you judge it) and then to advocate a course of action (what will 
you do about it). 
Detailed notes of the responses were taken and a record of the 
interview was written up immediately after the interview. 
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Interviewees were promised that their remarks would not be 
attributed to them individually. Firstly, because the purpose of 
the interviews was to achieve a collective liberal view of both 
the Constitutional "reform" as well as change in South Africa in 
the 1980's. It was an attempt to find out how white English 
speaking liberals as a group viewed these questions. Secondly, 
because all of those interview_~d hold important positions in 
organisations. Non~attribution allowed them to speak both more 
personally and more frankly. 
These interviews (unattributed). are included in Annexure Two 
(pages 375-40~). They are frequently quoted in the course of this 
chapter. 
2. The Dilemma The 1983 Constitutional Referendu~ 
The Referendum held for white voters on ·2nd November 1983 was to 
determine the degree of support for the Cons~itution of South Africa 
Act 1983, as debated and passed by Parliament in its second sitting of 
this same year. The question posed on the ballot paper was simply "Are 
you in favour of the implementation of the Constitution of South Africa 
Act of 1983 as considered by Parliament." The 1983 Constitution is an 
immensely complex document. As the Leader of the Official Opposition, 
the PFP, commented after the result was known, few people could have. 
voted for its detailed proposals as these were not understood by 70 per 
19 
ceni of public representatives, lei alone the.electorate. 
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The authors of the new constitution argued in essence that its purpose 
was to provide a vehicle for participation fot coloured and Indian 
South Africans, as .well as to provide a new system of government not 
based on the Westminster "winner take all" system. To achieve this, 
the constitution provides for an ethnically constituted three chamber 
parliament on a 4:2:1 ratio for whites, coloureds and Indians 
respectively. It provides for a dualistic legislative and executive 
process of government with ethnic chambers and executive cabinets 
dealing w;i.th "own ·affairs" and "general affairs" being dealt with 
jointly. By way of moving away from Westminster, it provides for.an 
indirectly elected Executive President with significant legislative 
.influence as well as executive power, and for a system of legislative 
joint committees similar to aspects of the American Congressional 
system. 
The Campaign 
South Africa's five white political parties took up positions as 
follo-ws: 
The governing National Party (NP) -which received 56 per cent of 
the popular vote in the last general election - camp~igned for a 
yes vote; The Conservative/Centrist opposition, New Republic 
Party (NRP) - which received seven per cent of the popular vote in 
1981 - also campaigned for a "Yes" vote; 
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To the left of the·government, the official opposition, 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) - receiving 21 per cent of the 
popular vote in 1981 - campaigned for a "No'' vote; 
To the right of the government, the reactionar·y Herstigte 
Nasionale Party (HNP) - which gained 14 per cent of the popular 
vote in the last general election - also campaigned for a "No" 
vote; 
F{nally, the right of centre Conservative Party (CP), formed as 
the result of a defection of 18 of the NP's 131 members of 
parliament in 1982, campaigned for a "No" vote. 
The major criticisms levelled· at the new constitution by its opponents 
were: 
20 
from the left: 
that it provided no vehicle for participation for black South 
Africans, who constitute 70 per cent of the population,thereby 
avoiding SA's major political challenge; 
that it provided no real power sharing as whites re.tained real 
control through their permanent 4:2:1 majorities in the electoral 
college, (which elects the President) Parliament, and the 
President's Council (whose key function.is to resolve confli~t 
between the three. ethnic chambers); 
that it entrenches rather than ameliorates ethnic conflict because 
it defines political power along ethnic lines (three separate 
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ethnic chambers, ethnically defined voters rolls, the ethnic 
divide between~ and general affairs); 
that because of the excessive powers given to the President, it 
created a position of near dictatorship; 
and finally, that it was clumsy, complex and unworkable. 
from the right: 
that by sharing power with people of colour, it meant the end of 
white South Africa; 
that power sharing with coloureds and Indians was an inevitable 
step towar·ds power sharing with blacks; 
that it represented the end of white self-determination; 
that black and white interests in South Africa were so ultimately 
divergent that the constitution would be a formula for perpetual 
conflict and deadlock; and 
that it created a dictatorship and was the end of democracy. 
The Government responded to these diverse criticisms as follows: 
that blacks were not being excluded from the process of 
constitutional development but merely from this constitution. The 
homeland policy already provided for political p~rticipation for 
blacks living outside "white" South Africa. It ackn.owledged that 
a political vacuum existed for blacks living permanently in 
"white" South Africa and appointed a cabinet committee.to 
investigate this problem; 
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that the new constitution was based on the principle of consensus 
decision making rather than majoritarian decision making and that 
in this way, it did provide for real power sharing and could 
function despite its seemingly complex structure; 
that the powers of the President were no more than the combination 
of the powers of the present State President and Prime Minister; 
that the constitution created parallel and co-ordinated structures 
for ~elf-determination for each ethnic group as well as for 
co-responsibility as between groups. 
Probably more significant than the debate as to detail (sununarised 
above) were the symbols and feelings central to the debate. The 
Government and the NRP argued that this was a step in the right 
direction. It was neither complete nor perfect, but it nevertheless 
represented progress. The right wing opposition argued it was a.first 
decisive step in the abdication of whites from their present position 
of power and a sort of roller coaster to majority rule. Remember 
Rhodesia was, therefore, probably their .most effective campaign slogan. 
The left wing opposition dwelt most on the exclusion of blacks and 
thereby the exacerbation of black/white· tensions as well as their fear 
of dictatorship. They, therefore, argued that the new con.stitution 
represented no real reform but rather a step in the wrong direction. 
They seemed early in the campaign to acknowledge the unpopularity of 
their stance by choosing as their campaign slogan "It takes guts to say 
No" and (in conunon with their right wing opponents) "don't be a yesman". 
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Few issues can have been as exhaustingly and comprehensively (though 
not necessarily logically!) debated.in the relatively short history of 
South Africa as ~ united territory. Almost every conceivable interest 
group and organisation was drawn on the issue. Almost every angle -
the new constitution and business, .foreign investors, blacks, the 
Church, the economy, the student, etc. etc. - was explored. 
Many traditionally united groupings were divided on this issue. 
Whereas the English speaking Churches, 
21 22 
and universities, and 
23 
traditional liberal organisations s~ch as the Black Sash, 
24 
and the 
Institute of Race Relations, 
25 
were uniformly opposed; the English 
language newspapers, and the business community were deeply divided. 
26 
The nature of the divided judgement was essentially as to whether this-
was a step in the right or the wrong direction. The black community 
was, not unsurprisingly, united in its opposition to the new 
27 
constitution. - The coloured ·and Asian communities in contrast were 
28 
deeply divided. 
A final note of confusion was contributed by an almost single-handed 
campaign of the liberdl journal Frontline for liberal opponents of the 
29 
constitution to spoil their ball~ts, as well as a puzzling call· from 
the largest English daily, the Johannesburg Star for_ liberal opponents 
to stay away from the ballot box. 
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The Results 
The results produced a resounding majority for the Government and its 
allied NRP. At first glance, it would appear as if the electorate had 





% of the.popular vote in 1981 
for 'yes' parties 64,9% 65,9% 
%1of the·popular vote in 1981 
for 'no' parties 33,3% 33,5% 
spoilt ballots 1,8% 0,6% 
However, this apparent coincidence conceais a substantial defection 
from the governing NP to the right wing No position, and a matching 
defection.from the. PFP to the Yes· position. The nature of the 
defection is revealed when the results are compared in voting regions 






No PFP support (no candidate) 73,4% 69,7% 
PF'P less 10% of total vote 64,8% 58,2% 
PFP between 10% and 25% of vote 67,2% 68,9% 
PFP more than 25% of vote 64,2% 72,5% 
It is also revealed by comparing the voting areas returning the highest 
"Yes" vote and those returning the lowest. 
East London 77 ,9% 
_ Pietermaritzburg 76,3% 
Cape Town 75 '6% 
Durban 73,6% 
and 












Weak PFP · 
Support 
Finally, the "Yes" vote by province indicates the areas where the 






Commentators noted that the PFP suffered a defection of between 30 per 
30 
cent and 40 per cent of their 1981· support. The .extent of the 
defection is impossible to estimate wit~ any accuracy, as it depends on 
.the magnitude of right wing defection from the NP in PFP strongholds. 
What is clear is that substantial numbers of PFP voters "crossed the 
floor" to vote "Yes". 
3. Seeing: The Origins df Constitutional Reform 
When aske9 what the origins were of the current "reform" initiatives 
(and reform was purposely placed in inverted commas) interviewees 
produced a wide and widely disparate, set of responses. 
Perhaps the most common .thread was the feeling that reform did not 
arise from a genuine. "change in heart" on the part of Afrikaner 
Nationalists: 
"I'm fairly sure that these 'reforms' don't arise from 
a liberal tendency within Government." 31 
·"This means that the changes are negative and 
reluctant in nature. The idealism of old-
fashioned Apartheid has played no role." 32 
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Reform was seen to be occurring within the straight-jacket of old 
objectives: 
"The current reform initiatives were characterised 
by what many referred to as Old Cape Liberalism, 
but which could more accurately be described as old 
Cape racism. This was based on the unarticulated 
premise that coloureds and (by implication) Asians 
could be included in white society because they were 
like the whites, but blacks must be excluded." 33. 
and 
"Change became imperative - however, it had to be 
change which gave the appearance of reform, without 
threatening the Nationalist's real grip on power." 34 
and again 
"P.W. (Botha) is trying to retreat in good order, 
whilst keep control~" 35 
Although all interviewees seemed agreed that change did not result from 
a. change of heart, several did refer to which might be seen as 
endogenous origins, or put differently a changed pattern of Nationalist 
response: 
"The major origin lies in the Afrikaner Nationalism's 
sense of 'konsekwentheid'. The coloureds and Indians 
were left out." 36 
Another interviewee concurs, seeing as an important pressure: 
"Afrikaner fundamentalism and the need to formulate 
complete solutions." 37 
and another refers to endogenous causation: 
'~isquiet in the Church, disquiet in the universities 
rebelliousness amongst the young, ••• " 38 
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If Afrikaner Nationalism is not a prime or princip~l mover (indeed 
more of-a iimitation), what is? Seven areas of origin are descibed 
below, and the frequency with which they were cited is given below. 
This table must be seen only as a rough agenda of causation. Many 
areas lack precise definition. Frequently areas were cited ten-
tatively. Furthermore, interviewees were not asked to select one, or 
even the major area of cause. Many cited several factors, often 
without weighing them. The-table is not, therefore, an attempt at 
quantitative analysis but merely a summary of factors mentioned, and 
an indication of the most frequently cited. 
Military considera-tions 7 
Forces of an econom1_c nature 7 
The desire to be part of the West 5 
Nationalist fundamentalism 
(the desire for complete sol~tions) 4 
Black protest actions 3 
Demographic forces/urbanisation 2 
Afrikaner dissidence 2 
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The factors mentioned most frequently then were military 
considerations, economic forces and the desire for good relations with 
the West. 
Military Factors 
The context in which military factors occurred was more in the form of 
future .threats rather than present considerations: 
"the military's desire not to fight on two fronts." 
40 
"the growing military threat ••• II 
39 
"(Military leaders) made numerous statements indicating that South 
41-
Africa 's problem could not be resolved militarily." 
42 
"The costs of countering subversion are growing." 




Economic forces were seen to be promoting a broader incorporation .of 
blacks: 
that it had led to the abandoriment of the goal of meaningful 
44 
terri~orial separation; 
that it h~d ~hanged employer attitudes on issues ~uch as influx 
45 
control and the permanence of urban blacks; 
that the coloureds were now where the Afrikaners were in the 




Relations With the West 
The desire to be part of the West is seen as leading to reform in that 
South Africa has taken note and reacied to international actions and 
pressures. As one interviewee put it: 
'' South Africa'~ relations with the West-had 
created some new legitimacy needs." 47 
Another spoke of the need the Government might feel: 
"to impress Washington and Bonn." 48 
One of the mo~t striking features of these views as to the origins of 
"reform" is the limited (indeed almost neglible) role attributed to the 
actions of non-Afrikaner nationalists inside South Africa. Only three 
interviewees mentioned black actions outside of the military arena, and 
only one saw these as the major cause of reform, and even then this 
49 
action (Soweto 1976) was cited. as the psychological turning point. 
The actions of white liberals receive no mention whatsoever. This 
confirms _the sense of powerlessness so central to the thesis under 
consideration. Of course, liberals (both whites and blacks) and 
non-liberal black organisations (trade unions) have been active in 
promoting economic integration. Hbwever, the fbrces of economic 
integration are cited as impersonal f~rces, rather than the result of 
liberal action. 
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4. Judging - The New And Old Constitutions And Constitutional Ideals 
In order to establish a benchmark for further judgement interviewees 
were asked to compare and contrast the proposed new constitution of 
1983 with the present constitution (i.e. the Constitution Act of 1961). 
Eight of the fourteen interviewees saw the new constitution as 
50 
unambiguously worse. Major reasons cited were as follows: 
the greater rigidity and inflexibility of the new constitution, in 
that it now enshrines aspects of apartheid ~ociety (e.g. the 
51 
Population Registration Act) in the Constitution itself; 
. . 52 
because it provides for "an excessive and frightening" 
53 
concentration of power, particular in the hands of the 
President: "it is an undemocratic constitution in the sense that 
it further erodes the balance of power between the individual and 
54 
the State;" 
because ''it further entrenches and will furth~r increase race 
group consciousness; ~ •• i~ will divide functional activities 
(such as health) on a race group basis. This will increase 
conflict between groups defined around race ·over scarce 
55 
resources;" 
because it was fundamentally deficient in the process of its 
creation being "the work of a handful of individuals" rather 
than the outcome of a sustained and significant debate. It was, 




finally, because it is so complex as to be unworkable. 
Five of the interviewee.g were ambivalent when making the comparison. 
In the words of one of them: 
"It is not possible to make a simple good/bad judgement. 
The new constitution is positive in that the issue 
of political rights for people who are not white is 
at least being addressed. Reform is on the agenda. 
However, .it is bad in the way in which reform has 
been tackled." 58 · 
This sentiment. was echoed by several interviewees including some who 
judged the new constitution to be unambiguously worse: 
"However, at least, the new constitution does legitimise 
the idea of the division of power." 59 
Another ambivatent interviewee: 
"It is better in the sense that it confers a symbolic 
equality of status on coloureds and Indians." 60 
and another: 
II the sheer proximity 
people of colour in the 
symbol of change." 61 
and again: 
of Government leaders to 
new deal will create a 
"Still it .is a gesture. Perhaps we're wrong in not 
recognising this as a significant gesture. It is the 
beginning of the end. Verwoerd understood that 
separation could only survive as absolute separation. 
Treurnicht also understands. this." 62 
and finally: 
II I cannot give a resounding no to the new 
constitution. The Afrikaners are now trying to get 
out of a fortress which they have been constructing 
for decades. They have made it almost impregnable. 
Now they find that not only can no-one get in, but 
also they cannot get out. The fortress has become 
a prison." 63 
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However, if the five "ambivalents" had some sympathy with at least a· 
part of-what the architects of the new constitution, and if they saw 
some positive features in the new plan, on balance, they judged it more 
negatively than positively. 
"On balance, therefore, whilst it represents one or 
two steps forward, it represents many more 
-backwards." 64 
Only one of the fourteen saw the· new constitution as "marginally 
better" than-the present one. This interviewee argued as follows: 
"The inclusion of coloureds and Indians in the formal 
political process cannot be dismissed as insignificant 
On the other hand, it certainly does not 
qualify as real power sharing -as their political 
actions will never be decisive. The coloureds and 
Indians will enjoy a sort of blackmail power. To 
the extent that the Nats really want this system to 
work, they will have-to make concessions to-ensure 
continued coloured and Indian co-operation. 
It is true, of course, that the major issue has not 
been addressed i.e. the political· accommodation of 
blacks. They are excl-uded from the new constitution. 
However, they are excluded from the present one also." 65 
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Constitutional Ideals 
Having compared the proposed with the present constitution, 
interviewees were now a~ked to judge the proposed constitution 1n terms 
of their own constitutional ideals. This question produced three 
i-nteresting areas of difference: 
individual versus group rights~ 
the tension between universal ideals and South African realities; 
and 
the contrast between stressing the content of an ideal 
constitution and the way in which it was "made". 
Group versus Individual Rights 
Of those who dealt expressly with this issue, four interviewees laid a 
clear emphasis on individual rather than group rights: 
"We should move away from this group business entirely. 
The sooner groups ~re not part of a constitution, the 
better." 66 
"Group rights should not be entrenched. Group rights 
are really group interests, and do not require 
entrenchment." 67 
"Whilst individual rights should form-the basis, 
group rights could find expression in the form of 
the protection of language rights and the right to 
mother tongue education." 68-
"It should not be necessary 1n an ideal situation to 
regulate group rights." 69 
I 
Five others indicated a constitutional role for groups: 
"Liberals were correct to oppose the Government's 
obsession vith the group, but wrong to give the 
group no place in their scheme of things." 70 
"The individual is the key. However, I do not 
belie.ve that you can have a universal franchise 
on the basis of equality. I do not want to swap 
one kind of tyranny for another. We need a process 
of checks and balances which can prevent group 
tyranny." 71 
"The numbers should be constructed in a way that no 
one group should be able ~o govern alone." 72 
"Groups should play a role - but self-defined 
(voluntary association) groups. The influence 
of minorities is as good a judge as any of a 
democracy." 73 
"An ideal constitution would need to regulate group 
rights as well as individual rights in some way or 
another •••• it is desirable that, at least in some 
areas, groups should be prevented from behaving in 
ways which other groups find quite.intolerable." 74 
Universal Ideals, Sbuth African Realities 
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S~veral interviewees noted the conflict between universal ideals and 
South African realities: 
"Simple majoritarianism will never be accepted by those 
presently in power." 75 
"An ideal constitution ••• would have at least to 
offer the prospect of mean.ingful political power. 
Political participation could be limited or 
qualified." 76 
"I don't know how much you have to fiddle with . 
democracy in an unequal society (to prevent group 
tyranny)." 77 
"Realistically one cannot expect the white population 
to accept a sudden transformation from their 
present dominant role to a politically impotent 
one." 78 
Constitutional Content and Constitutional Process 
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"The process of making a constitution is as important as its .content." 




Others focussed more on content, though they would almost certainly 
endorse the sentiment expressed above. The ·contrast does reflect a 
tension between normative (or ontological) content as opposed to 
intersubjective (o.r existential) process. 
Although only four of the fourteen interviewees made an explicit 
judgement of the proposed constitutio~ in the light of the id~als the~ 
82 
articulated in answer to this question, it can be reasonably 
construed that all would judge it very negatively. Where reference was 
made to group rights, to the need for compromise between ideal and 
reality, and the need for an incremental process, great care was 
generally taken to differentiate ·the "compromises" being -discussed from 
. 83 
the shortcomings alread~ noted in the proposed constitution. 
79 
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Finally, it is interesting to note the degree of support that was 
inditated for either a consociational form of constitution, or for an 
evolutionary fo~m of political participation such as is created by a 
qualified franchise. 
84 
Six interviewees support the former, and two the 
85 
latter. A further two, may be reasonably safely included as 
supporters of -such a "compromise" constitution from answer to other 
86 
questions, leaving.only four of fourteen as universalist "hard liners"._ 
5. Acting - the Referendum Dilemma 
Having judged the proposed ne_w constitution, interviewees were now 
asked what liberals should do in the then imminent referendum. The 
interviewees were asked what liberals should do in the referendum and 
·what the consequence-s of the advocated action would be. 
There was complete unanimity as to the first part of the ~uestion. 
Only one interviewee even mentioned an alternative: 
"Whilst· ther.e is a good (intrinsic or moral) argument 
that can be made for spoiling one's ballot, 
there are good_ strategic reasons for not doing so." 87 
Altho~gh int~rviewees were not asked· to provide reasons for the 
advocated ·aciion (as these had been examined in the questions relating 
to judging) several did offer reasons: 
"For one,- a liberal vote may 
alienation felt by blacks. 
system in order to function 
lessen the degree of 
Secondly, a parliamentary 
effectively requires a 
degree of party loyalty. The PFP leadership 
bad no option but to call for a 'No' vote. 
It is now vital that as much rank and file support 
for this call should be ensured." 88 
"Firstly, because the constitution negates basic 
liberal ideas, and secondly, because the exclusion of 
blacks means that the momentum away from these ideals 
will be greater than the momentum towards them through 
the inclusion of coloureds and Indians." 89 
"They should vote No, both for strategic and moral 
reasons." 90 
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_The logic underlying the advocated action became clear as the 
interviewees discussed the consequences of a "No" vote. A number_ 
- avoided the question of consequences altogether: 
"I know what they should do, but I don't know what 
the consequences will be." 91 
"From the point of view of strategy, as to which 
option will bring more change - I can't work this 
out. Therefore, the decision should be ethically 
based." 92 
Others who did discuss consequences did so in a most negative way: 
''As to results: nothing is going to happen for a~ 
long time. Nothing happens easily or quickly in 
this society." 93 
"In essence, the 'No' vote is a v-ote of conscience. 
It will lead to no strategic advance. It will 
help liberals retain their integrity. PFP leaders 
will be able to continue to look black leaders 
in the face." 94 
"Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that 
will work. We have to go forward in faith, doing 
what we can where we can." 95 
"The consequences will not be disastrous. If there 
is a 'No' majority, it will be claimed equally as a 
victory for the right and the left. It will also 
increase polarisation within the white community. 
There is likely to be no Constitutional movement 
for the next little white. A 'No' majority will, 
however, open up the debate." 96 
"The practical consequences will be the status quo 
constitutionally, leaving the situation as it is 
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now, providing for the possibility of change later .• " 97 
A victorious "No" vote (a possibility which most of those intereviewed 
regarded as unlikely) then is. se·en at best as a blocking move and at 
worst as a vote of conscience. 
Some more specific discussion as.to the consequences of a victorious 
"No" vote occurred around the impact of such a vote on the Nationalist 
government. All interviewees agr.eed such a vote would not bring the 
98 
government down. Many felt it_ would, however, change the direction 
and leadership within this party: 
''A certain consequence of a 'No' ~ote will be Bo~ha's 
replacement by De Klerk." 99 
There was some disagreement and uncertainty as to both the sig~ificance 
and desirability of a shift in leadership from Botha to De Klerk: 
"This is to be welcomed as De Klerk is both·more 
intelligent and more rational -than Botha. He also 
-has his eye more on the main problem i.e. _the blacks." 100 
II it makes little difference whether Botha or 
De Klerk-is at the helm. The future does not 
revolve around personalities, but rather around 
pressures. The pressures will continue." 101 
"Even if F.W. De Klerk takes over, it will take him 
no more than .a few years to learn that he has .to 
move to. the left, mainly because of the demands of 
the economy." 102 
"(De Klerk) is intellectually superior to P.W. Botha 
and doesn't have Botha's hang-up with the past (for 
instance, he will find it easier to talk to the PFP). 
De Klerk under the impact of a successful no vote 
would have to move left, ai reconciliation with the 
right is an impossibility." 103 
"It would be better to have a Cape Prime Miniter 
(Botha/Heunis) than a Transvaal P.M. (De Klerk)." 104 
11 
••• in the longer term, he (Botha) is likely to be 
replaced by De Klerk. Is this a good thing? He's 
very 'behoudend'. ·Botha d.id go a little forward. 
Will De Klerk? I don't know. I certainly do not 
go along with the argument that says let's have 
the worst now, so that things can get better." 105 
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The uncertainty reflected above about what .those interviewed agreed was 
the most likely consequence of the success of the action they a·dvocated 
is why the 1983 constitutional referendum has to be called a dilemma. 
It i• a choice with no clearly good or desirable option. As.two 
interviewees noted: 
and 
II voting 'Yes•· is a blank cheque. And once traditional 
opposition voters have signed such a blank cheque 
once, they are likely to do .so again. However, 
it is difficult to see how a fundamentally ambiguous 
'No' victory would assist more rapid reform." 106 
"If the 'Yes' vote is successful, this will result . 
in the further alienation of the black people. 
If the 'No' vote succeeds, the Nats would swing to 
the right." 107 
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The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a dilemma as "A form of 
argument involving an adversary in choice between two alternatives, 
both equally unfavourable to him· ••• " The 1983 Constitutional 
Referendum would seem to fit.that definition well for the liberal 
voter. 
6. Towards An Ideal Future Society 
The final two questions in the interview broadened the focus away from 
the 1983 constitutional referendum. The first question sought to 
explore what the future hopes or goals or ideals of interviewees were. 
The second asked about the strategies which those interviewed thought 
should be pursued to attain these goals. 
Future Ideals 
In the discussion of future ideals, the interviewees were asked'to 
sketch their future ideal South Africa, and then to speculate on the 
role bf both whites and liberal values in such a society. 
Post-Apartheid Society 
The vision which emerged was one of a non-racial liberal democracy with 
greater equality and more civil rights, but with many elements of 
present day S6uth African preserved. 
"This would be a non-racial, social democratic society 
where resources would be al.located ac.cording to the 
needs of the people. It would be governed by an 
interest-based multi-party democracy. Education 
would be universal and free. There would be no 
influx control and an equitable welfare system 
which was not economically crippling to maintain. 
The economy would be geared towards maximum employment 
Individual rights would be guaranteed by a Bill of 
Rights. There would also be maximum decentralisation 
of power." 108 
"(My ideal) is of a liberal democracy. It is of an 
economic order that is not socialist (in the East 
European/Chinese sense) as it seems clear that the 
socialist order cannot support freedom. However, 
it would also not be free enterprise. It would be 
a society aiming for a pluralisation of ownership, 
experimenting with new ·forms of economic control." 109 
"As a mildly pink social democrat (a liberal socialist) 
I would like to see: 
the decentralisation of power; 
- the entrenchment of individual rights; 
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cultural diversity rather than cultural iinperalism; 
experimental forms of economic partnership such as 
co-operatives; 
significant land reform; 
active measures to redistribute wealth by taking the energy 
of the people seriously, but without increasing State 
power." 110 
The Role of the Whites 
This question coincided with the political dispensation envisaged. The 
prognosis for white participation ranged from very optimistic: 
"Whites will have an absolutely crucial role in 
building this future. You just cannot have radical 
change without taking the white majority with you." 111 
"Whites are likely to play a significant role in both 
the polity and the economy. We are not going to have 
simple majoritarianism." 112 
"In such a (future) society,· the white would play a 
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very useful role as a citizen of a common society." 113 
to the more limited, but nevertheless meaningful: 
"The whites, whilst not playing a dominant and 
leading role, would nevertheless remain politically 
significant (unlike Zimbabwe) and should be meaningfully 
represented in the political partnerships which 
exist. This, however, will be determined by how the 
wbi.tes act during the period of transformation." 114 
My ideal is: 
II A society in which whites really shared power 
with blacks, in a way in which white politicians 
and white voters still played a meaningful role in 
the political pro6ess." 115 
to a significantly limited and indeed insecure role: 
II Whites Will have a great deal Of political 
influence (indirect political power _through their 
role in the economy) but little direct political 
power." 116 
"There certainly can be no guarantees. Whites may 
~well end.up being politically irrelevant." 117 
The Role of Liberal Values 
A liberal conception of both' power and the State was implicit in all 
.the conceptions of the future. However, the role of liberal values 
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was far from clear. Some interviewees merely affirmed the role these 
values would play: 
"Liberal values will also be absolutely basic to this 
future society. We must recognise the rights and 
dignity of the individuals." 118 
Others seemed to see these values 1n a sacrificial role: 
''Ordinary biblical virtues should be the cornerstone: 
fair dealing, equity. However, human society 
being what it is, you cannot have a good society 
unless an element or group of its people are 
.making sacrifices and not just demanding justice 
·for themselves. Someone must be ready to take a 
"lower" place. This is the role of Christians in 
any society." 119 
"A new society would be characterised 1n particular 
by .two attributes; 
much more tolerance. It is the particular role 
of liberals to keep this tolerance alive; 
- constitutionalism or power restrained by law. 
Again, ie is the role of liberals to sell thi~ 
idea. The whites in Zimbabwe failed to do this 
and they are now paying the price." 120 
These are more admonitions than roles. Perhaps the clearest statements 
are linked to the nature and pace of change. 
"The one· hundred per cent moral 
sufferage in a unitary society. 
do we achieve this? 
view must be universal 
The question is how 
The only way I can see this coming about_ is through 
violent revolution assisted from the -Outside. If · 
we don't want this, then we will have· to accept some 
sort of compromise - some form of confederal or 
federal society. . 
The task of fashioning a liberal society in this 
country will be a very daunting one. I'd settle 
for a very painful· (and slow) evolution towards a 
better society. It will be more painful for the 
whites than the blacks. It will be particularly 
painful for the radicals who want it all at on,ce." 121 
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However, this area leaves many questions: 
Who is going to create the liberal freedoms that are so cherished 
here? Whites are seen as playing a limited role. Are black· 
liberal forces going to ensure civil liberty and "power restrained 
by law"? Where are these forces now? 
Why should a liberal democracy result here when the forces 
bringing change (as surveyed under 3) are military and economic? 
Neither of these are seen by those interviewed as being liberal in 
nature. 
Why should a liberal democracy result here, when the process of 
122 
decolonisation has produced virtually no such societies elsewhere? 
Why should the pattern of Zimbabwe not repeat itself? 
These are posed only a_s questions. They are not ass·ertions. They are, 
how~ver, sufficiehtly important que~tions to deserve answers. 
Future Strategies· 
The final question asked was: ".Starting from where we are now, how can 
·such a society be achieved?" The answers given. ro. this question are 
most distinctly characterised by: 
the lack of clearly formulated strategies; 
th~ lack of positive or initiative-taking strategies. 
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Four interviewees responded by merely describing the role future events 
123 
were likely to take. Liberalism emerged from these descriptions in 
a basically p~ssive role. 
"The present half-hearted attempts at reform will 
collapse probably within a time fra~e_ of.two- three 
years. The Government is most likely at that stage 
to mov~ left, seeking an alliance with the PFP. 
This will require the PFP to make compromises. 
Should the Government stay where it is or even 
move right, change will most l~kely be brought about 
by a combination of increased black and foreign 
pressure. In this scenario, the PFP would have to 
entertain alliances with internal black groupings." 124 
"If the actors see South Africa's problems not as 
those of colonialism or imperalism, i.-e. the throwing 
off of some foreign and unacceptable ruling class, 
but rather in terms of Disraeli's two nations problem, 
then it should be possible to solve our problems 
relatively gradually and peacefully." 125 
Another six interviewees gave a general description-of t~e role 
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liberals could and should play._ No less than five of these seven, 
used the words to the effect of keeping alive basic liberal values. 
Other aspects of the general role described were: 
"They can also contribute -to the build-up of pressure 
that will at least prevent the Nationalists from moving 
backwards. They can also assist change-oriented 
organisations to be more effective." 128 
"Liberals should start where they are strongest i.e. 
in the econ-omy, the Church, the Un:i versi ties, the 
Private Schools, the Press. There is a case for 
situational ethics. Reform will not come overnight. 
Liberals will have to be prepared to settle for 
incremental gains which are- steps in the right 
direction." 129 
II we must use ·parliament, and also not be afraid 
to use extra-Parliamentary (but not extra-legal) 
activities as demonstrated by the Black Sash and 
Institut·e of Race Relations." 130 
"You must do what is r.ight, whether you can see the 
outcome or not. For example, in employing non-violent 
strategies, you cannot weigh or measure the outcomes.· 
However, if violence is wrong, it is wrong whatever 
the consequences. I must do what I believe is right 
irrespective of the .consequences." 131 
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Three of those interviewed did describe specific roles for liberals. 
They are what one might call "micro-roles" in that they operate at a 
small group level and are contingent on the activities of others: 
"The most important role liberals can play in 
promoting real change is to teach: to teach civil 
disobedience, but also to teach self-reliance and 
independence. To equip all South Africans.with 
basic problem solving skills which allow them to 
act responsibly and freely for themselves." 132 
"For now, ·liberals should concentrate on the creation 
of non-government., grass roots, democratic organisations 
in the areas of worker organisation, health and ·· 
education. Such organisations will contribute 
to the process of change as well as being consistent 
with the type of society likely to emerge here in 
the 1 onger term.-" 13 3 
"Liberals also have a role to play in doing what is 
often contemptuously referred to as ambulance work. 
But if there were no ambulances, the suffering in 
the world would be greatly increased." 134 
Finally, three interviewees in particular engaged in some liberal 
self-criticism: 
II liberals must guard against purist interpretation 
of their own values. Full freedom is not possible 
in a society that has unresolved, fundamental 
conflict. To imagine a full Bill of Rights in such 
a society is just dreaming." 135 
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"Liberals, whether of a Christian, Jewish or humanist 
orientation, should give more attention to the problems 
of communicating their values to others i.e. those 
who do not think as they do. 
I think that's a weakness of liberals: they assume 
that if one formulates a good consistent liberal 
proposition, that this proposition speaks for itself 
- that it needs no evangelisation or propagation." 136 
"Liberals have paid too little attention to the ways 
of getting where we want to go." 137 
Of Optimism and Pessimism 
The group interviewed was basically pessimistic about the future and 
particularly pessimistic about the future role of liberals and, 
therefore, themselves: 
"At times, one despairs of moving there (towards the 
ideal future). Can our problems be solved?" 138 
''.It is, therefore, hard to imagine a voluntary 
surrender of power and equally hard to imagine an 
involuntary seizure of power." 139 
, "However, one has to be pessimistic -about the 
emergence of this campaign of disobedience on a 
scale large enough and in time. Non-violent 
resistance tequires a great deal of •elf-sacrifice, 
discipline and organisation." 140 
"One has to be pessimistic about the future liberal 
role, though there are grounds aplenty for optimism 
about the future. Liberals don't plan strategically 
or effectively. -Liberal values in themselves are 
not very powerful agents for organisation or 
mobilisation." 141 
"I am fatalistic. I don't see change coming without 
Zimbabwe-type conflict. I cannot see white -South 
Africans sitting down to debate the real sharing of 
power." 142 
"I am not optimistic in the short run. Nor will we 
ever achieve a full liberal democracy. However, I 
can't see a holocaust either. We have a reasonable 
chance of some sort of reasonable settlement." 143 
11There will have to be a dramatic break with the past 
in one form or another. The Nationalists will not 
simply agree to give up power. Also this break 
may be a long time in coming, and it will involve 
lots of pain. In the meantime, there is likely to 
be an increase in guerilla activity and an increasing 
militarisation of our society." 144 
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"(I am) pessimistic at the moment. I see an increasing 
struggle between the two nationalisms. The 
tendency of the Government to excessively oppress 
its black.opponents is provoking an ever more violent 
response." 145 
Where a-different note was struck, it was in a guarded, ambivalent or 
metaphysical (transcendant) way. Perhaps the most emphatic and 
positive statement made was this-one: 
146 
"I am not pessimistic about the future." 
Others were more circumspect: 
"I have optimism for the long term.. There will be 
lots of pain along the way. In the long run, the 
kind of society envisaged above must emerge; it 
is the only -way a society such as South Africa can 
be run .in the longer term." 147 
"Are you optimistic or pessimistic? 
I'm like a yoyo. At times, I believe that we cannot 
possibly succeed. There is so much unreason around. 
Yet there is also plenty of goodwill around. I 
cannot see this society disintegrating. There is 
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too much that is good. Things will carry on siUD11ering. 
Life.will become a little more brutish but not 
unbearable. 
In the long term, I remain hopeful because of my 
belief in the innate goodness of man. I suppose 
this could be call a blind faith or even 
sentimentality." 148 
"Would you characterise yourself as an optimist or 
a pessimist? 
Schizophrenic: 
I see no hope: 
the attitude of 
Israel." 149 
whenever I indulge in human calculation 
but instinctively I cannot escape 
Christian hope which we inherit from 
"This (liberal action) is a seed - you may not see 
t~e fruit. This is based on a belief in the 
resurrection." 150 
We close this section with words that offer some eminently practical 
advice: 
''Liberals carinot give up hope. If one gives up hope 
then one should get out, or keep one's mouth shut." 151 
7. An Initiai Evaltiation 
·The re~ponses to the last two questions paint a pitture of liberal hope 
and liberal strategy which is unattractive. Many of the hopes seem 
naive - for example, the hope of decentralised power in a new third 
world nation. They are certainly idealistic - the hope, for example, 
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of a comprehensive welfare system which would not be economically 
crippling. They seem to lack a sense of the trade-offs between present 
and past; between group interests and power; .which are a part of the 
real world. Equally, and perhaps for this reason, they lack 
conviction. They lack conviction not because they are not desired, but_ 
because they are not necessarily hoped for in the sense of expected. 
With regard to strategy, the picture is even bleaker. Responses here 
were generally vague. The roles described were carved.out of a fabric 
of pessimism. Roles were contingent, reactive and indirect. The most 
concrete role described - teaching th~ values of non-violent 
resistance, creating grass roots organisation, and doing ambulance work 
- were all "micro-roles". They are, ··of course, valuable 1n 
themselves, but sur_ely difficult to maintain in the absence of some 
b~oader framework, and some broader hope. 
Throughout, one has a sense of diffidence. As the one interviewee 
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The purpose of this conclusion is to determine whether the fourfold 
hypothesis stated in the Introduction has been confirmed or confounded by 
the evidence and discussion given iri Chapters One to Five. Each part of 
this hypothesis is considered in turn in the four sections below: 
1. Liberal Ethics and Powerlessness 
In the Introduction (page 7) we asserted: 
"that liberal ethics in South Africa, particularly since 
the victory of the (Afrikaner) National Party in 1948 
have been characterised by a sense of political power-
lessness;" 
In Chapter Three, liberal thought and action .are surveyed during the. 
decades of the Fifties, Sixties and Seventies. -The picture which 
emerges is one which often supports the sense of powerlessness 
suggested above. The apparent mutual exclusion .of liberal principle 
and political power is evident in the career of South Africa's most 
politically powerful liberal, Jan Hofmeyr. Crises of' conscience took 
him out of the United Party cabinet, and the party itself on two 
1 
occasions in the 1930's. In his periods of.acting premiership, power 
2 
and principle were often in head on collision. Hofmeyr was also often 
under pressure from liberal col-leagues to leave the government and lead 
3 
- a truly liberal party. On the other hand, he wa~ blamed by party 
4 
loyalists for the defeat of 1948, 
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Smuts, though by no means an unambiguous liberal 1n South African 
5 6 
terms, is accused of letting power slip through his fingers, though 
this 1s probably as much att.ributable to an arrogant complacency as 
muc.h as a sense of powerlessness. He is also accused of failing to act 
7 
on a possibility to regain power. 
The theme of powerlessness is taken up again in the founding of the 
Liberal Party in the mid-fifties. Here one of the party's most 
prominent leaders observes that its founders were: 
"without an adequate appreciation of the part that 
political power plays in politics." 8 
Indeed throughout the Fifties and Sixties, liberals (both within the 
Liberal party and outside it) were confronted with a dilermna 
eonsti~uted by their reactions to white nationalists on the one hand 
and black nationalists on the other. Liberal opposition to racial 
segregation on the one hand denied them any sig.nificant access to power 
9 
as determined by the white political process. Liberal respect for the 
rule of law, and their rejection of violence,.vitiated their sympathy 
and support for black nationalist groupings such as the ANC and the 
PAC. As these movements turne-d (often in response to white nationalist 
repression) from the tactics of petition to passive resistance and then 
sabotage, so liberal attitudes towards them became more and more 
complex. It was clear where the (Afrikaner) Nationalists stood, and 
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equally clear where organisations such as the ANC and PAC were moving. 
' 10 
But what of the liberals? 
A sense of powerlessness is also induced by the Nationalist legislative 
blitzkrieg, which conunenced with their accession to power in 1948 and 
11 
continued in full force until late in the 1960's. This legislative 
progranune was combined by a progranune of ruthless administrative 
action, which saw non-nationalists removed from almost all positions of 
power. The converiient· diplomatic despatch of General Evered Poole, 
South Africa's most experienced soldier, in 1948 is but one early 
example of this. Similar removals were to ·take place in the SABC, CSIR 
and indeed in Government appointed positions across .the society. 
The continuing opposition of power and principle is well indicated by 
the passing of the Improper Interference Act. This made it impossible 
for liberal political organisations to act out their cormnitment to 
12 
multi-racialism though non-racial membership clauses. 
The sen•e of powerless isolation liberals felt in South Africa during 
the 1966's is well illustrated by their almost ecstatic respons~ to the 
visit of Robert Kennedy to South Africa in 1967. As one Rand Daily 
Mail editorial noted, this visit reminded South African liberals that 
it was the (Afrikaner) nationalists and not ·themselves who were out of 
13 
step with the times; 
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However, the story of liberalism during these three decades cannot be 
characterised as one of unbroken defeatism and.helplessness. Examples 




of the PP (becoming in time the official opposition as the 
15 
PFP); as well as the SPROCAS programme within the Churches, also 
the move into economic strategies-which occurred in student 
organisations and led, through the formation of wages commissions, to 
16 
an important renaissance in the black trade union movement. All of 
these resurgences took place in the 1970's and this decade can be seen 
as a period of liberal regrouping and strategies review. This process 
generally required more pragmatic thinking, as was indicated by the 
SPROCAS embrace of feasibility as an important principle, as well as 
the pragmatic analysis of Rick Turner written in 1973 (The Present as 
History) and included in the 1980 edition of Turner's The Eye of the 
Needle. 
If the 30 year period is viewed as a whole, however, the theme of 
powerlessness is clearly evident and indeed characteristic. 
In the second attempt to_explore liberal ethics in South Africa - the 
documents review describf;!d in Chapter Four - further evidence of a 
sense of powerlessness is recorded. 
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In the case of the Institute of Race Relations • contradiction is 
observed between the modus operandi of the Institute - the gathering 
and rational presentation of facts - on the one hand; and the nature 
of reality on the other. 
"In the past, we in the Institute may'have erred in 
thinking men and women are more subject to persuasion.by 
reason than they are." observes one Institute President. 17 
Another notes: 
"A long experience of public affairs has taught me that 
reason and persuasion have a less decisive influence 
on public opinion than the force of circumstance." 18 
The role that power plays in a society such as.Sbuth Africa was clearly 
well understood by Institute leadeis: 
"The dilemma is an agonising one - how to satisfy black 
·aspirations without destroying white confidence ••• " 19, 
And, further: 
"Power lies with the White e lee tor ate. The White 
electorate, by a majority of nine to one, or more, 
is violently opposed to participation of all races 
in a single society " 20 
This acknowledgement of the realities of power led the last quoted 
President to recommend that the Institute attack more modest targets. 
It led others to evaluate· the role of the Institute in very modest 
terms: 
"The essence of the Institute's work, the striving to 
influence the minds of men, is by its very nature 
imponderable. Many of us believe that the effort 
has been meaningful · .... " 21 
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Likewise, ·the goals. set for the future are informed by a sense of 
powerlessness: 
. "We do not know that peaceful methods will win, but at 
least we do not know that they will fail." 22 
In the case of the PFP, the powerlessne~s is of a clear structural 
form. This party has had to exist for a long period of time without 
ever being able to cherish the realistic prospect of coming to power, 
23 
or even participating in a governing coalition. This must create 
what can be described as a crisis of motivation. In .the case of.the 
PFP, this is evident in the repeated warnings of its leadership of the 
dire consequences which lie in store for South African society and its 
government. The following quotation is typical: 
"The sand in the hour-glass is rapidly running out and 
our children are watching us and wanting to.know what 
we are doing." 24 
The situation of Harry Oppenheimer and the Anglo American Corporation 
is more complex than that of the two aforementioned organisations. 
Whereas these two first discussed bodies have clearly had to operate in 
a context of .powerlessness, can this be said of Harry Oppenheimer and 
Anglo American? 
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At first glance, it would seem absurd to claim that art organisation as 
large as Anglo, and an individual as dominant within that organisation 
as Harry Oppenheimer is, suffered from powerlessness. Yet this is what 
Oppenheimer claims for himself in respect of politics and his liberal 
convictions. Interviewed on the occasion of his retirement as Chairman 
of Anglo American in November 1982, he claimed he had been a complete 
failure politically. Others have claimed that he is one of the most 
powerful man in the world. 
A~ we noted in Chapter Four, the debate about the extent arid nature of 
Oppenheimer's and Anglo's political power is not an easy one to call. 
All we have done is to list some of the questions we believe should be 
further researched. ·What cannot be disputed is- that Oppenheimer, 
through Anglo has had opportunities for the exercise of considerable 
political influence. Some of these avenues for influence are indicated 
25 
in Chapter Four. In t~is respect, Oppenheimer and Anglo have been in 
a situation significantly different from other liberal organisations 
and this is indicated in the ethical perspectives revealed by the 
documents review. 
Firstly, the identity of ethics and action advocated by Bonhoeffer is 
much more readily apparent in Oppenheimer's writings than that of the 
26 
other two organisations. Secondly, Oppenheimer alone of the thr~e 
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organisations/indiv1duals examined exhibits a manifest concern for 
27 
responsible action. Thirdly, his writings are characterised ·much 
1!10re by the promise of a better ·future, than dire threats of apocalypse. 
Finally, he is more consistently optimistic than leaders in the other 
29 
two liberal contexts. 
The third attempt to explore liberal ethics in South Africa takes the 
form of the fourteen interviews described in Chapter Five. These 
interviews with leading white English-speaking liberals centre around 
the dilemma of the 1983 Constitutional.Referendum. These interviews 
provide some of the most dramatic evidence of powerlessness. 
This evid-ence was provided. firstly in the answers l~berals gave to .to 
the question: what has prompted the current reforms? A series of 
factors were cited. These have been grouped into seven areas in 'the 
30 
discussion in Cha~ter Five. The actions of white liberals themselve~ 
are not included {n the factors forcing change. .Even where areas of 
change (such as the processes of economic integration) are mentioned 
in which liberals have been active, they are described in impersonal or 
even trans-personal terms. They lie in the area decribed by a Race 
Relations President reported in Chapter Four as the "force of 
circumstance." 
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Secondly, when the inte-rviews discuss what should be done about the new 
constitution, their replies are replete with a sense of powerlessness: 
~ 
"I know what they should do, but I don't know what the 
consequences will be." 31 
Ethics and.strategies are often opposed: 
and 
"Whilst there is a good (intrinsic or moral) argument 
that can be made for spoiling one's ballot, there are 
good strategic reasons for not doing so." 32 
"From the point of view of strategy, as to which option 
will bring more change - I can'~ work this out. 
Therefore, the decision should be ethically based. 11 33 
Where consequences were envisaged following from the action 
reconnnended, these were seen as trivial, marginal or even non-existent. 
"In essence, the no vote is a vote of conscience. 
It will lead to no strategic advance." 34 
"The PFP leadership had no option but to call for a no 
vote. It is now vital that as much rank and file 
support for this call should be ensured." 35 
"As to results: nothing is going to happen for a long 
time." 36 
"Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that wi.11 
work." 37 
"The consequences will not be disastrous." 38 
"The practical consequences will be the status quo 
constitutionally ••• 11 39 
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A sense of powerlessness was evident in a third aspect of these 
interviews. Where interviewees were asked to describe the vision of a 
future ideal society, the role they envisaged for liberals and liberal 
values was a passive, extremely limited one. 
Whilst many interviewees affirmed the basic rightness of liberal 
values, none described a role for such values ~n a future desired 
society. One interviewee acknowledged this lack explicitly: 
"Liberals didn't plan strategically or effectively. 
Liberal values in themselves are not very powerful 
agents for organisation or mobilisation." 40 
There was a similar lack of clarity about what liberals should do to 
achieve thi~ desired future: 
"You must do what is right; whether you can see the 
outcome or not. 11 41 
was the most emphatic advice offered. Others were more self-critical: 
"Liberals have paid too little attention to the ways of 
getting where-we want to go." 42 
Finally, powerlessness is revealed in the preponderance of pessimism 
over optimism. The most optimistic statement here was: 
"I am not pessimistic about the future." 43 
"I'm fa_talistic. I don't see change coming without 
Zimbabwe style conflict." 44 
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"I'm not optimistic in the short-run&" 45 
"(I am) pessimistic at the moment." 46 
"It is-; therefore,.hard to imagine a voluntary surrender 
of power and equally hard to imagine an involuntary 
seizure of power." 47 
"Can our problems be solved?" 48 
"However, one has to be pessimistic ••• " 49 
"One has to be pessimistic about the future liberal role 11 50 
In the attempts made in Chapters Three, Four and Five to get close to 
liberal perceptions of how they choose between morally significant 
courses of action, there is compelling evidence that these choices are 
repe.atedly informed by a sense of personal powerlessness: 
· 2. · An Ethics of Inner Conviction 
It was asserted, in the introduction, that as a consequence of th~ 
above discuss~d sense of powerlessness: 
"(liberal) ethics have been more concerned with principle 
motives, conscience and internal consistency than with 
the consequences of liberal action; 11 51 
What do we mean by an ethics of principle~ motive, conscience and 
int~rnal consistency? We have used the word ethics to indicate the way 
52 
in which actors choose between morally significant courses of actio~. 
I 
-245-
The review of Twentieth Century ethics attempted' in Chapter One 
indicates a continuum of approaches. Our definition has identified 
choice as central to the practice of ethics. This immediately 
introduces a degree of indeterminancy uncomfortable for.a rationalist 
derived ideology such as liberalism. As we have noted earlier: 
·"The rationalist seeks statements which are universal, 
·unambiguous and not capable of contradiction, or 
logical inconsistency." 53 
A dominant theme in all the twentieth century approaches to ethics 
surveyed in Chapter One is the fundamentally subjectiv~ nature of this 
choice.· The English Moral Philosophers surveyed note·that ethical 
judgements are different in both form and content from other types of 
judgements we make. They are neither derived from experience, nor 
54 
deduced from logic. In this sense, ethics ~o beyond pure reason. 
Weber notes that political ethics involve passion, responsibility and a 
55 
sense of proportion. Weber ·defines politics as a ''means striving to 
share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either 
56 
among states or within a state." 
.. 
Power is, therefore, another 
dimension in ethical choice. 
57 
A major impact of the existentialist style or approach is the 
rejection of universal moral codes which can act as a sort of 
check-list to help man mak~ ~t~ical decisions, or as the 
existentialists would see it, to ~ake these choices for him! A~ Sartre 
notes: 
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"The possibility of acting must be realised in the 
context of a concrete situation, where the agent is 
surrounded by actual other people." 58 
and Warnock concludes: 
"The only general law of ethics must be to avoid general 
laws." 59 
De Beauvoir contributes the concept -0f the antimonies of action. Every 
action for man is simultaneously against man. She notes the maudlin 
realities of political action. In order to fight the oppressor, we 
must oppress the oppressor, and his often innocent collaborators and 
subordinates. Indeed we must often oppress our own comrades, and again 
often prioritise our causes, as all evil cannot be tatkled at once. 
60 
Such antimonies inevitably involve the ~ctor in painful choite._ 
Camus continues this theme of difficult choice noting that often mari is 
forced to choose not between good and evil, but between evil and evil. 
In this respect, he notes the conflici between freedom on the one hand 
and justice on the other. Again, in the context of Algeria, he notes 
the choice which confronts the actor between the tyranny of the 
61 
colonial regime and the terror of those opposing it. Camus 
concludes that the only authentic response is to strike a balance 
between those conflicting demands. - This will of necessity involve 
accepting modest objectives: 
"Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a 
world in which children are tortured. But we can 
reduce the number of tortured children." 62 
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It is against this background that we use the concept of an ethics of 
inner conviction. This is Weber's ideal type. It is the ethic of 
absolute values, of the Sermon on the Mount; concerned with individual 
motives and not the social consequences of action. Weber contrasts 
this ideal type with what he terms the ethic of responsibility. In 
terms of this ethic, the actor weighs the consequences of his actions, 
takes account of realities and the deficiencies of.the people on whom 
the good and result of the action is dependent. 
Whai evidence did we find of a preponderance of the perspective or 
approach of inner conviction?. As is suggested in the thesis, evidence 
of this ethical mode is closel~ linked with the evidence of · 
powerlessness. Indeed often powerlessness seems a consequenGe of an 
ethical fixation with principle. At other times, the line of causation 
se~ms to work in the other direction. 
·Examples of a preponderance of an ethics of inner conviction drawn from 
the survey of liberal thought and action in Chapter Three are; 
the crises of conscience that took Hofmeyr first out of the 
63 
cabinet and then out of .the caucas of the Unit~d Party; 
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Hofmeyr's refusal to use his 1948 budget to gain political 
advantage in the .general election which the budget immediately 
64 
preceded; 
H6fmeyr's own appreciation of the conflict between his conscience 
65 
and the exercise of power; 
Paton's question: "How could one be simultaneously both governor 
66 
and crusader." This is reminiscent of Weber's words: "He who · 
seeks salvation of the souls, of his own and others, should not 
seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different 
tasks of politics can only be solv~d by violence." 67 
The long debate as to whether it was better to work within a 
relatively powerful vehicle, such as the United Party, or attem~t 
to create a new vehicle such as the Liberal Party (1953) and the 
68 
Progressive Party (1959); 
The conscience-based decision of the Liberal Party to stay away 
£rom the 1955 Cbngress of the People; because of the role members 
69 
of the Communist Party had played in organising this Congress; 
. The difficulty the Liberal Party had in responding both to the 
"positive apartheid" programme of the Government, launched in the 
.late 1950's, as. well as the passive resistance and then sabotage 
campaigns conducted by Black Poli.tical ·organisations in the 1950' s 
and early Sixties.· ·Both of these political.initiatives 
70 
transgressed aspects of liberalism's "universal code" ; 
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The dilel1llllas posed for multi-racial political parties, 
particularly the Liberal and Progressive Partie~ by the enactment 
of the Improper Interference A.ct; and the differing response of 
71 
these two parties; and 
Finally, the reje~tion of the SPROCAS political proposals by 
liberals Brookes and Wolheim because they conflicted with elements 
72 
of the fundamental liberal credo. 
In the documents review in Chapter Four, examples of an ethics of inner 
conviction approach are to be found in the following: 
Hellman's characteristic of the influence of the Institute of Race 
73 
Relations as "imponderable" 
Archbishop Hurley's observation that Institute leadership was "a 
little short on that instructive grasp of realiti~s, that 
subconscious assessment of possibilities so necessary to the 
74 
soldier, the policeman and the politician." 
Auerbach's statement: 
"I don't know what will work best, but we must go on 
speaking out against oppression and injustice because 
silence will be taken as consent." 75 
In Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert's six roles for.the PFP, as 
indicated in his 1~84 no~confidenc~ debate speech, four of ihe six 
roles are essentially inner conviction ones, namely: 
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* keeping alive the idea of constitutional government; 
* fighting for civil liberties; 
* speaking up for the underdog; and 
76 
* keeping the government on.its toes. 
In the series of interviews conducted with prominent liberals about the 
1983 Constitutional Referendum, and reported in Chapter Five, the 
following evidence of an ethics of inner conviction is to be found: 
In the strong reliance liberals place in a general code of values 
and beliefs, as evidenced in their answers to the question about 
77 
their ideal constitution; 
By the vagueness as to the consequences of the action advocated in 
the Referendum: 
"I know what (liberals) should do, but I don't 
know what the consequences will be. 
"From the point of view of strategy, as to which 
option will bring more change - I can't work this 
out." 
"In essence, the novote is a vote of conscience. 
It will lead to no strategic advance. It will 
help liberals retain their integrity. PFP 






come up with a liberal strategy that 
We have to go forward in faith, 
we can where we ·can." 78 
By a similar degree of vagueness with regard to liberal strategy: 
"You mus-t do what is right, whether you can see the 
-outcome or not. For example, in employing non-
violent strategies., you cannot weigh or measure 
the outcomes. However, if violence is wrong, it 
is wrong whatever the consequences. I must do 
what I believe is right irrespective of the 
consequences." 
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" ••• liberals must guard.against purist interrup~ion 
of their own values ••• " 
"(liberals). assume that if one formulates a good 
consistent liberal proposition, that this 
proposition speaks for itself - that it needs no 
evangelisation or propagation." 
"Liberals have paid too little attention to the 
ways of getting where we want to go." 79 
These insiances of an ethi~ of inner conviction approach are not cited 
as criticisms. It is not suggested that these approaches are 
n~cessaiily wrong or inappropriate. Nor is it suggested that they 
alone characterise liberal ethics. The research reported in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five does ~ontain evidence of approaches much closer to 
Weber's ethics of responsibility: 
Sprocas' combination of an ideal solution with the problems of the 
80 
transition from the present; 
In Chapter Five, there ·is evidence of. a degree of pragmatism with 
regard to libe~al ideals: 
"Liberals were correct to oppose the Government's 
obsession with the group, but wrong to give the. 
group no place in their scheme of things." 81 
In the same chapter, there are examples of what can be described 
as consequential liberal ~trategies, albeit stated in general 
terms: 
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"Liberals should start where they are strongest i..e. 
the economy, the Church, the Universities, the 
Private Schools, the Press. There is a case for 
situational ethics; Reform will not come overnight. 
Liberals will have to settle 1or incremental gains 
which are steps in the right direction." 82 
Weber ind~ed did not claim that his two ideal types were mutually 
exclusive but instead argued that: 
" an ethic of ultimate ends (inner convictioin) and 
an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts 
but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute 
a genuine man ••• " 83 · 
What is argued here is that the strong preponderance of approach in 
S.A. liberal ethics is that of inner conviction. Further support to 
84 
this contention is.offered by Heribert Adam. In a chapter entitled 











In discussing the possible philosophical reasons for failure he notes, 
quoting Dickie-Clarke: 
" the liberal has tended to assume that too much of 
the world out th~re is fixed, amenable to logic, 
fundamentally rational and open to persuasion ••• " 85 
continuing with his own observation that: 
II liberal belief in the power of persuasion rests on 
the idealistic assumption that people will abandon their 
particularistic group interests in favour of a universal 
truth, morality or humanity." 86 
In discussing possible political factors, Adam notes: 
"The moralistic ·approach, in a polarised content of power 
with high stakes, points to the political reasons for the 
failure of liberalism." 87 
Noting that what he terms. a "smug disdain of some members of a world 
culture (liberals) for the parochialism of an unenlightened adversary 
is frequently accompanied by an almost masochistic glorification of 
'creative suffering'~. Adam concludes "No wonder then that the 
effectiveness ·of political action generally ranks lower than the 
88 
affirmation of principle." 
Further support for our contention, though of ~ more indirect nature, 
comes. from an essay ori the liberal-radical controversy over South 
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89 
Afr~can history. The author notes the tendency of liberal historians 
90 
to judge their subjects. He argues further that these (moral) 
judgements "have stemmed naturally from the fundamental liberal belief 
91 
in the possibility of reasoned progress." He continues to make a 
more specific criticism, writing about the Oxford History of South 
Africa: 
.,They (the editors and writers who are all liberals) tend 
to filter many of the very real complexities, unpreventable 
confusions, mutual misunderstandings, and other non-· 
blameworthy and irreducible causes of conflict and lack 
of progress in South Africa through a liberal moral 
screen." 92 
Such actions are thoroughly consistent with the ethics -0f inner 
conviction. 
3. The Changed Circumstances of the 1980's 
Myths, Realities ~nd Options 
The third dimension of our hypothesis suggested that: "this sense of· 
powerlessness is not justified in the social and political environment 
of the 1980's.n (Page 7). 
In thi.s section, we examine this claim by reviewing some old .myth, 
cu~rent realities and new options. 
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The Myth of "Positive" Apartheid 
A policy of white control over the levers of political power (and 
economic resources) has been the key feature 6f the governance. of South 
Africa since the arrival of Van Riebeeck. This policy direction has 
enjoyed many labels: trusteeship, guardianship, white leadership and 
Apartheid. The labels (and the political movements creating them) 
denote both degrees of control, as well as options ~s to how this 
control should be exercised. At various times, attempts have been made 
both to legitimise (morally and politically), as _well as to safeguard, 
this position of white control. We are concerned here with the key 
attempt to do this in the last three decades~ It is this attempt which 
we call "Positive" Apartheid. 
Malan won power iri 1948 on the race policy of Apartheid or separation. 
This clearly implied a separate white nation, in which blacks would 
exercise no political rights. Just what was to be done to blacks was 
not clearly spelt out at this time. It was more than a deca~e later, 
in a rapidly changing international context, that the ''positive" side 
of the policy of separation was spelt out. It was done at the time the 
introduction of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, and in 
particularly, in ·the words and visions of Dr Hendrik Verwoerd. 
Verwoerd correctly analysed the alternative race policies facing 
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South African as a policy of partnership (as advocated by the United 
Party), leading inevitably to a black dominated multi-racial society, 
93 
and "giving the Bantu full rights to develop in their own areas." 
Whilst displaying a degree of probably deliberate vagueness about what 
"full rights" meant, Verwoerd indicated this would be determined by the 
94 
"Bantu" themselves. Nevertheless, Verwoerd clearly envisaged the 
possibility of full independence for "Bantu nations'' and held out the 
vision of a connnonwealth (or European Common Market) association of 
states, embracing white South Africa and these independent black 
states. He drew heavily on the comparison with the envisaged future 
for Bechuanaland in this regard. 
There is every indication that Verwoerd was both serious.and ·sincere 
in his vision for the creation of separate, viable and "real" black 
95 
states. It is equally clear writing in 1984 that this vision was 
based on a series of dangerous ·and_costly myths. 
The first of these myths Verwoerd stated most clearly in his 1959 
speech: 
"It is the ideal to retain political independence with 
economfc interdependence." 96 
A second,. -and importantly related myth was: 
II 
Natives who then enter White South Africa (from 
the self-governing or independent Black states) to 
come and work here, if their labour is still needed, 
par-ticularly in the cities, will be migrant labour 
generally speaking, although not migrant labour in 
the ordinary sense of the term, that is to say, 
labourers who come for periods of six months, a 
year or 18 months at a time. Large numbers of 
them will come and work and live here for a number 
of years as family units but will then be i~ter­
changeable. They will remain anchored in the 
homelands, and as they find uses and rewards in the 
developing Bantu areas for the skills which they 
have acquired in the White area in the meantime, 
they will return to the Bantu areas and reap the 
benefit of their knowledge there .• " 97 · 
-257-
The above paragraph contains key elements of government policy with 
regard to influx control, urbanisation, urban housing, urban schooling 
and urban health care. 
A th{rd myth derives from Verwoerd's re~lpolitik observation, which in 
a South African context condemns the progrannne of "Positive Apartheid'' 
to an unsuc~essful end~ 
II leadership in a democracy is not retained by 
means of.pious words. It depends on numbers, as 
anybody who has made a study of the history of 
any nation knows. In the final result, it is 
the force of numbers which predominates - high 
or low, poor or rich, Black or white ••• 11 
· This is the realpolitik reality and now the myth: 
the 
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II and, therefore, it is necessary to apply all our 
energies and to. -make sacrifices and to work hard in 
order to ensure that there will be a White part of 
South Africa, even though we must accept the 
presence of Coloureds~ but where the Bantu population 
wiil not.predominate in that community as part of that 
community." 98 
Verwoerd goes on to use the Tomlinson Commission Report (though 
with doubtful accuracy) to predict that ifthe intended energies 
. . 
are applied and sacrifices made the number .of blacks in "white" 
South Afric~n uiban and ~eri-urban areas ·in the year 2000 will 
be approximately 2 500 000. In contrast, if the policies of the 
United Party are followed, this number would be 11 or 12 million. 
The reason that the abov~ quoted propositions are described as 
~yths is indicated by what has happened in the 25 years since 
Verwoerd made these_ statements, and what is likely to happen in 
the 16 years which remain before the year 2000. 
99 
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Currently some 50 per cent of South Africa's total population 
(including Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and BophuthaTswana) of 31 million 
are urbanised, and at least 46 per cent of the approximately 22 million 
blacks - or 10 million are urbanised - overwhelmingly in what used to 
100 . 
be called "white" South Africa. Thus ve.rwoerd Is prediction noted 
above that if the policies of positive apartheid were followed, the 
numbers of blacks in "white" South Africa would be approximately 
2 500 000 had already been falsified fourfold by 1983. 
These numbers (as Verwoerd noted above) are crucial. They have buried 
for all time the notion of a "white" South Africa (or a white/coloured 
and Indian South Africa). The Buthelezi Commission Report found that 
the 1980 census reported a black majority in every magisterial district 
101 
in "white" Natal as well as "black" KwaZulu. This is almost 
certainly true of every magisterial district in the whole of South 
Africa. Blacks outnumber whites by a significant margin in all four 
provinces, even when the seif-governing national states 
. ' 
(non-independent homelands) and the four "independent" territories.are 
102 
excluded • 
. All trends into the future indicate these proportions increasing in 
favour of black South Africans. Indeed a· consens~s of predictions 
would see approximately 16 million South Africans urbanising in "white" 
~outh Africa betw~en now (1984) and the year 2000, the vast majority of 
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103 
whom will be black. Thus the number of blacks in what Verwoerd 
called "peri-urban" areas of "white" South Africa will be double -the 
figure he suggested would result from "liberal" United Party policies, 
and almost ten time~ hi~ prediction consequent on Nationalist policies. 
A final mythical quality of positive Apartheid needs to be noted. The 
ten homelands (four currently independent in the eyes of South Africa, 
but not of the international community) have not developed economies 
which in any sense can be called viable. Whilst these areas house 35,7 
per cent of South Africa_'s population, they contribute a mere 3,4 per 
104 
cent of its Gross Domestic Product. The central government (i.e. of 
"white" South Africa) provides massive subsidies for the public 
expenditure of both the "independent" and self-governing states, 
calculated by one source as 88 per cent of total public expenditure in 
105 
the 1975 to 1980 period. 
In the light of the above, one cannot but agree with the following 
conclusion: 
"Whatever economic grounds may have existed for viewing 
separate development as a workable policy have thus 
evaporated ••• For both black and white, the gap between 
illusion and reality, between promise and performance, 
has become too great to be ignored. The government, 
while continuing the policy of separate development, 
has begun to recognise the impossibility of creating 
ten viable homeland economies. Many urban and rural 
Africans will remain a permanent component of the -
-. 
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population of the common areas. And homeland self-
government., or even independence, will not end the 
economic ties between the territories and the peoples 
of the former unitary state of South Africa. The 
homelands will continue to look at fundamental autonomy 
·based on viabl.e economies. Structurally, they will 
remain part of the South African system, their economic 
fortunes linked inextricably to South Africa." 106 
The Myth of Revolution 
If the myth of nPositive" apartheid has been central to.South African 
politics since at least 1959, so bas the myth .of revolution in the 
thought and actions Of a wide range of group~ in opposition to 
Afrikaner nationalism. Commentators and activists repeatedly imply, 
threaten and predict inexorable movement towards this apocalyptic 
.event. As ·two internal c.ommentators note: 
"There have been five-minutes-to-midnight scenarios 
aplenty, either of the variety where a large-scale 
racial conflagration is .seen as inevitable or where 
. the problems of political and economic transition 
are tucked away into the residual category of some 
· form of therapeutic revolutionary violence and 
justified in terms of a romantic utopian ideology."· 107 
At a more popular level, an American journalist (and chronicler of 
··American involvement in Vietnam) entitled an article he wrote after a 
108 
visit to South Africa "The Fire to Come" .. 
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It is not difficult to see why a belief in a revolutionary outcome t.o 
conflict in South Africa is so prevalent.· At a rational level, it 
seems impossible that a society based on such massive and manifest 
injustice can continue to c6her~. As Heribert Adam observes: 
11 The frequent prediction of revolution is based on 
elementary insights of political sociology. In South. 
Africa domination is easily recognisable as direct 
personal exploitation. The rulers are not hidden 
behind a sophisticated ideology or an anonymous 
bureaucratic apparatus. On the contrary~ they are 
definable as a precise group visible even to the 
most politically naive ••• Consequently, there are 
few incentives for subordinates to identify with 
their rulers. 11 109 
At an emotional. (judgemental) level, an overwhelming .sense of the 
rightness of the cause of black liberation leads many to predict its 
inevitable triumph: 
. "The complex combination of social forc~s present in black 
resistance have succeeded in igniting a conflagration . 
which no amount of repression or incorporation will 
succeed in extinguishing." 110 
How real is the possibility of revolution occurring in South Africa in 
the foreseeable future? 
Skocpol has provided a contemporary review and critique of general 
111 
theories of (social) revolutions. She reviews four major "families" 
of revolutionary theories: 
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Marxist; 
what she terms "aggregate-psychological" (Ted Gurr); 
"systems/value consensus" (Chalmers/Johnson); 
"poli tical-confl ic t" (Charles Tilly). 
Skocpol finds all four families deficient in some respects. In 
building an alternative approach she stresses three critical aspects: 
the need for structural analysis as opposed to the "voluntarist" 
approach of present paradigms; 
the need to situate revolutions in their international, 
world-historic contexts; and 
the need to see the state ~s an at least potentially autonomous 
112 
structure and factor. 
Skocpol then proceeds to analys~ in detail the French, Russian and 
Chinese revolutions. Her first conclusion is that a fundamental 
weakening; if. ~ot actual failure, of state power is a precondition for 
113 
successful revolution. She quotes with approval, Katherine Charley: 
·"no revolution will be won against a (domestic) modern 
army when that army is putting out its full strength 
.against the insurrection." 114 
In a second ~onclusion, Skocpol notes that: 
"Wars and imperial intrusions were. the midwives of the 
revolutionary crises, and the emergent revolutionary 
regimes consolidated state power not only amidst armed 
domestic conficts but also in militarily threatening 
international circumstances." 115 
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In a third conclusion relevant here, Skocpol notes some characteristics 
common not only to the three cases states above but also to revolutions 
in Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Algeria; Cuba, Bolivia, Angola, Mocambique, 
Guinea-Bissau ~nd Ethiopia: 
"The .occurred in predominantly agrarian countries,.and 
they became possible oniy through the administrative 
- military breakdown of pre-existing .states. Peasant 
revolts or mobilisation for guerilla warfare played i 
pivotal· role in each revolutionary process. Furthermore, 
in everyoune of the cases, orgariised revolutionary 
leade.rship (recruited from· the ranks of previously 
marginal, educational elites) emerged or came to the 
fore during the revolutionary crises .• " 116 
. . . 
In a more specific application of revolutionary theory to South Africa, 
Calvin Woodward agrees with Skocpol that: 
" no revolution can succeed without the weakness of 
the conservative forces becoming manifest." 117 
He lists other revolutionary signposts as: 
-265-
" - prolonged ••• disc.ontent among a significant portion 
of population; 
protracted emigration 'the desertion of the 
intellectuals'; 
intensified and pervasive violent outbreaks; 
open conflict within the circle of powerholders; and 
state indecisiveness." 118 
Woodward notes that the presence of all these indicators does not make 
119 
revolution inevitable, but merely possible. With regard to South 
African Woodward notes: 
"There are no open indications of widespread discontent, 
the power elite evinces strength and confidence, and 
the use of force internally by the establishment has 
not significantly increased over recent_years." 120 
He, therefore, concludes: 
"The general view is that not-at least for ~he foreseeable 
future is it likely that the white establishment 
could be forcibly or violently be overthrown." 121 
At a less theoretical leveli two conservative American academics (Gann 
and Duignon) have sought to -envisage just how a revolution might take 
place and to estimate the resources a successful revolutionary force 
would need to deploy.- It is hard to find fault with the direction of 
their findings. These are: 
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that in terms of conventional war, no power on the African 
continent, or elsewhere, is likely to be able or willing to deploy 
the at least 100 000 men, fully supported, that would be needed to 
122 
seriously threaten the South African army; 
that the 1.iberation movements lack a committed mass following 
123 
inside South Africa capable of fermenting revolt from within; 
that non-violent approaches such as civil disobedience and 
industrial strikes are equally unlikely to succeed. (As 
unionisation of black workers coritinue, especially in key 
industries such as mining, the latter contention must be queried); 
· and finally, 
that though guerilla warfare could cause considerable discomfort 
to the present South African regime 1 it ~as highly unlikely to 
125 
bring it to its knees. 
~he conclusions of Gann and Duignon are broadly confirmed by other 
Americans operating from a quite different values perspective. These 
126 
are the members of the Rockefeller Commission. In a chapter which 
surveys the military balanc~between the present regime and its 
challengers, they conclude: 
124 
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"There is little evidence on which to question the 
short-term survivability of white power in South Africa. 
Anaiogies drawn from Iran, Nicaragua, or elsewhere 
ignore the realities of power in South Africa and the 
severe obstacles fa~ing prospective revolutionaries. 
Although 'revolutionary' is often used to describe the 
the South African situation, 'pre-revolutionary' would 
probably be more accurate and perhaps even that term 
stretches the facts." 127 
This view is supported by a wide range of South African academics: 




Heribert Adam; Slabbert and Welsh; 
132 
Herman Giliomee; amongst others. 
Lawrence 
In asserting the present regime's fundamental stability, at least for 
th~ foreseeable f~ture, wi are not seekirig to deny the extent of 
injustice it contains, nor to dimini~h th~ ext~nt of suffering it 
imposes. Indeed the stability makes both the injustice and the 
suffering that much worse. Yet it is a maudlin lesson of history (both 
·contemporary and ~ncient) that e~il regimes can persist over very long 
periods of time, as with Franco's Spain~ 
Finally, the mythical nature of the revolutionary option r~nders 
discussion of its desirability hypothetical. Lest desirability should 
be implied from the above, it is important to note that revolution in 
South Africa would be on a huge scale involving the loss of millions of 
lives, and the destruction of a large p~rt of society's fabric. The 
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future benefit justify such a present sacrifice would have to be both 
very certain and very significant. This writer cannot envisage a 
benefit big enough. 
The Reality of Economic Interdependence 
Economic growth 1s changing the patterns of power and influence of 
black and white South Africans. That this is a major area of 
133 
structural change is widely accepted. Some of the distinctive 




changes 1n reward; 
changes 1n organisation. 
Whilst the South African economy has long been dependent on black 
labour, the predominance of black workers 1s increasing significantly. 
Whereas in 1936, whites constituted 40,6 per cent of the manufacturing 
labour force, by 1976 this had dropped to 21,2 per cent. In the 
clothing and textile industries, the decline was much more dramatic: 
-1936 - 62,0 per cent white; 1976 - 7 ,4 per cent white. 
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In 1960, 
whites accounted for 47 per cent of those 1n the employ of the central 
135 
government. By 1977, this had dropped to 28 per cent. In 1980, 
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whites constituted the majority of the workforce only in the financial 
sector (72,8 per cent) and came close to majority in transport and_ 
communication (45,2 per cent). Elsewhere they formed the minority of 
the labour force: Electricity (36,7 per cent); Commerce (29,7 per 
cent); Services (24,1 per cent); Construction (22,6 per cent); Mining 
136 
(11 per cent) and Agriculture (7,9 per cent). 
More significant than these quantitative change~ are the changes 6f a 
qualitative nature. The "modern" sector of the economy is beginning to 
mature out of its predominate employment of unskilled workers. In the 
decade of the seventies, a dramatic shift took place in the natur~ of 




Artisans 14% 13% 
Operators 14%. 13% 
Semi-skilled workers. 21% 39% 
Labourers . 51%. 35% 
Along with _these changes in skill levels, so the sectoral pattern of 
employment have been changing. From 1970-1980, emplqyment in 
Agriculture decreased by a massive 54 per cent (from 2 525 587 to 
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1 363 820) whilst the professional and technical workforce increased by 
72 per cent (from 360 524 to 622 280); clerical workers increased by 
48 per cent (from 559 684 to 828 800); arid sales workers by 5l·p~i 
cent (from 288 846 to 437 340). The ecoriomically active workforce as 
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a whole increased by only 7 per cent over this period. 
These trends are continuing. The current Government Economic 
Development Plan, which runs from 1978 to 1987 predicts an increase in 
annual demand for new apprentices of 9 OOO(from 14 000 per annum 
currently to 23 000) and of technicians of 7 500 (from 2 000 per a~num 
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currently to 9 500). 
The increa~ing skill levels of black workers torrelates with our 
increasing black share of earned income. In Rand figures, this.share 
has increased from 25 per cent of the total in 1970 to 40 per cent in . 
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1980. The rat~o of average black to white wages has also declined 
141 
as the t~ble belo~ indicates: 
1972 1982 
Sector 
_Mining 1: 14 1: 4 
Manufacturing 1:6 1:3 
Electricity 1: 4 1:3,6 





Trade 1:4,6 1:4 
Transport & Communication 1:6 1:3,8 
Finance 1:3,9 1:2,6 
Government service 1:6 1:3,9 
Total 1:6,6 1:3,7 
Finally, the changed skilled levels of black workers has been 
accompanied by (and certainly made possible) higher levels of worker 
organ{sations. Currently some 15 per cent of the relevant (i.e. 
domestic and agri~ulture labour excluded) black labour: force is 
organised, or some 500 000 workers. Organisation levels are higher in 
key industries (e.g. metal, motor) and ~mongst larger companies. 
Whereas the typical black worker of the 1950's was uriskilled, 
unorganised and ear-ned about one-sixth of the average white worker, the 
black worker of the i980's and 1990's is skilled or semi-skilled, 
·organised into powerful industrial unions, and earns no less than a 
third of the average white worker. 
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Consumption Interdependence 
As the position of blacks in the workforce becomes more significant 
quantitatively as well as qualitatively so their role as consumers also 
142 
increases. Currently there are few markets in which the black as a 
consumer can be ignored. Our everyday experience tells us this: 
shops, especially in the major CBD's are increasingly oriented 
towards-black as well as white needs; 
restaurants and hotels (in towns as well as ~ities) are now 
multi-racial as a rule, and ~niracial by exception. Much of this 
desegregation has occurred through change of social convention, 
rather than change in law or. regulation; 
adv~rtising increasing project's non-ra~ial lifestyles and 
non~racial wants. 
Though of course this consumption interdependence does not mean a 
change in the power structure per se nevertheless it is true that a 
macro-power equilibrium must be based on micro-relationships of 
interdependence and rough power equilibrium. -The world of the consumer 
provides one of those changing micro-patterns. 
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The Reality of International Interdependence 
The pattern of South Africa's international relationships has changed 
dramatically since 1948. These changes can be broadly characterised as 
reflecting paradoxical trends of isolation on the one hand and 
interdependence of the other. 
These changes are as much a product of events outside South Africa (and 
especially on the African continent) as events inside. The map on page 
143 
274 indicates the most imp~rtant area of change : de-colonialisation. 
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THE COMING OF BLACK RULE IN AFRICA 
1950 1960 
·t970 1980 
BLACK RULED AREAS -~. 
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In 1950 the only black-ruled countries were Egypt and Ethiopia. By 
1980, the only white-ruled territories were South Africa and Namibia. 
These changes produced two decades of isolation, (in the Fifties .and 
Sixties) as South Africa went from being a small, but valued, member of 
the Allied alliance, and its Prime Minister (Jan Smuts) a respected 
world ~itizen, to being one of the great pariah states of the world 
community. Whilst isolationism continued (and indeed grew) in the 
seventies and eighties, areas of interdependence also emerged. Some of 
these areas are highlighted below. 
Military Interdependence 
It seems ironical that the spread of black rule in Africa should have 
led to both the reality and perception of military interdependence. On 
South Africa's side, the key·event was the fall of the Salazar regime 
in Portugal in 1974 and the subsequent rapid withdrawal of Portugal 
from its two colonies which border South Africa on her north-east and 
north-west flanks. This withdrawal led first to a period of military 
adventurism. South Africa deployed some 2 000 paramilitary members of 
144 
the police force in Rhodesia (as it then was). A second "adventure" 
of a more dramatic kind was South Africa's intervention in the Angolan 
civil war in 1977. Smaller scale raids were to follow into Lesotho and 
Mocambique. 
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The experience of the.Angolan adventure in particular seems to have 
impressed on South Africa's political and military le~dership that· 
security for South Africa's borders would .not be achieved through 
military prowess alone.· The military raids always.occurred at high 
political cost (internally as well as internationally). Their effect 
was always temporary. A policy of permanent military expansion was 
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both undesirable and difficult. Increasingly South Africa sought to 
combine military .initiatives with diplomatic ones. Perhaps the first 
of these can be seen in Vorster's "Africa initiative" - th·e 
establishment .of diplomatic relations with Malawi, secret visits to 
West African states, and most particularly Vorster's critical role in 
both the Kissenger and Carrington mediated attempts to resolve the 
Rhodesian confict. Botha continued this policy and expanded it. The 
signing of the Nkomati Acc~rd with Moca~biqu~ is the most recent and 
the most dramatic ~vidence of its effect. 
. . 
On the part of black-ruled Africa, after the first heady jears of 
independence) the new regimes realised their military fragility. There 
is clear evidence of the role of Mocambique's Machel in forcing Mugabe· 
to accept the Lancaster House agreement: 
"(Machel's) final message was blunt: Mugabe must.accept 
the risk of Lancaster House and fight .the elections. 
He didn't say it but the warning was implicit. Mugabe 
would have asylum in Mocambique if he refused, but no 
longer the.bases for war." 146 
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This realism was to find an echo in Angola's talks with South Africa re 
Namibia, culminating in the Lusaka _troop withdrawal agreement. A 
second ~cho is seen in the Nkomati Accord. Just as South Africa could 
.hot secure its borders through military ~dventures (alone) so black 
Africa could not challenge Pretoria militarily (head on). 
This has created a situation where South Africa's bordering states have 
all agreed not to allow their territory to be used by the ANC for 
147 
military purposes. South Africa in its turn, has at least 
significantly de-escalated if not discontinued its direct and indirect 
148 
military intervention in these territoTies. 
Economic Interdependence 
South Africa's economy is an extremely open one, in the sense ihat a 
large proportion of economic activity is dependent on world trade. 
149 
Exports and imports combined account for almost half of total GDP. 
South Africa's ~ajor trading partner~ ar~: 
USA (16,9 per cent of tw6 way trade in 1981); 
Japan (13,9 per cent); 
ui (13,6 per cent); 
West Germany (11,8 per cent); 
150 
followed by Switzerland and Italy. Trade with Africa 1s of 
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Investment and technology transfer links are as strong as the trade 
links·. South Africa 1 s need for both are totally evident. The country 
in return offers a specialised supplier and receiver market of 
significance to major western economies. 
Those links create an interdependence such that just as South Africa 
and her neighbouring black-ruled states need each other militarily, so 
too do the West and South Africa (and increasingly bla.ck and· 
white-ruled .Southern Africa) need each other economically. 
Psychological Interdependence 
From the point of view of the present regime 1n South Africa perhaps 
the strongest interdependen~e of all is to be found at the 
psychological level. White South Africans (and especially those 
belonging to the political ruling class) enj~y a love/hate relationship 
with the rest of the world. It is a relationship almost adolescent in 
its nature. Convinced o.f being misunderstood, bit.ter about alleged 
double standards and hugely rE;!sentful of censure and advice, the worst 
fate for white South Africans vis-a-vis their fellow .species is to be 
ignored. 
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As contact with the world conimunity increases (through trade, 
corrnnunication, tourism, et'c.) so the tension between resentment and a 
desire to be accepted grows. This certainly creates an interdependence 
and potentially, an area for recip-rocal action/reaction. A negative 
example of this was the electioneering benefit John Vorster derived 
from the Carter Administrtion's policy of moral censure. The opposite 
can be argued (though controversially) with regard to the Reagan 
Adminstration policy of constructive engagement. Here movement on the 
Namibian issue, normalisation in relations with neighbouring states, a 
decrease in bannings and detentions, the acceptance of the Rikhoto 
decision as well as the reconsideration of the Orderly Movement and 
Settlement of Black Persons Bill can all be cited_ as possible fruits of 
this policy. 
The actual balance .sheet is not the issue here. White South Africa 
does care what the rest of the world thinks about her. She is keen 
(within fairly narrow constraints) t~ improve her international 
relations. 
Political Options 
In Chapter Three, we have noted that liberal political strategies have 




Afrik~ner Nationalism.confronted liberalism in the Fifties and Sixties 
as a monolithic juggerna~t. It was characterised by an almost total 
clarity of purpose. Two overriding goals were dominant: 
to ensure a white South Africa (racial separation in every 
possible sphere - "positive" Apartheid in the form of the 
Bantustan policy); 
to establish an Afrikaner republic. 
It was also characterised by an unusually high degree of unity. Caucas 
feuds were few, and normally conducted in private. Leadership changed 
hands infrequently and (until recently) with little conflict. Two of 
the first three Nationalist Prime. Ministers died in office, whilst the 
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third retited voluntarily at the age of 82. From 1948 until 1966, 
the NP was without rival in Afrikaner politics. Even after the Hertzog 
break in 1966, it was another 17 y~ars befo~e anothe~ Afrikaner 
153 
oriented political part_y was to win a seat in Parliament. Truly.· the 
154 
NP as represented, as Adam has described it, ethnic mobilisation. 
What is the position of Afrikaner Nationalist politics today? 
Certainly Afrikaner political unity has been broken. In the last 
general ~lection (1981), a rival Afrikaner Party (HNP) gained 14 per 
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cent of the total vote or the votes of one at least in five Afrikaans 
voters. A further one in twenty voted for the PFP or NRP, creating a 
situation in which one out of four Afrikaans voters supported a party 
155 
other than the NP. Since 1981, the NP's position has been further 
eroded by the split (by far the most significant since 1948) of Andries 
Treurnicht's supporters and the formation of the CP. In four Transvaal 
by-elections in May 1983 (three of which wer_e in admittedly 
conservative areas), the NP polled 46 per cent of the popular vote to 
the CP/HNP's 41 per cent (the balance constituted PFP/NRP Eupport). 
The CP became the first party to the right of the NP to win a 
Parliamentary seat, a feat they were to repeat later that year. 
Finally, the 1983 constitutional referendum indicated yet further 
erosion of the NP's traditional support base. This Referendum 
reflected new voter alliances. The largest "Yes" vote was recorded 
where English opposition voters were at their strongest: 
Cape Town 75,29% 
Durban 72,25% 
Johannesburg 68' 45%-







The table on page 283 suggests a new polarisation of white politics. 
/ 
No longe~· is the divide that between an exclusivist Afrikaner 
Nationalism.and an inclusive English oriented party (NP versus UP), but 
between political groups essentially crystall~sed around attitudes to 
race. 
If mbnolithic unity has been shattered, so too has the clarity of 
~ision and certainty of purpose. In a sense this c~rtainly has fallen 
victim to.Afrikaner Nationalism's complete success in its one key 
objective (republiekwording) and c.omplete failure :in the other 
("Posit_ive" Apartheid). 
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Adam, with one perspective on the "n.ew politics" of Afrikaner 
157 
nationalism, sees the old Apartheid "religion" . being replaced by 
what he terms "survival politics". Many liberal critics deride this 
change as purely semantic: Apartheid in new words. Whilst they are 
quite correct in asserting that the change does not amount to a 
- - -- -· -------~ ~ ,----- ---y-- --·-----, 
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"surrender" of Afrikaner or white hegemony, they are quite wrong in 
suggesting it represents no change. Andries Treurnicht and .the minimum 
of 400 000 (perhaps 500 000) Afrikaans voters who followed him in the 
Referendum understood this. Some quotations from a recent manifesto of 
the new.nationalism, entitled."The Second .(R)evolution" and written by 
158 
Willem de Klerk indicates just how significant the break with past 
dogma is. This work is subtitled: . Afrikanerdom and the Crisis of 
Identity. De Klerk .asserts that this crisis has been brought about by 
a process of questioning, 1nter alia: 
"Questioning the one-sidedness of the policy of apartheid 
which finds its leitmotiv in. the homelands, ·underlining 
in particular the failure of homeland development and · 
the problem of the absorption of blacks who were supposed 
to go back to their homelands and border industries .• 
Questioning the political rights of the urban blacks 
and the senselessnes of shunting them back to the 
homelands to exercise these rights. Questioning the 
absurdity ~f rigid divisions in sport and in other 
unnecessary area~. Questioning coloured and Indian · 
rights and citzenship. Questioning the statutory 
entrenchment of Apartheid and structural discrimination. 
Questioning the whole moral ·basis of the concept of 
Apartheid." 159 
This process of questioning causes De Klerk to make a bold statement 
about Apartheid politics: 
"All the barriers mentioned above have brought Afrikaners 
to the realisation that the concept of Apartheid as a 
political policy is doomed .to failure." 160 
He continues; 
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"This means that the fundamental·· laws of the old Apartheid 
dispensation will have to be repealed - this is an 
essential part of compromise politics." 161 
·De Klerk tries to give content to this term "compromise politics", 
though his attempt raises as many questions as it addresses: 
11The philosophy of the new compromise-politics contains 
the following elements! 
The dispensation of nations is the political ide-al, 
· not confrontation between nations or their subjugation. 
The dispensation of nations cannot be attained through 
the concepts of a unitary state or separate nation 
states. 
The dispensation of nations is only possible by 
creating a nation concept which contains elements 
of both a unitary state and nation-states. All 
parties must be persuaded to agree to this compromise 
dispensation. . 
The compromise formula is authority over own affairs 
and shared authority for all the peoples and groups . 
in South Africa. This is called the politics of 
association. 
The unitary state as concept is recognl.sed in this 
compromise in the participation on all levels of 
government, full participation on the communal level 
by all and the abolition of legal discrimination. 
Ethnicity as an enforced social separation would be 
largely abolished, except where group interests were 
the decisive factor.. There would be joint citizenship 
and the sharing of public amenities, wherever 
desirable. 
The nation-state-concept is recognised in this compromise 
because ethnicity as a political division is 
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is retained and·territorial division as a political 
creed is abandoned. The point of departure is that 
population groups remain the basic bricks of politics 
arid society and that group autonomy is retained by 
authority over own affairs. Own affairs can be 
decided in an on-going process of consultation, 
but basically this means that the sphere of exis-
tence of each group, their 'own' sphere, will be 
maintained by their own political structures, own 
living areas, education and establishments. However, 
the entrenchment of the own sphere also compromises 
by permitting a 'grey sphere' in living areas, 
education, etcetera, the right of choice to take 
party in the grey sphere will be aknowledged." 162 
Iri the Eighti~s, Afrikaner unity has been replaced by Afrikaner 
diversity: the politics of conquest with its Verwoerdian certainty by 
the politics of survival with its De Klerkian fuddle. 
Black Politics 
If a monolithic and single-minded Afrikaner Nationalism had severely 
circumscribed the options of liberal politics, so too had the absence 
of an effective black politics of reform. 
The major standard bearer of black political aspirations, virtually 
from Union, had been the African National Congress. This organi.sation 
(only becoming a mass movement in the late Fifties) has progressed 
through a range of tactics and strategies: 
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163 
from petititon (approximately the 1910's to the 1940's); 
164 
to protest (1940's); 
to defiance (disobedience of racist laws - 1950's); 
165 
to sabotage (destruction of property but not life, 1n exile 1n 
1960's); 
166 
to a more broadly guerilla war strategy in the 1980's. 
Liberalism was often the object of petition particularly in the 1930's 
167 
and 1940 1 s. Protest provided opportunities for collaboration, but 
the defiance, sabotage and guerilla plane~ posed serious moral and 
168 
practical dilemmas. Protest and defiance (ambiguously) could be 
reconciled with a politics of reform, which was the boundary line of 
liberal tactics. Even defiance ~aised conflicts about the rule of law. 
In the Fifties, the working alliance between communists and the ANC 
posed further dilemmas, causing the Liberal Party to boycott the 1956 
Klipspruit People's Congress. 
A structural problem for black politics in this period was the lack of 
the resources which would make a politics of reform possible. In the 
absence of an American-type liberal constitution petition, protest 
and defiance were tactics of limited consequence. The absence of a 
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disciplined mass membership base rendered civil disobedience 
campaign highly vulnerable to the reactions of a State which was both 
ready and able to repress. Importantly, Walshe has observed that the 
increasing industrialisation (and perhaps inore accurately their 
proletarianisation). 
" had given the African masses a minimal but real 
stake in stable social conditions. It had also 
established their vulnerability to unemployment and 
the loss of meagre but real opportunities for economic 
advance which could not be recouped upon banishment 
to the rural areas~ Congress, therefore, languished, 
being unable to prise reforms from the closed fist of 
Afrikaner Nationalism.'' 170 
This absence of a black "politics of reform" contributed to liberal 
impotence in the Fifties and Sixties. Has the situation changed? 
This question (as with so many about South African society and 
politics) cannot be answered easily or unambiguously. It is, however, 
possible to poini to two important areas of change. 
The first of these is the re-emergence and "coming of age" of black 
trade unions. Reborn in the early Seventies (with important impetus 
from the 1973 Durban strikes) and recognised by the State in 1979 (in 
one of the most important reversals of National Party policies in 
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almost four decades of rule) some 40 black and multi-racial um.ens now 
have a membership base of between 400 000 and 500 000. More 
·importantly, they ar~ "in business" as trade unions for the first time 
in South African history. They have been recognised by a wide grouping 
of employers, across a.range of industries. They engage in collective 
bargaining, their shop stewards fight for the human dignity and fair 
treatment of black workers .in the workplace. Almost all commentators 
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from the ANC to the rightwing Conservative Party recognise their power. 
A second new factor is the creation of the largest black political 
movement in South Africa's history, lnkatha Yenkululeko yeSizwe, led 
by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. In 1983 this movement claimed a membership. 
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base of some 750 000 of which at least one-third were fully paid-up. 
Inkatha has not only mass membership but also an effective branch 
strutture (2 000 branches in 1983), ~ vigourous Woman's Youth Brigade, 
and a "base" in the power structure through·its role in the homeland 
government of KwaZulu. This latter·fact has led critics to dismiss 
Inkatha as collaborationist, and its leader Buthelezi as a stooge. 
Though these rhetorical dismissals are often heard, both inside South 
Africa and out, Buthelezi's base of support cannot be ignored. This 
is overwhelming amongst blacks in Natal and significant elsewhere in 
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South Africa. The Rocke'fellor Connnission acknowledge him as "a 
175 
force to be reckoned with." Lodge writing of Inkatha from a 
largely critical perspective notes: 
" Inkatha, despite its increasingly conscious rivalry 
with and antagonism towards the ANC is likely to expand 
its power and influence within urban African 
conununities ••• " 176 
Inkatha's power base (as with the unions) enable it to develop a 
politics of reform. Its occupation of a key homeland government 
together with its refusal to accept full "independence" has forced the 
South African government to seek alternative political_ solutions to the 
problem of black participation - alternati~es, that is, to 
balkanisation. The present cabinet committee which i_s examining the 
political future of some 10 million "urban" blacks is a consequence of 
Buthelezi's politics. It is powerful enough to openly defy the 
177 
government on at least certain issues. Inkatha's opposition to 
178 
certain government plans has led to their abandonment. Inkathahas 
formed alliances with other groups inside South Africa, as well as 
179 
conducting vigourous relations abroad. Perhaps its most creative 
political action to date has been the Buthelezi Connnission, which 
explored the political alternatives between Apartheid and one-man 
one-vote, in the context of Natal, but with relevance to all South 
Africa. 
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Other threads of a black politics of reform can be identified though 
in less certain form. One of these is the area of Black Local 
Government. Though the new local government bodies enjoy considerable 
constitutional power, their lack of an adequate financial base, as well 
as the dubious calibre and mandate of the present "generation" of 
elected councillors vitiates their impact. Mandate problems also 
undermine the coloured and Indian members of the new tricameral 
pailiament, though this is at least mitigated in the case of the 
colou!eds by the coherence and leadership of the totally dominate 
Labour Party. 
Protest movements have not disappeared. Organisations which act more 
as the articulators and mobilisers of black aspirations and black anger 
have flourished in the Eighties. AZAPO, UDF and the NF all are 
significant actors. Both the quantity and quality of their stlpport are 
impossible to determine definitively in the absence of some 
representative system which measures support in an organised way. 
The significant change in the Eigh~ies, however, is the expansion of 
the range of black strate-gies. Though long-term goals are common, 
strategies now span revolt, protest. and reform. This creates new 
options for liberal action. 
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4. Towards an Ethics of Responsible Liberal Action 
, 
The fourth part of our hypothesis reads as follows: (P~ge 7} 
"that liberals should review their ethical approach 
with a view to developing an ethic of responsible 
liberal action." 
In Section Three of this conclusion we have argued that a series of 
forces have created a new set of options for libetals. Can these new 
options sustain a "new" ethic? Before examining this we must redefine 
the ethics of responsible (liberal) action~ 
This· ethic is developed in Chapter Two, in the ''model" we have derived 
from the thoughts and actions of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. We can briefly 
·· sunnnarise this model as fol lows:· 
such ethics are more concerned with action (the deed) than with 
judgement; 
these ethics can be guided by no pre-given moral code, but must 
make concrete choices in particular situations; 
the responsible actor must accept that he lives in a world come of 
age. He cannot surrender his judgement (nor his responsibility) 
to institutions or ideologies; 
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in planning his action, his analysis must go beyond reason and 
take full cognisance of factors such as power, -evi 1 and reality; 
ethical judgements can be based neither solely on the 
consideration of motives, nor of consequences, but must hold both 
in tension; 
a responsible actor must accept his own guilt - it is impossible 
to act without a~ invol~ement in bad conseq~ences; 
he must be ready to combine freedom and justice; 
finally, he must act in a way which demonstrates a careful concern 
180 
for the foreseeable consequences of his action. 
Is it ~ossible to realise liberal values through stich an ethic in South 
Africa in the 1980' s? It wi 11 be argued by .means of a series of 
illustrations drawn from different fields of liberal endeavour, that 
this is possible. In so doing, it is not suggested that such an ethic 
has been entirely lacking in liberal aciion in the past, but only that 
181 
it has been under-emphasised. 
The Sprocas series of reports described in Chapter Three, and 
especially the report of political alternatives, review liberal 
principles comprehensively and develop these into a much more 
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realpolitik of programme. Rick Turner, in his postscript to his 
work The Eye of The Needle provided an analysis of South Africa's 
social dynamics out of which a series of organisational strategies 
183 
could be developed. This analysis of Turner· constitutes a valuable 
,• 
bridge between the changes we have observed in Section Three of this 
conclusion and the strategies we wish to illustrate in this section. 
For this reason, we shall list some of Turner'• s more important 
insights: 
184 
South Africa 1s as remarkably stable as it 1s grossly unequal; 
Industrialisation is creating a potential power base for a black 
185 
proletariat; 
Separate development institutions provide a potential shelter for 
black political organisation, which when combined with the above 
186 
become a formidable change agent; 
187 
White reactions are far from irrelevant; 
The three most likely responses of the present regime to pressures 
for change are: 
* radically improved development of the homelands; 
* the co-option of the black middle class; 
* a combination of the two which is remarkably accurate of 
present policies (and thi~ was written in 1973!) 
. I 
II the attempt to integrate the two minority black 
communities, that is the 'coloured' community and the 
Indian community, into the white group, and at the_ 
same time speed up the development of the homelands, 
to make concessions, short of a sharing of political 
power, to the African urban middle class."_188 
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Of these three options, Turner observes three important points: 
'~irst~ none of them would radically alter the fact that 
South Africa is a highly unequal society. Second, 
nevertheless, any one of these strategies would make South 
Africa a much less harsh and a much more liveable society 
than it is at present. • •• Third, although each of these 
strategies can be seen from the white perspective as an 
attempt to maintain power by playing on black divisions, 
there is no guarantee that any of these strategies would 
actually succeed." 189 
Against -the background of such an analysis can an ethics of respon-sible 
liberal action be illustrated? We shall examine a number of arenas for 
liberal action. 
The Economy 
This is without_ doubt the area of greateit liberal power and influence. 
In this area, three avenues of action can be identified: -
The democratisation of the workpla-ce through the incorporation 
of emerging black unions in a process of joint decision-making 
both in collective bargaining and on a more microscopic scale 
(shop floor). 
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Such democratisation _- a move towards management by consent 
though it will not transfer political power will lead to a 
transfer of resources. This is a pre-condi_tion for a shift in 
political power; 
The creation of lobbies for change. If issues are carefully 
selected, carefully researched and carefully propagated, business 
can lobby effectively for significant change. The Urban 
Foundation has already indicated this. Two of the most important 
and athievable (~t least in part) areas for such lobby activies 
are influx control/urbanisation arid the desegregation of training 
and education institutions (particularly at the tertiary level); 
Increasing black skills and leadership in the economy. Here black 
access to artisan skills is crucial. Access to managerial and 
other technical occupations is also important, again because it 
in~olves an inirease of resource~ in black hand~. 
The Media 
The English language press has long espoused liberal values. These 
values have also, however, long been only part realised. In 
~articular, against a background of changing social forces, a vital 
attitude shaping challenge awaits the press: 
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Eroding racial prejudice. Such prejudice acts as a filter which 
can and does sway reaction to pressures for change. Blacks are 
too often presented in the English press as victims (so 
encouraging guilt) or rebels (so encouraging fear). They are too 
seldom presented as liberal values proclaim them: fellow human 
beings and fellow South Africans - including in_ their number .;.. 
artisans, journalists, writers, doc tors, etc~- The press can help 
to project the "cross cutting cleavages" which now exist 
extensively in South African society. 
To undermine racial fear. White fear of apocalypse bas been 
exacerbated by liberal moralism to the point where many whites 
believe armageddon inevitable, and black/white compromise 
impossible. Yet everyday South African society abounds with 
examples ·of black/white compromise and co-operation. A belief in 
t~e po~sibility of inter-racial compromise should be nurtured. 
Educating whites (in particular) to understand the changing 
realities of South Africa. Here industrial relations, education, 
urbanisation, -consumerism all offer opportunities to reflect a new 
society replete with new options. 
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The Universities 
English language universities have long been the torch bearers .of 
liberal values. What would an ethics of responsible action look like 
in this area? 
Relevant education for these universities. The graduates.of these 
institutions are almost all destined for managerial and 
professional roles in society. Does university training in 
business administrtion~ ~ngineering, medicine, accountancy, etc. 
incorporate a conscious. liberal ethic? 
A model of a non-racial social organistion: all English language 
universities now have sizeable black minorities. How successful 
they prove to be in effectively incorporating these minorities 
within the life ~nd purpose of the tinivei~ity will be in important 
test case for other social formations. 
The Churches 
The English language churches are the largest multi-racial 
organisations in South Africa. Though they have long proclaimed 
liberal values, these values have been again 6nly partially practised. 
It is important to extend the degree of realisation not only to rebut 
the negative charge of bypocrisy, but because of enormous social 
influence this could bring to bear. 
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Areas for potential responsible action are: 
the breaking down of de facto racial barriers, particularly at the 
parish level; 
increased black/white interaction in common activities, creating 
new common roles; 
the extension of the churches role as an ethical agent in both the 
black and the white role. This role should explore the ethfral 
(i.e. action-related) consequences of the christian faith for 
politicians, workers, managers, etc. 
Political Parties/Groups 
Here the single most important challenge is to create values coalitions 
across the ~olou~ bar around lib~ral- values. Here the new 
constitutional dispensation, for all its flaws, offers new -
opportunities. It could conceivably increase the present level of 
liberal MP's from the current 15 per cent (27 out of 178) to over 40 
per cent (147 out of 298). 
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The Buthelezi Commission is an example of a highly significant 
black/white joint action. So too was joint Inkatha/PFP protests about 
Ingwavuma and KaNgwane. The referendum alliance is also an example of 
such t~ctical co-opertion. 
It should be noted here that it is tactical co-operation and not the 
·submergence of a white liberal identity and white liberal interests 
that wo~ld constitute responsible ~ction. It has been argued that 
white liberals must choose constantly between white and black target 
audiences. Such a choice is false. Ability· to attract fu.rther white 
support for liberal positions is now directly linked to the ability to 
demonstrate co-operation with black groupings. 
The extent to which white liberals demonstrate thei~ ability to bring 
liberals together qua liberals rather than as blacks or white, will 
over time, allow them to refute Turner's charge that they: 
"remain whites first and liberals second." 190 
The above merely sketches the outline of an ethics of responsible 
action in five areas. All need to be developed by actors in concrete 
situations. All will involve actors in difficultand ambiguous choice, 
often calling upon them to choose between evils, and to estimate 
balances of consequence. 
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Finally, we join with Weber in noting that a moment will come when 
consequence ceases to be an adequate guide for action. Some di1emmas 
are so fundamental that in order to preserve personal integrity, only a 
response of "principle" suffices. Then calculation ends and an 
intuitive "gut level" response takes over. In South Africa in the 
1980's, however, liberals must first tread the road of responsible 
action before they can legitimately say with Weber "thus far and no 
further." 
All the above examples imply no change in liberal values (as set out by 
leatt in the Introduction, pages 11-13). These values remain as valid 
and vital as ever. They do,·however, imply a revised ethic. 
Instead of choosing to act (or declining to act) on the basis of an 
inner conviction alone, there is a need: 
to undertake a realistic survey of the situation: 
What interest is being served by the situation I am seeking to 
change? Who can exercise what sort of power? (There will be a 
need to go beyond the rational in this exercise); 
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to examine ·all the options: 
All possible actions must be contemplated (how else is 
responsible choice possible?) These options must first be 
identified and only then judged and only then accepted or 
rejected. 
consequences must be weighed against conscience: 
In choosing a line of action, an attempt must be made to 
anticipate its consequences. This exercise will always be 
hypothetical, and can never .be totally precise. It is, however, 
never impossible. The act finally chosen must combine good 
consequ~nces with good intentidns. 
Such a_reconstructed ethic should enable liberals to greatly increase 
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After 1933 Hitler abolished the multi-party system, and the purpose 
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rule: 
1935 in favour of the National £ocialists 98,8% 
1938 in favour of the National Socialists 99,1% 
It is interesting to note that both Bullock 1967, and Fest 1974, 
comment that the 16 million or so votes that Hitler gained between 
1928 and 1933 were gained from the Centre and Right, rather than from 
either·the Cormnunists or Social Democrats, whose fortunes improved in 
respect of the former and remained constant in respect of the latter. 
7. Bullock 1967, page 257. 
8. Grunberger 1977~ page 13. · 
9. Quoted in Grunberger 1977, page 14. 
10. Social security was improved; the collective bargaining process was 
promoted, with some 12 to 14 million workers covered by collective 
agreements; strikes decreased in the 1927 to 1930 period to 
·something like half of their pre-war level. Part of this decrease 
was the result of increased government involvement in the settling of 
labour disputes - an involvement which was to cost the Weimar 
Republic dearly in the years of economic crisis,. from 1930 to 1933. 
(See Grunberger 1977, pages 19 to 21). The. registration of patents 
(a good index of entrepreneurship and innovation) doubled from their 
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49. Ibid, pages 240-247~ 
50. Ibid, pages 247-254. 
51. Beck's resignation on 18th August was ~ spur to the will to a direct 
revolt. Beck resigned once he had failed firstly to persuade Hitler 
from his military planes, and. also to persuade the General staff to 
act collectively to op~ose Hitler. In a sense the spur to revolt was 
the failure of the path of reason. 
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52. It is interesting to note that one of the actors in this plot, Heinz, 
former leader of the Stahlhelm, thought the idea of the arrest and 
trial unwise'. He had secretly ordered his men, whose task it was to 
effect th~ arrest, io simply shoot Hitler. 
53. For a detailed account of what Hoffman calls Balder's Coup plan see 
Hoffmann 1970, pages 109-129. 
54. Fest 1977, page 836. For Fest's account of the Coup attempt see 
pages 834-841. 
55. Hoffmann 1970, page 363. 
56. Ibid, pag~s 301 and 302. 
57. General Oster was to provide the explosive. This was impossible 
after the Elser attempt, Hoffmann 1970, pages 303-304. It is 
interesting to note that Ian Colvin, one of Canaris' bibgraphers, 
believes that the Elser attempt was an SS planned operation (hence 
Hitler's life saving early departure from -the Cellar.) 
58. Hoffmann 1970, pages 306-307. 
59. Ibid, pages 332-333. 
60. Ibid, pages 324-325. Note the problem the conspirators experienc~d 
- repeatedly with fuses, Hoffman 1970, page 324. 
61. See Calvin's Chapters III, XI, XIV, XIX. 
62. Fest 1977, page 1061 and _Arnold - Forster 1981, page 261. 
63. Captain Kaiser describes this indecisiveness on the part of the 
Generals Ohlbricht and Fromm: -"The one wants. to act when the command 
is given, the other -to command when the deed is done." Hoffman 1970, 
page 352. 
64. Fest 1977, page 1037. 
65. In Hoffmann's definitive study Dohnanyi emerges as one of the handful 
of central characters in the resistance with as many references (42 
in all) as Canaris and Beck. 
66. F.W.T. Craske was elected Youth Secretary for the British Empire, the 
United States and the Far East; the Frenchman P.C. Toureille was 
elected for France, Latin America, the Balkans, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia; and Bonhoeffer for Germany, Northern Europe Hungary 
and Austria. 
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67. See Bethge 1967, pages 146 and 147i 
68. See for example his trip to Rome in 1942 in Bethge 1967, pages 676 
to 678. 
69. Ibid, pages 589, 610, 696, 733, 734 and 737 for evidence of this 
transition. 
70. A short account of this role has been attempted elsewhere in Godsell 
1978, pages 440-443. 
71. See Bethge's section "A Double Life", pages 587-590 in Bethge 1967. 
See ~lso "Ten Years After" in Bonhoeffer 1980, pages 9-26. 
72. Bonhoeffer 1965, page 43~ 
73. Ibid, page 17. 
74. Ibid, page 43. 
75. Ibid~ page 72. 
The consistency of Bonhoeffer's thinking on this issue is worth 
observing here. In a sermon preached in February 1929 in Barcelona 
he said the following: 
" ••• the concepts of 'good~ and 'evil' exist only in the 
performance of an action, i.e. at any .specific present, 
and hence any attempt to lay down principles is like 
trying to draw .a bird in flight " 
Bonhoeffer 1971, p~ge 36. 
and 
"The Christian himself creates his standards of good and 
evil for himself. Only he can justify his own actions, 
just as only he can bear the responsibility." 
Bonhoeffer 1971, page 40. 
and 
'' ••• there cannot be ethics in a vacuum, as a principl~; 
there cannot be good and evil as general ideas, but 
only as qualities of a will making a decision ••• 
Bound up in the concrete decision, through God and 
In God, the Christian acts in the power of a man 
who has become free." 
Bonhoeffer 1971, page 43. 
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76. See his rejection of the relativisit approach (and utilitarianism) 
because of its failure to recognize the ultimate reality, God. 
Bonhoeffer 1965, page 192. 
77. Bonhoeffer 1965, page 164: 
"The distinction between life that is worth living and 
life that is not worth living must sooner or later 
destroy life itself." 
78. Ibid, page 168. 
79. Ibid, page 97. 
80. Ibid, page 99. 
81. Ibid, page 101 and 102. 
82. Ibid, page 102. 
83. Ibid, pages 261 and 233. 
84. Ibid, page 65. 
85. Ibid, pages 264 and 265. 
86. Ibid~ pages 65 and 66~ 
87. tbid, page 268. 
88. Ibid, pages 233-234. 
89. Ibid, page 234. 
90. Ibid, page 234. 
91. Ibid, ·page 241. 
See also here Kirst's analogy and parallel in Kirst 1965, especially 
pages 365-378. 
92. Ibid, page 249. 
93. Ibid, page 253. 
For a good dramatic account of this tension see Zuckmayer 1980. 
94. Ibid, . page 246 . 
95. Ibid, page 246. 
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10. Paton· 1965_. .. _pages 334-:ns. 
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11. Ibid, page 337. 
12. Ibid, page 343. 
For a full account of this crucial event see pages 338-343. 
13. Quoted in Ibid, page 356. 
14. Ibid, page 351. 
15. Ibid, pages 357-378. 
16. See Paton 1980, page 309 and Malherbe 1981, page 282. 
17. Friedman 1975, page 212. 
18. Malherbe 1981, pages 366-369; this possibility was confirmed in 
private conversation with Harry Oppenheimer. 
19. Paton 1965, page 369. 
20. For a fuller account of the fate of the African Representatives see 
Ballinger 1969, pages 383-396. 
21. See the report of the Botha Commission (1953) and the Native Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953. 
22. - Luthuli 1961, page 99. See also Walshe 1971; pages 287-294 and Lodge 
1983, pages 35 and 36i 
23. By the end of the campaign, the number of resistors totalled 8 577 
and the paid-up membership of the African National Congress from 
7 000 tb about 100 000. Walshe 1973, page 31. 
24. iuthuli 1962, page 115. 
25. For a description of this event see Luckhardt 1980, pages 301-303 
and Lodge 1983, page 143-146. 
26. Although initially on a qualified franchise - this was extended to a 
universal franchise in the 1954 Congress of the Party. 
27. Margaret Ballinger and her husband, Messrs Stanford and Rubin. 
Ballinger 1969, page 403; 
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28. This tension is almost a hallmark of South African liberalism. 
Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert made this the theme of his maiden 
speech- in Parliament in 1974. 
Hansard 1974, Columns 
- 29. Ballinger 1969, page 403. 






32. See Lacour-Gayet 1977, page 312. 










- 269 784 
135 598 
775 818 
34. See Patrick Duncan '_s cot1ID1ent "The liberals ••• must realise the very 
difficult position with Africans that African leaders get into when 
they become dependent on white support." 
Quoted in C.J. Driver 1980, page 166. 
35. Again see Duncan's opposition to practical co-operatin~ with Bunting 
and the Chartists during the anti-pass campaign. Driver 1980, 
page 176. 
36. · See Duncan's campaign in the Sea Point Provihcial Council by-election 
in 1959.- _Driver 1980, pages- 167-169. 
37. For example De Beer lost his medical practice, Swart his legal 
partnership. 
38. See Mandel~'s speech to the court in Cartey and Kitson 1970, page 
327. 
39 ~ Their share pf the -popular vote fel 1 from 8, 6 per cent in 1961 to 3, 1 
per cent in 1966. Suzman remai_ned the sole Prog representative. The_ 
Liberals fared even worse. 
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40. A ninth ethnic group, the Swazis, was added later. At present, 
however, the South African government is seeking to "cede" this group 
to neighbouring Swaziland. 
41. See Adam 1979, page 260. 
42. See Hoffman's use of the term as set out in the notes to Chapter Two, 
page 316 • 
. 4.3. Helen Suzman increased her majority from a marginal 711 votes to a 
safe 2 049. Colin Egline 16st the Sea Point seat by 231 vote~. 
44. The prime example of this in his first years of leadership was his 
·"New Deal for the Cities" -·which was more of an urban planning 
policy than the traditional race politics of the Progs. 
45. The predominant .campaign slogan was "We have the leaders - you have 
the votes." 
46. These Commissioners involved in their activities a formidable group 
of South African liberals. Just some of the more prominent names are 
listed here: Economics (Sprocas 1972): Douwes Dekker, Ngcobo, 
Richard Turner, Gideon Jacobs, Van Der Horst and Francis Wilson (who 
served as secretary). Society (Sprocas 1971): Buthelezi, 
Hammond-Tooke, Schlemmer, Slabbert, and Whisson. Law· (Sprocas 
1972A): Bhengu, Dugard (secretary), Kinghorn, Molteno, Unterhalter 
(chairman), Barend Van Niekerk and Ernie Wentzel. Education (Sprocas 
197JA): Auerbach, Briggish, Hunter, Luyt, Malherbe, Kgware, Clive 
Nettleton. 
47. This commission also comprised an impressive team: Tony· Mathews 
(chairman), David Welsh (secretary), Rene De Villiers, Andre du Toit, 
Andre Hugo, Leo Marquard, Beyers Naude, Donald Wbods amongst others. 
48. See pages 8-12 in Sprocas 1973. 
49. Andre du Toit, one of the commissioners, raises this problem in a 
much more recent publication (Du Toit 1982) linking it to Weber's 
distinction between an ethics of inner ~on~iction and an ethics of. 
resp6nsibili~y, or as Du Toit describes it the morality of the 
political agent: pages 56 and 57. 
50. Sprocas 1973, pages 13-20. 
51. Ibid, page 128. 
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52. See the detailed criticism of the Molteno report, Sprocas 1973, 
pages 127-142. 
53. Ibid, page 224. 
54. Ibid, page 224. 
55. Ibid, page 233. 
56. Ibid, page 243. 




1. The Native Welfare Societies were largely the creation of Charles T. 
Loram, the Chief inspector of Native Education in Natal. The Joint 
Councils arose out of a visit to South Africa of Dr Thomas Jesse 
Jones of the Phelps-Stokles Foundation and the West African 
Dr J.E.k. Aggrey. By 1931,some 30 Councils had been formed, and the 
number was to rise to 80 at the movement's zenith. See· Hellmann 
1979, pages 4-5. 
2. It is interesting to note that the original finance for the Institute 
came from grants from two American Foundations, Phelps-Stokes and 
Carnegie. See Hellmann 1979, page 5. 
3. Hellmann 1979, page 9. See the remarkable degree of convergence this 
statement contains with Leatt's catalogue of basic liberal values as 
quoted in the Introduction page 7. 
4. Writing in 1979, Hellmann noted that only a single Institute 
publication, "Detention Without Trial in South Africa 1976-1977" had 
ever been banned: Hellmann 1979, page 15. 
5. By 1976, the number of questions requested by the Institute had risen 
to 161. 
6. See for instance Horner's role re Wage Board enquiries during the 
early to mid-1970's. 
7. This. progrannne· was investigated by the Schlebush Commission, probably 
marking the all time low point in Institute/Government relationships. 
8. This progrannne aimed to improve the working and living conditions of 
domestic servants, and improve their (normally white) employers. It 
has given rise to a trade union type ~rganisation, the S A Domestic 
Workers Association (SADWA). 
9. This provides guidance and placement information·for black work 
seekers. 
10. This was-created to educate and prepare the white "centres of power" 
for change. It was spawned from an appeal made by Archbishop Hurley 
at the 1978 Institute Conference. Both EIC and HAP have subsequently 
become autonomous bodies. 
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11. See Hellmann 1979, page 8. 
12.- The Cour·t found evidence of the negligent control of funds, but with 
no suggestion of self-benefit. A comparatively light fine 
constituted· the sentence. This offence ·took place during Rees' term 
of office with the SA Council of Churches. 
13. This was Muri ell Horrell. 
14. For example, Alfred Hoernle served as the Institute President for 
nine years; his wife, Winifred for seven; Edgar Brookes for 
four.Although the Presidency rotated normally on a two year cycle in 
the later stages, a hard core of elected official~ remained 
remarkably constant. 
15. See Hellman 1979, page 8 and 9. The Institute is currently in the 
grips of ~ severe financial crisis and is now trying to funds its 
activities out of membership fees by developing a new cate~ory of 
Cor~orate (business) membership. Unlike its conservative 
counterpart, SABRA, (and many similiar bodies in Europe and North 
America), the Institute receives no funds from the Government. 
16. Hellmann 1979. 
17 •. Rich's work terminates with the formation of the Liberal Party in 
1953, and only ~ part of hi~ fifth chapter, and the conclusion, deal 
with post-war situation. 
18. Rich 1984, page 123. 
19. See Walsche 1971; Lodge 1983; Paton 1980 and Rich himself for the 
extensive libe~al tradition amongst black South Africans. 
20, See the evidence later in this chapter as well as elsewhere (Chapter 
Five for example) of liberal concern with political and civil rights. 
21. Rich 1984, .page 123. 
22~ See pages 124 and 125, Ibid. 
23. See pages 27, 33, 43 and 62 amongst others (Ibid). 
24. See Brookes' utterly explicit repudiation (indeed confession) in 
Chapter Two of his "A South African Pilgrimage" (Brookes 1977). 
25. Given in the minority report in Sprocas 1973. 
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26. A particularly misleading reference is found on page 101, where Rich 
suggests that Whyte's takeover of the Institute in 1947 enabled 
Brookes to become more influential in the Institute, and in turn 
enabled Brookes to take-up "some of his -earlier suggestions made on 
the Pact government between 1924 and 1926." 
27. Robertson 1971 (~obertson covers a shorter period, namely 1948-1963). 
28. Hellmann 1979, page 27. 
29. See Chapter Two, pages 93 and 94, and again in page 99. 
30. Dr Alfred Hoernle quoted in Rheinallt Jones 1953, page 1. 
31. Schreiner 1963, page J. 
32. Hurley 1965, pages 4 and 5. It is interesting to note that this 
tension between thought and action is evident in the interviews which 
form the basis of Chapter Five. See Interview One. 
33. See pages 95 and 96 in Chapter Two. 
34. Mrs Winifred Hoernle in the 1949 Presidential Address, page 12. 
35. Donald Molteno, in the 1949 Presidential Address, page 22. 
36. . Rene de Viiliers in ihe i981 Pre~idential Address, page 13. 
37. Archbishop Hurley in the. 1965 Presidential Address, page 15. 
38. L~o Marquard, ·in the 1969 Presidential Address, page 22. 
39. Sheila van der Horst, in the 1972 Presidential Address, page 22. 
40. Bernard Friedman, in the 1975 Presidential Address, page 14. 
41. Leo Marquard, in the 1969 Presidential Address~ page 1. 
42. Hellmann 1979, page 11. 
43. I;D. MacCione in the I957 Presidential Address, page 3. 
44. Leo Marquard in the 1957 Presidential Address, page 4. 
45. Dr H~gh Ashton in the 1978 Hoernle Memorial Lecture, page 28. 
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46. See, for example, Dr Edgar Brookes 1n the 1963 Presidential Address, 
page 2. 
47 •. Archbishop Hurley in the 1965 Presidential Address, page 14. 
_In this quotation there are hints of de ~eauvo~ur's Ethics of 
. Ani.biquity and Camus I Ethics of the Second Prize. 
48. Donald Molteno QC, in the 1960 Presidential Address, page 5. 
49. · _Dr Bernard Friedman, in the 1975 Presidential Address, pages 8-9. 
50. Donald Molteno QC, in the 1960 Presidential Address, page 19, and 
O.D. Schreiner in the 1962 Presidential Address, page 20. 
51. Leo Marquard in the I957 Presidential Address, page 13 • 
. 52. O.D. Schreiner, in the 1962 Presidential Address, pages 10-11. 
53. Sheila van der Horst, in the 1972 Fresidential Address, page 16. 
54. Bonhoeffer, 1980, page 17 (own translation). 
55. Ibid, page 18 (own translation). 
56. Ibid page 23 (own translation). 
57~ Rene de Villiers, in the 1981 Presidential Address, page 19. 
58. Professor C.W. de Kiewiet, in the 1960 Hoernle Memorial Lecture, 
page 2. 
59. Franz Auerbach, in the 1982 Presidential Address, page 17. 
60. Dr Edgar Brookes, in the 1961 President1al Address, page 2. 
61. Franz Auerbach, in the 1983 Presidential Address, page 8. 
62. See pages 128-138. 
63. This group included the then Transvaal leader of the United Party, 
Mr Harry Schwartz. 
64. This second group was led by the veteran maverick, Japie Basson, who· 
was to be expelled from the Party in 1982 on joining the President's 
Council. · 
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65. Parliament sat twice in this year. 
66. In all, some 24 speeches, covering about 350 Hansard Columns or 
125 000 words were reviewed. 
67. The tensions of such a person have been excellently set out in 
Dr Van Zyl Slabbert' s maiden speech, Hansard 1974, Columns 1180-1182. 
68. Suzman; Hansard 1970, Column 202. 
69. There was no point in moving on unseconded motion. 
70. These reasons are largely drawn from the motives or amendments moved 
in the year 1960, 1961 and 1974 to 1984. They are, therefore, not 
comprehensive as Helen Suzman provided many reasons for a fundamental 
lack of confidence in government in her sole liberal vigil from 1962 
to 1974. 
71. Again, this is not a comprehensive list of all the proposals made, 
but only those that constitute a central theme in a no confidence 
speech. 
72. Other specific proposals were made on particular issues such as 
common citizenship (1980, 1981); full rights for coloureds (1977); 
acceptance of the permanence of urban blacks (1977) and the redrawing 
of homeland boundaries • 
. 73. Hansard 1984, Column 44. 
74. Hansard 1960, Column 79. 
75. ·Hansard 1984, Column 25. 
76. Hansard 1976, Column 104. 
77. . Hansard 1976, Column 105. 
78. Hansard 1976, Column 105. 
79. .Ibid, Column 105. 
80. Ibid, Column 106. 
81. Ibid,Column 107. 
82. Ibid, IBID, Column 108. .. 
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83. Hansard 1982, Column 27. 
84. Hansard 1978, Column 22, 23 and 24. 
85. Hansard 1983, Column 36. 
86. Hansard 1981, Col-umn 33. 
87. The other is the th re-at (implied or explicit) of violence and 
revolution. 
88. Suzman in Hansard 1963, Column 104. See Eglin's comments in similar 
view in Hansard 197_4, Column 125-128. 
89. See for example Suzman's comments oil the need for job regrading in 
Hansard· 196 7, _Columns 137 and 138 and Slabbert 's "plea to remove the 
outmoded political shackles from the performance of our economy" in 
Hansard 1984, Columns 26-28. 
90. Suzman in Hansard 1970, Column 207. 
91._ For example~ see Van Zyl Slabbert's referen~e to the work of the UCT 
Business School on black attitudes towards the free enterprise system 
in Hansard 1982, Columns 20 and 21. 
92. On the later issue, see Suzman's position in 1973 in Hansard 1973, 
-Column 149. 
93. S~e for example Slabbert's caveat in the economic policy section of 
his 1~84 No Confidence Motion: 
"Anyone who sees in this appeal of mine a plea for 
indiscriminate laissez faire policies, free-of 
discipline and restraint, simply has no appreciation 
of the enormity of the problem that confronts us." 
Hansard 1984, Column 31. 
Also his description of the central economic problem confronting 
South Africa as ~tructural inequality. 
94. Currently the FDP provides the important Ministers of Foreign and 
Economic Affairs. 
95. Of course, the National Party did need a coalition partner in its 
first term o~ office, and found it in Paul Sauer's Afrikaner Party at 
a time when some (such as Malherbe) suggested that Sauer was as ready 
to form an alliance with Smuts 1 United_ Party. See Malh~rbe's letter 
to -Smuts in Malherbe 1981 page 366-372. - As Friedman comments " ••• he 
(Smuts) had commited the unpardonable sin in power was in his grasp, 
but he let it slip through his finger." 
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It is of course not impossible to imagine a future situation in which 
a centre-left coalition would be possible.· Indeed PFP voters gave 
the government essential assistance in achieving its 1983 referendum 
victory. 
96. See for ~xample, Anna Starcke's interview with Colin Eglin in July 
1978: 
"At this point in time, a party which advocates a form of 
liberal multi-racialism is not one of the essential poles 
of power in South Africa ••• So far our own efforts, 
together with historical development, have not yet 
coincided to crystallise an exciting new deal for the 
future. You can help to move people, but its events 
and history that cause them to start saying: 'let's 
rethink in a fundamental way." 
Starke 1978, pages 94, 95. 
97. Hansard 1961, Columns 102 and 103. 
98. Hansard 1963, Column 107. 
99. Hansard 1965, Column 200. See also Hansard 1971, Column 228 and 
19T2, Column 230. 
100. Hansard 1977, Column 81. See also Hansard 1974, Column 131 and 
Hansard 1977, Column 86 and Hansard 1.978, Column 30 and Hansard 1979, 
Column.46. 
101. Hansard 1979, Column 24. 
102. Hansard 1981, Coh,1.mn 39. 
103. .Hansard 1976, Column 109. 
104. Hansard 1980, Column 40. 
105. Starke 1978, page. 148. Oppenheime.r describes himself as an "old 
fashioned" Liberal~ 
106. See the discussion of Leatt's 11 core liberal values 1n the 
Introduction, pages 11 and 12. 
107. These figures are drawn from the most recent annual reports of 
Minorco, De Beers and Anglo American. 
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108. For example, Fortune magazine has rated Anglo the largest foriegn 
investor in the U.S. for several years running. 
109. Lanning and Mueller in Africa Undermined, page 446. 
llO. See his comments in his interview with Starke, page 157: "Business 
people have no power in the sense implied. You can't, however large 
a business you may control, go on s.trike ••• All the power of 
business people ••• is limited to this: that you can, in business, 
do certain things which produce a whole series of data with which any 
government has to reckon in form its policy." 
111. New York Times interview. ( See Oppenheimer, 1982a in the 
Bibliography). 
112. Yudelman 1984. 
113. The acquisition by Barlows, with Anglo assistance, of the Rand Mines 
group of companies is the example Yudelman gives on the growth 
constraint's Anglo perceived. The similar acquisition by Afrikaans 
capital interests of General Mining, again with Anglo assistance, as 
an attempt to reduce government hostility towards the mining 
industry. 
114. Lanning and Mueller 1979, page 467 . 
. 115. Rich 1984, page 134. 
116. See the author's own disclaimer: innes 1984, page 15. 
117. Anglo '·s role in raising. black wages on the Gold Mines during the 
1970's by some 600% nominal or 150% real illustrates the first area: 
Oppenheimer's call for the recognition of black unions and the reform 
of SA's labour laws-in 1974, as well as Anglo'~ evidenc~ to the 
Wiehahn and· Riekert Commissions illustrate the second: schemes such 
as the Cadet scheme, which aims at overcoming the barriers to blacks 
in management illustratei the third: 
118. See the 1982 and 1983 Annual Reports of The Urban Foundation for an 
explanation of this shift of emphasis. This Foundation, representing 
an important coalition of English and Afrikaans business interests in 
active association with black urban communities, raised and expended 
some R40 million in donation funds, and another R40 million in 
foreign loans, in the first five years of its existence. In the area 
of lobbying it can count the following amongst its important 
achievements: 
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the total reform of SA's housing policy (99-year lease, 
self-help housing schemes, the grand housing sale and the 
creation of Public Utility housing companies); 
th.e reform of the· black local government, as well as the 
Black Community Development Act, and perhaps most 
importantly, the blocking of the proposed Orderly Movement 
and Settlement of Persons Bill; 
signficantly influencing the de Lange investigation into 
education in South Africa. 
119. Oppenheimer is the largest financial backer of the PFP and the Anglo 
and De Beers' Chairman's Fund is the largest source of philanthrophic 
funding in South Africa. This fund expends currently about Rl6 
million per annum on a wide range of educational, rural development 
and change-oriented activities and organisations. 
120. Oppenheimer 1958, page 8. 
121. Quoted in Relly 1983, page 9. 
122. Oppenheimer 1958, page 5. 
123. Quoted in the 1982 Urban Foundation Annual Report. 
124. Oppenheimer 1960' page 3. 
125. Oppenheimer 1978, page 2. 
126. Oppenheimer 1959, page 3. 
127. Oppenheimer 1959, page 4. 
128. Oppenheimer 1959, page 4. 
129. Oppenheimer 1982, page 4. See also Oppenheimer 1968' page 8. 
130. Oppenheimer 1960' page 4. See also Oppenheimer 1964, page 6, and 
Oppenheimer 1978, page 2 on the consequences of economic boycotts. 
131. Oppenheimer 1960' page 4. 
132. Oppenheimer 1963, page 2. 
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133. Oppenheimer 1963, page 2. 
134. Oppenheimer 1981, page 2. See also: 
"More than ever, as a result of the vents of the past-
year, we see two primary responsibilities of business 
leadership as the development of healthy industrial 
relations, and a proper concern for the quality of 
life avalable to our employees outside the job situation." 
Also Oppenheimer 1979, page 7, for an acceptance of management's 
failure to act as a non-racial employer. 
135.· Oppenheimer 1980, page 3. 













See Oppenheimer 1960, page 3. 
self-interest involved in the 
1962, page 3: 
Note how Oppenheimer acknowledges the 
pursuit of growth. Also Oppenheimer 
"Nevertheless the fact remains that economic growth 
and racial discrimination are in fundamental opposition 
to each other and that economic growth is an essential 
element in building a peaceful and just society." 
Oppenheimer 1981, page 4. 
Oppenheimer 1971, page 2. 
Oppenheimer 1976, page 4. 
Oppenheimer 1973, page 4. 
Oppenheimer 1960' page 5. 
Oppenheimer 1981, page 4. 
Oppenheimer 1971, page 4. 
Oppenheimer 1980, page 3, 
Ibid, page 3. 
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1. See Section One of the Introduction, pages 11 and 12. 
2. See Section Three of the Introduction, pages 18 to 23. 
3. Marxism being the other. 
4. As Leatt 1978, notes: "It is misleading to speak of the liberal 
traditionin South Africa as the preserve of English speaking whites, 
it includes Afrikaans and Blacks." Page 33. 
See Leatt's brief remarks about the liberal tradition amongst 
Afrikaners (page 36) and Blacks (pages 37 and 38). 
5. As quoted in the Introduction, page 15. These values were often 
transmitted through the vehicle of the Church. They are clearly 
evident in the views and values of men such as Dr A.B. Xuma, Dr 
Moroka, Chief Albert Luthuli and more contemporaneously men such as 
Bishop Tutu, Bishop Zulu, Bishop Manas Buthelezi as well as Chief 
Gatsha Buthelezi. In the early days of the ANC, the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church played an important role in this respect. 
(See Wa1she 1973, page 18). 
6. For an early example of this, see the Joint Council Movement in the 
1930's. The Liberal Party exercised considerable influence in the 
1960's. See Lodge 1983, Walshe 1971. Individual liberals 
(Schlemmer, Nattrass, Webb, etc.) have exercised considerable 
influence in respect of the actions and beliefs of the Inkatha 
Movement.· The Buthelezi Commission Report bears eloquent witness to 
this and the role of liberal values.· 
7. See Walshe's comment about the influence of the liberals in contract 
to the Marxists. Walshe 1973 and 1971 as well as Lodge 1983. See 
also the language of the freedom charter as published in Luthuli 
1978, pages 212-216. 
8. Fredman, Nell and Randall 1983, page 116 and the Buthelezi Commission 
Report, Volume I, 1982, page 272. 
---------------------------------- --· 
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9. Fredman, Nell and Randall 1983, pages 116 and 117 and the Buthelezi 
Commision Report, Volume I, page-s 269-271. 
10. Buthelezi Report, Volume I, page 273. 
11. The exceptions are Zach De Beer and Rene De Villiers. Though both 
are mother tongue Afrikaners, both ~re long distanced from Afrikaner 
Nationali.sm and would probably be regarded more as liberal than 
verligte Afrikaners. 
12. See Du Toit 1983, pages 86-88. 
13. Van Wyk Louw 1971, especially pages 17-31. 
14. This was a consultation of South African churches then belonging to 
the World Council of Churches, held in.Johannesburg in 1960 and 
attended by the Dutch Reformed Church. The declaration arising from 
this consultation (See De. Grucy 1983, pages 148-153, .for the full 
text) affirmed racial equality, individual human rights, rejected the 
prohibiting of mixed marriages, affirmed rights of land ownership and 
political participation for all. Initially, the declaration received 
considerable support from the Afrikaans Churches. . However, after a 
concerted campaign by Nationalist politicians (led by the then Prime 
Minister, H.F. Verwoerd) most recanted this support. 
(Villa-Vicencio, 1982, page 87). 
15. In Potchefstroom, evidence is· to be found in the theological journals 
Loog arid Woord and Daad and the organisation Die Afrikaanse 
KalVinistiese Beweeging. At a student level, the rebellion against 
·the pro-Government Afrikaner Studentebond (ASB) began there, and the 
initial leadership for the rival (and liberal) POLSTU was drawn from 
Potchefstroom. For an example of a liberal credo from thi_s origin; 
see the Koinopia Declaration 1977. 
16. This has been well-illustrated by the debate, particularly that 
dealing with constitutional reform, between the reformist but still 
pro-Government ver"ligtes such as Terreblariche and Esterhuyse and the 
liberal (oorbeligtes in the eyes of their opponents) such as Du Toit, 
Degenaar and Giliomee). See Du Toit's important paper No Chosen 
People "1981. Stellenbosch's disaffiliation from the ASB at an 
earlier time is.also evidence of this. 
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17. In this respect; the debate about the preamble of the new 
Constitution with its references to the Almighty, the flag and the 
Anthem is particularly revealing. The Conservatives argued for a 
white South Africa, the Nationalists for a sort of shared South 
Africa. 
18. See Adam and Gilomee 1979, pages 104-114 for an account of the 
process of ethnic mobilisation, as well as pages 196-257 for an 
account of how Afrikaner Nationalist politics works or worked. 
19. Inter~iew with Van Zyl Slabbert in the Rand Daily Mail of 3rd 
November 1983. 
20. These arguments are most clearly set out in a speech given by Van Zyl 
s1abb~rt to a meeting of businessmen held in Johannesburg on 28th 
October 1983. (Slabbert 1983). 
21. The Catholic Bishops Conference and the Methodists were perhaps the 
clearest in condemning the new constitution and advocating a "No" 
~ote, but leading Anglicans, Presbyterians and Congregations echoed 
these sentiments as did the_ S.A. Council of Churches. 
22. NUSAS collected an impressive 14 000 signatures at the four English 
language universities. 
23. The Black Sash ran an active campaign of house meetings, pamphlets 
and car stickers against the constitution. See Black Sash 1983. 
24. Although the Institute did not adopt a formal resolution on the 
issue, the speeches of its new director, John Kane-Berman, as well as 
of .its recently elected President, Lawrie Schlemmer, and its new 
Chairman of the- Executive Committee, Advocate Ernie Wentzel, made its 
position clear. See the October edition of Race Relations News. 
- 25. Although a majority (Rand Daily Mail, Pretoria News, Sunday Express, 
Cape Times, Arus, Daily News, Natal Witness, Sunday Tribune) 
advocated a "No" vote, amongst the minority "Yes" vote endorsements 
were that of the largest Sunday newspaper in the country (the Sunday 
Times) and the most influential business weekly (the Financial Mail). 
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26. Harry Oppenheimer, the best known and most influential businessman 
advocated a "No" vote (see Oppenheimer, 1983), whilst his successor 
at Anglo American, Gavin Relly, appeared to favour a "Yes" -vote, 
though he did no more than comment on foreign reaction (see Relly, 
1983), as did the most prominent Natal businessman, Chris Saunders. 
A number of key figures remai:ned silent (Mike Rosholt, Tony Bloom, 
Raymond Ackerman). Employer organisations did not adopt formal 
positions though the impression was created that the Government had 
received considerable support from Assocom and more limited 8upport 
from the FCI. 
27. From the ANC (which formally supported a "No" vote) to I_nkatha, the 
UDF, the homeland leaders and the Black Chamber of Commerce, NAFCOC, 
the condemnation was universal. 
28. The division was evident at a leadership level. The three formal 
Coloured political parties favoured a "Yes" vote. Coloured 
politicians active in both the UDF and as well as the looser National 
-Forum campaign~d against it. The Government created, partially 
elected S.A. Indian Council was prevaricating in favour, the Natal 
and Transvaal Indian Congresses emphatically against. 
29. Denis Beckett did receive support from the Anglican Bishop of 
Johannesburg and from a few individuals elsewhere. However, the 
extent to which his third option was attacked throughout the couniry 
by NP, NRP, PFP, Black Sash and Race Relations speakers was an 
indication of how seriously the option was considered. 
--
30. See Schlemmer quoted in the Sunday Times of 6th November 1983. 
31. Interview 12, see also Interviews 4, 7, 9 and 10. 
32. Interview 9, see also Interview 3. 
33 .- Interview 6. 
34. Interview 4. 
35. Interview 10, see also Int-erview 12. 
36. Interview 11. 
37. Interview 7. See also Interview 12. 
38. Interview 14. 
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39. Interview 2. 
40 Interview 5. 
41. Interview 6 
42. Interview 12. 
43. Interview 14. 
44. Interview 1. 
45. Interview 5. 
46. Interview 8. 
47. Interview 5. 
48. Interview 8. 
49. Interview 10. 
50. See Interviews 12, il, 10, 8' 6, 5, 4 and 3. 
51. See Interviews 3, 4, 5' 8, 10, 11 and 12. 
52. Interview 5. 
53. Interview n, also Interview 12. 
54. Interview 8. 
55. Interview 8 .. See also Interviews 10' 6 and 5. 
56. Interview 6. 
. 5 7. Interview 5 • 
58. Interview 1. 
59. Interview 5. 
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60. Interview 11. 
61. Interview 7. 
62. Interview 9. 
63. Interview 14. 
64. Interview 11. See also Interview 7 and see the response of all five 
to the questions as to how liberals should vote 1n the referendum. 
65. Interview 2. However, this interviewee endorsed a "No" vote, both 1n 
the course of the interview as well as publically. 
66. Interview 10. 
67. Interview 8. 
68. Interview 4. 
69. Interview 6. 
70. Interview 12. 
71. Interview 9. 
72. Interview 7 •. 
73. Interview 11. 
74. Interview 2. 
75. Interview 2. 
76. Interview l. 
77. Interview 9. 
78. . Interview 13. 
79. Interview 11. 
80. Interviews 2, 3, 6,_ 11, 7 and 9. 
Bl~ See paiticularly Interviews 4,5, 8 and 12. 
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82. Interviews 14, 13, 5 and 3. 
83. For example, see Interviews 11 and 12 for Group rights compromises 
and interviews 1 and 9 for limited democracy compromises. 
84. 'Interviews 13, 12, 7, 11, 5 and 2 in the first ~ase and interviews 1 
and 9 in the second. 
85. Interviews 3 and 14. 
86-. Interviews 10, 8, 6 and 4~ 
87. Interview 4. 
88. Interview 2. 
89; Interview 7. 
90. Interview 5. 
91. Interview 14. 
92~ Interview 10. 
93. Interview 3. 
94. Interview 6. 
95. Interview 11. 
96. Interview 8. 
97. Interview 13. 
98. See particularly Inter~iews 5, 7, 8 and 12. 
99. Interview 3. See other comment on this in Interview 13, 12, 9, 8, 7_, 
5 and 4. 
100. Interview 3. 
101. Interview 4. 
102. Interview 5. 
103. Interview 7. 
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104. Interview 8. 
105. Interview 9. 
106. Interview 2. 
107. Interview 14. 
108. Interview 5. 
109. Interview 11. 
llO. Interview 8. 
lll. Interview 9. 
ll 2. Interview 7. 
ll 3. Interview 13. See also Interviews 5 and 11. 
ll4. Interview 1. 
ll5. Interview 2. 
ll 6. Interview 8. 
ll 7. Interview 3. 
118. Interview 9. 
ll9. Interview 10. 
120. Interview 12. See also Interview 4. 
121. Interview 14. 
122 .. · Amongst African and third world nations, Botswana stands out as a 
shining example. However, it is a very small (some 900 000 people) 
homogenous (virtually all Batswana) nation. Furthermore, it is 
multi-party only in name. No change of government has yet occurred 
in its short independent history, and the opposition parties tha~ do 
exist are not sufficiently large to threaten the government. 
123. Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 6. 
124. Interview 1. 
125. Interview 2. 
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126. Interviews 5, 11, 7, 9, 10 and 12. 
127. Interviews 5, 11, 9, 12, and 7. 
128. Interview 5. 
129. Interview IL See also Interview 12. 
130. Interview 9. 
131. Interview 10. 
132. Interview 4. 
133. Interview 8. 
134. Interview 14. 
135. Interview 12. 
136. .Interview 13. 
137 •. Interview 14. 
138. Interview 2. 
139. Interview 3. 
140. Interview 4. 
141. Interview 5. 
142. Interview 6. 
143. Interview 11. 
144. Interview 8. 
145. Interview 12. 
. 146. Interview 7. 
147. Interview 8. 
148. Interview 9. 
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150. Interview 10. 
151. Interview 14. 




1. See page 110. 
2. .See page 111. 
3. See pages 111 and 112. 
4. See Paton's (1965) description of.the post-el~ction UP caucus meeting 
(pages 389 and 390). · See also Keppel-Jones (1975) page 199. 
5. For example, as defined by Leatt pa·ges 11-13. 
6. See Friedman page 113. 
7. This refers to the possibility of doing a deal with Havanga's 
Afrikaner Party as advocated by Malherbe and others (page 114). 
8. Duncan, page 123. · 
9. For example, the newly-formed Progressive Party lost all ~ut one of 
its eleven Parliamentary seats in the fir~t general elections it 
contested (1961). It had to wait a further 13 years and three more 
general elections to break this single seat representation. The 
Liberal Party itself fared much worse~ never e~en coming close to 
winning a white seat. 
10. See pages 126-129. 
11. Legislation implementing Nationalist policies, especially racial 
segregation and the assault on civil liberties, has continued in the 
1970's and 1980's. However, in the last decade-and-a-half, many 
ambiguous measures, as well as undeniably positive and ·reformist 
measures (such as the labour reforms) have been mixed in with 
"negative" legislation. 
12. See .Pages 134 and 135. 
13. Rand Daily Mail, 14th October 1967. 
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14~ See pages 136 to 138. 
15. See pages 138 to. 147. 
16. . See page 147. The activities of the Catholic-oriented YCW and YCS 
movements were also important in this respect. YCW and YCS have 
contributed a disproportionate part of the leadership particularly in 
the GUSA-affiliated black unions. 
17. Sheila Van Der Horst, quoted on page 160. 
18. Bernard Friedman, quoted on page 160 . 
. 19. Dr Hugh Ashton (Hoernle Memorial Lecture), quoted on page 162. 
20. Archbishop Hurley, quoted on page 162. 
21. Hellman, quoted on page 157. 
22. D~ Edgar Brookes, quoted on page 165~ 
23. See this argument set out more fully on page 175~ 
24. These are the words of Van Zyl Slabbert in 1981. For a fuller 
statement of this argument, see pages 174-177. 
25. See pages 182 and 183. 
26. See pages 183 to 185. 
27. See pages 186 and 187. 
28. See pages 190 and 191. 
29. See pages 189-198. 
30. See page 29. 
31. Interview 14, quoted on page 219. 
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32. Interview 4, quoted on page 218. 
33. Interview 10, quoted on page 219. 
34. Interview 6, quoted on page 219. 
35. Interview 2 . ' 
quoted on page 219. 
36. Interview 3, quoted on page 219. 
37. Interview 11, quoted on page 219. 
38. Interview 8, quoted on page 220. 
39. Interview 13, quoted on page 220. 
40. Interview 5' quoted on page 229. 
41. Interview 10, quoted on page 228. 
42. Interview 14, quoted on page 220. 
43. Interview 7, quoted on page 230. 
44. Interview 6, quoted on page 230. 
45. Interview 11, quoted on page 230. 
46. Interview 12, quoted on page 230. 
47. Interview 3, quoted on page 229. 
48. Interview 2, quoted on page 229. 
49. Interview 4; quoted on page 229. 
50. Interview 5, quoted on page 229. 
51. Quoted on page 7. 
52. This usage 1S given on page 17. The discussion of the broad range of 
usages of the term "ethics", given on pages 13-18, indicates that 
this usage · is well within the mainstream of both philosophical and 
theological tradition. 
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53. Chapter One, page 31. 
54. See in particular Pritchard and Ross, as discussed on page 28. 
55. See page 37. 
56. Quoted on page 34. 
57. One cannot speak of an existentialist school, for there is debate as 
to who can be called an existentialist, and what the term denotes. 
58. Quoted on page 45. 
59. Quoted on page 45. 
60. See the discussion on pages 46-48. 
61. See the discussion of these conflicts on pages 53-56. 
62. Quoted on page 5 7. 
63. See page 110. 
64. · See page 114. 
65. See page 112 and note 13 in Chapter Three, page 323. 
66. Quoted on page 112. 
67. Quoted on page 38. 
68. This debate has raged for a long time in South Africa politics. 
Hofmeyr was at the centre of it (see pages 111 and 112). It was a 
central debate in.the liberal wing of the United Par~y throughout the 
1950's. Indeed, the initial leader of the Liberal Party, the 
long-serving Native Representative, Margaret Balliinger, suggested in 
a speech at· a Young Progressives Conference in 1970, that the 
"liberal" UP MP's had made a mistake _in breaking away from that 
party in 1959. -
69. See page 123. · Also see C.J. Driver's (1980) refer~nc~s to Patrick 
Duncan's attitude to the Congress of the People, on pages 103, 122 
and 159. 
70. See pages 131 to 133 and 124 to 127. 
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71. See pages 133 and 134. 
72. See page 146. 
73. Quoted on page 157. 
74. ·Quoted on page 158. 
75. Quoted on page 166. 
76. Quoted on pages 169 and 170. 
77. See page 215. 
78. Quoted on page 219. 
79. Quoted on page 228 and 229. 
80. Quoted on page 139. 
81. Quoted on page 216. See other examples of pragmatism quoted on this 
page. 
82. Quoted on page 227~ 
83. Quoted on page 26. See also page 252. 
84. Adam and Giliomee 1979. 
85. Ibid, page 266. 
86. Ibid, page 266. 
87. Ibid, page 268. 
ga. Ibid page 269. 
89; Wright H.M. The Burden of the Present 1980. 
90. Ibid, page 50. 
91. Ibid, page 52. 
92. Ibid, page 54. 
93. Hansard 1959, column 3076. 
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94. See Hansard 1959, column 3076. 
95. See for example Hansard 1959, column 6220. 
96. Hansard 1959, column 6222. 
97. Hansard 1959, column 6218. 
98. Hansard 1959, columns 6223 and 6224. 
99. Hansard 1959, column 6218. 
100. Population estimates are for mid-1983 and are drawn from the 
Institute of Race Relations Survey for that year, page 99. 
The estimates of a minimum of 40 per cent Black urbanisation is based 
on te research done for the document prepared for the Barlow Rand 
Contact Group, entitle "Towards a Positive Urbanisation Strategy" 
(1984), ~nd is confirmed by the research of the Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis (BEPA) at the University of Pre~oria. 
101. In the area of "white" Natal as a whole, blacks outnumbered whites by 
a margin of more than 2:1 (1 240 689 blacks-to 557 044 whites). 
Buthelezi Commission 1982, Volume 1, page 69. 
102. Transvaal 5 644 OOQ blacks to 2 140 760 whites; 
Natai 1 358 120 to 496 560; 
Cape 1 569 040 to 1 183 980; and 
OFS 1 549 600 to- 319 800. 
Race Relations 1983 Survey, ·page 99. 
i03. Lee and Godsell 1984. 
104. S.A. I.R.R. Survey 1983, page 363. -(1980 figures). 
105. This excludes indirect subsidies in the areas of tra~sport, posts, 
defence, etc. If these are included, the subsidy rises to 95 per 
cent. 
"Rockefeller" Report 1981, page 1.52. 
106. "Rockefeller" Report, page 153 (i.e. Foreign Policy Study Foundation 
1981). 
107. Slabbert and Welsh 1979, page 2. 
See also the sub-title of the Rockefeller Report "Time Running Out"; 
also th_e sense of "end time" induced by the observation in the 
introduction to the Buthelezi Report that: 
II this may well be the last time in South African 
prilitics that a Black leadership group, with national 
and international credibility and significant 
following, reaches out to others with an invitation 
to explore the possibility of a creative and 
generally acceptable political compromise." 
Buthelezi Report 1982, · 
Volume 1, page 33. 
108. David Halberson, Atlantic Monthly, November 1980. 
109. Adam 1971, page 5 
110. Lodge 1983, page 356. 
111. Skocpol 1980. 
112. Ibid, page 14. 
113. Ibid, page 284 and 285. 
ll4. Ibid, page 289. 
115. Ibid, page 286. 
116. Ibid, page 287. 
117. Woodward 1983, page 11. 
118. Ibid, page 8. 
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119. Ibid, page 8. See also Woodward's account of how revolution was 
avoided by constitutional reform in Britain, page 30. 
120. Ibid, page 42. 
121. Ibid,. page 54. 
122. In fact, the estimate of 100 000 is taken from a 1965 Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace study. The number today would be 
considerably higher as would casualty estimates. 
123. Gann and Duignan 1981, pages 195-199. 
124. Ibid, pages 199-203. 
125. ·Ibid, pages 203-209. 
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126. Its members were Franklin Thomas (President, Ford Foundation and 
Chairman); Robert C. Good and Alexander Heard (President and 
Chancellor respectively of Universities); Charles V. Hamilton and 
Ruth Simms Hamilton (University Professors); Peter McColough and 
J. Irwin Miller (business executives); Aileen Hernandy, Constance 
Hilliard and Alan Pifer (Foundation executives); and Howard D. 
Samuel (Labour leader). . . 
127. Rockefeller Report (Foreign Policy Study Foundation) 1981, page 236. 
128. See "The Present as History" published in Turner 1980, pages 100 and 
149-152. 
129. Adam 1971, page 15. 
130. Slaberi.and Welsh 1979, page 2. 
131. Schlemmer 1982, page 3. See also Giliomee 1984, ·pages 28-31 and 
Schlemmer 1983. 
132. Giliomee 1982. 
133. For example, it was nominated .as one of the major causes of the 
current reform initiatives. See page 209. 
134. Nattrass 1981~ page 174. 
135. Nattrass 1981, page 184. 
136. 1983 National Manpower Commission Annual Report, page 214. 
137. Seifsa Annual Report 1982. 
138. NMC 1982 Report, page 216. 
139. Nedbarik 1984, page 34. 
140. Nattrass 1981, page 214. 
141. NMC 1982 Annual Report, page 257. 
142. See Nattrass 1981, page 183. 
143. Drawn from the maps presented on pages 121, 123, 125 and 129 (as 
adapted) of McEvedy 1980. 
144. Martin :o. and Johnson P. ·1981, page 143. 
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145. Undesirable because it would only add more blacks to the population 
controlled by "white" South Africa. Ananalogy with Israel's 
positicin occurs bere •. 
146. Smith D. and Simpson C. 1981, page 152. See also pages 135 and 141. 
147. Formal non-aggression pacts exist in respect of Mocambique and 
Swaziland. However, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe have long 
followed this practice, which they have also reaffirmed recently in 
public. 
148. "Radio Truth" is an example of some continuing interference, though 
dire~t South African government support has not been established. 
149. In constant prices 48,3 per cent in the 1981-1982 period; 
per cent in the 1976-1980 period, Nedbank 1984 page 115. 
Rockefeller 1981, page 137. 
150. Nedbank 1984, page 121 and 129. 
151. "Rockefeller" 1981, page 135. 
52,2 
See also 
151. Verwoerd and Strijdom died in office. Malan re£igned in 1956, three 
years before he died. Vorster's was the first "forced" leadership 
change in the 36 years of Nationalist rule. 
· 153. This was Andries Treurnicht's victory in the so-called battle of the 
Berge.by-elections in May 1983. 
154. Adam and Giliomee 1979, pages 61 to 82. 
155. See Godsell 1981 for-a more detailed analysis • 
156. Adam and Giliomee 1979, ~ages 128 to 144. 
157. Religion is used here in the sense of civil religion .as developed by 
Moodie 1975. 
158. De Klerk is unquestionably an authoritative government spokesman. 
He is editor of the government-supporting Sunday newspaper, Rapport, 
and frequent philosopher of the Botha regime. 
159. De Klerk 1984, page 24. 
160. Ibid, page 39. 
161~ Ibid, page 45. 
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162. Ibid, page 41. 
163. See Walshe 19 71, Chapters III, IV, v, VI and VII. 
164. See Walshe 1971, Chapters XI and XII and Lodge 1983, Chapter I. 
165. See Walshe 1971, Chapter XIV and Lodge 1983~ Chapter II. 
166. See Lodge 1983, Chapter XIII. 
167. See the clash between Hofmeyr and the NRC Report on page 112. 
168. See Driver 19 80, page 172. 
169. Both Walshe 1971 (page 403) and Lodge 1983 (page 75) put membership 
at its highest (at the end of the defi~nce campaign at 100 000). 
Though not inconsiderable, this high level was maintained for only a 
short time. Popular support for the ANC was much greater. 
170._ Walshe 1971, page 405. 
171. - See for example Lodge 1983, page 350. 
172. Race Relations 1984, page 50. 
173. Kane-Berman 1982, page 155. 
174. Buthelezi Commission 1982, -page 101 and pages _241-250. See also Nell 
1983, page 120. 
175. Rockefeller 1982, page 192. 
176. Lodge 1983, page 352. 
177. Two examples.of this are Buthelezi's personal act of printing a copy 
of the Inkatha newspaper "The Nation" after that issue had been 
banned, and his defiance of the then Minister of Justice ban on 
Inkatha recruiting non-Zulu membership. 
178. Two important examples of this are B_uthelezi's rejection of the 
planned Black Advisory Council, as well .as Inkatha's campaign against 
the planned cession of KanGwane and Ingwavuma" to Swaziland. 
179. It has even set up a foreign office in Amsterdam: See Race Relations 
1984, page 51. 
180. A fuller description of Bonh_oeffer's "model" is given on pages 
99-102. 
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181. For example, one interviewee in Chapter Five calls for precisely such 
an approach when he said: 
"Liberals should start where they 
i.e. in the economy, the Church, 
the private schools, the Press. 
for situational ethics." 
are strongest 
the universities 
There is a case 
Another example of a call for a change in liberal ethics is to be 
found ih the speech of Harry Oppenheimer marking the 50th anniversary 
conference of the S.A. Institute of Race Relations, in which he said: 
"We are at a stage at which all of us who seek peaceful 
evolutionary change in South Africa should review 
our strategies. What is needed is a change of 
emphasis away from the politics of protest towards 
a politics of power; and all liberal institutions 
must examine how they can become more directly 
and positively engaged in promoting and encouraging 
the process of change which is now underway." 
Oppenheimer 1979A, page 7. 
182. See pages 140 to 146. 
183. Turner acknowledges that his postscript stops short of the 
development of new nrganisatiorial strategy. See Turner 1980, 
page 99. 
184; Ibid, page 100. 
185. Ibid, page 120 . 
. 186. ibid, page 129. In passing, it is worth noting Turner's percipient 
view of the precariousness of black consciousness organisations (page 
128). SASO and BPC were banned in 1977. Though new bodies have 
arisen (AZASO and AZAPO), they are probably as fragile. 
187. Ibid, page 138. 
188. lbid, page 135. 
189. Ibid, page 136. 
190. Ibid, page 138. 
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ANNEXURE ONE : INTERVIEWS 
INTERVIEW ONE 
1. What are the origins of the present 're.forms' on the part of the South 
African government? 
Social and economic pressures and forces in the society have built to a 
point where the notion of white ·superiority of some 30 years ago has 
been abandoned. Further these pressures, especially those of economic 
integration, have led to the abandonment (some ten years ago) of the 
goal of meaningful territorial separation. 
2. How ~o you judge the proposed constitution in the light of the present 
cons ti tu ti on? 
It is not possible to make a simple good/bad judgement. The new 
constitution is pos1t1ve in that the issue of political rights for 
people who are not white is at least being addressed. Reform is on the 
agenda. 
However~ it is bad in the way in which reform has been tackled. Not 
only have the blacks been excluded, but coloureds and Indians have been 
offered no real power. If the government had offered coloureds and 
Indians.even limited representation in the present parliament, even on 
a separate voters roll, this would have offered some real power as it 
would.h•ve enabled them to strike political alliances and affect the 
balance of power. Representation in separate houses on a fixed formula 
denies thel!l this opportunity casting them in the role of a permanent, 
powerless minority. 
3. How do you judge the proposed constitution against your ideal 
constitutional arrangement for South Africa? 
An ideai co_nstitution would not be based on race or urace loaded". It 
would have to affirm the citizenship ·Of all Bouth Africans and at least 
offer them the prospect of meaningful political power. 
Political participation could be limited or qualified. The qualified 
franchise, provided qualifications are accessible to all over time, 
still represents one way of doing this. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum? 
Vot.e no. The pressures which produced this attempt at reform will 
continue and indeed grow. At some time in the future this government, 
or another, will have to strike an alliance with liberal voters. At 
that time we will be able to secure real refor~. 
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5. · What is your vision -of an ide.al South African society? 
In political terms, it would be a plural society. The whites, whilst 
not playing a dominant or leading role, would nevertheless remain 
politically significant (unlike Zimbabwe) and should be meaningfully 
represented in the political partnerships which exist. (This, however, 
will be determined by how the white act during the period of 
transformation). 
Culturally the society is likely to have a pre-eminently English; 
western industrial culture. Whilst there is likely to be a shift away 
from some aspects of what may now be termed "white" culture, the 
cultural life of South Africa would continue much as before. An 
example of the shift that is possible would be the transfer of state 
subsidies from say PACT Opera and Ballet to The Market Theatre. 
In social and education terms, patterns of racial settlement and 
separation.are likely to persist for a time, but .should be left open to 
natural change and development. 
In economic terms, the most urgent priority post real power sharing 
would be the narrowing of the ,-s;:: 1.th/poverty gap. This would have to 
be achieved through taxation c on;:: kind or anothe.r. However~ the 
basic ~rivate enterprise economic approach should be retained. 
In the civil service, a degree of affirmative action would .be necessary 
to correct past discrimination against blacks. It is possible that a 
new black dominated government would go beyond reasonable corrective 
measures, peopling the civil service with friends and supporters. 
Liberals would have to resist this. 
6. -How can such a future society be achieved? 
As noted before, the socio-economic pressures at work in society will 
continue and indeed intensify. The present half-hearted attempts at 
reform will collapse probably within a time frame of two to three 
years. The government is most likely at that stage to move left, 
seeking an ailiance with the PFP. This will require the PFP to make 
compromises. 
( 
Should the government stay where it is or even move right, change will 
most likely be brought about by a combination of increased black and 
foreign pressure. In this scenario, the PFP would have to entertain 
alliances with internal black groupings. -
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INTERVIEW TWO 
1. · What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives? 
The international isolation and censure of South Africa may well have 
played a much greater role in producing reform then is generally 
acknowledged. 
A second factor of major significance is the military's desire not to 
fight on two fronts, and so hence their concern for reform. 
2. Is the proposed new constitution better or worse than the present one? 
Marginally better. The inclusion of coloureds and Indiands in the 
formal political process cannot be dismissed as insignificant. On the 
other hand, it certainly does not qualify as real power sharing, as 
their political actions will never be decisive. 
The coloureds and Indians will enjoy a kind of power, however, a sort 
of blackmail power. To the extent that the Nats really want this 
.system to work .they will have to make concessions to ensure coloured 
and Indian continued co-operation. 
It is true of course that the major issue has not been addressed i.e. 
the political accommodation of the blacks. They are excluded from the 
new constitution - however, they are excluded from the present one· 
also. 
. . 
3. How would you compare and contrast the proposed constitution with your 
"ideal 11 cons ti tu ti on? 
Firstly, the proposed .constitution is complicated and crazy. It is far 
too complex - simply unworkable. 
It has also been produced in a most peculiar way. The Union 
constitution was the result of serious negotiations over an ex.tended 
period - real debate. 
An ideal constitution would need to r~gulate group rights as well as 
individual rights, in some way .or another. Simple majoritarianism will 
never be accepted by these presently in power. And indeed, it is 
desirable that at least in some areas, groups should be prevent from 
behaving in ways which other groups find quite intolerable. 
An ideal constitution would certainly move away from racialism. 
However, group identity.will continue to be a reality for as long as it 
is possibl~ to see into the future. Because of this, again, certain 
actions of government should require a measure of support from all 
groups. 
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4. What should liberals do in the referendum? 
Vote no. There are a number of reasons for this. For one 1 a liberal 
"no" vote may lesson the degree of alienation felt by blacks. 
Secondly, a parliamentary system in order to function effectively 
requires a degree of party loyalty. The PFP leadership had no option 
but to call for a no vote. It is now vital that as much rank and file 
support for this call should be ensured. 
Furthermore, voting ~ is a blank cheque. And once traditional 
opposition voters have signed such a blank cheque, they are likely to 
do so again. 
However, it is difficult to see how a fundamentally ambiguous no 
victory would assist more rapid reform. 
5. What is the South Africa of the future which you would most like to see? 
A society in which white really shared power with blacks, in a way in 
which white politicians and white voters still played a meaningfull 
role in the political process. Preferably this role should not be 
defined around the issues of race, at least not solely about race. 
Culturally, the society would not be that different. The predominant 
culture of the country is "white" western culture. This would 
continue. 
Economically, the wealth gaps would have to be reduced - probably in a 
way which would mean that the whites had to live less well. However, 
there would be constraints on su~h a levelling down process - one could 
not proceed too far without putting the very nature of the country's 
wealth creating machine in jeopardy. 
6. How can we best move towards such a society? 
At times one despairs of moving there. Can our problems be solved? 
If the actors see South Africa's problems not as those of colonialism 
or imperialism, i.e. the throwing off of some foreign and acceptable 
ruling class, but rather in terms of Disraeli's two. nations problem, 
then it should be possible to solve relatively gradually and 
peacefully. 
Real negotiation with the blacks will have to take place and continue 
for quite a long period of time. There is a significant moral pressure 
on the whites to change. Furthermore, a number of factors in the 
situation will continue to constrain the aspirations blacks can 
reasonably entertain. This should create an area for possible 
compromise and agreement. 
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INTERVIEW THREE 
I. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives? 
Firstly, the pressures for economic integration - this produced the 
labour changes. Secondly, international pressures and actions. 
Thirdly, de"mographic forces such as the continuing urbanisation of 
blacks. 
'It should be noted that these are all forces outside the formal 
political p.rocess and in an important sense, independent of it. 
These forces will also continue whatever happens in the formal 
political arena. 
2. Is the proposed rtew constitution better or worse than the present one? 
Worse. 
Firstly, because it is much more rigid and inflexible. Whereas the 
present constitution can be altered by a simple majority in one house, 
the new constitution contains no less then 42 clauses where a 
concurr~nt majority in all three houses is required. 
Secondly, it is worse because essential elements of Apartheid, such as 
the Population Registration Act are written into this constitution. It 
could not function without these elements. An example of this is the 
4:2:1 ratio of representation according to race. 
3. How would you r_~:P_~_re and contr<. r 
ideal constitu .. 
nposed constitution with your 
An ideal constitutior .. :;ould result from si~nificant negotiations with 
all interested parties. 
Secondly, if it was a mistake (as it certainly was) to exclude blacks 
in t6e 1910 constitution, it was much more serious to repeat such a 
mi-stake in the changed world environment of 1983. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum? And what will be· the 
result of this action? 
They should vote no. 
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As to the results: nothing is going to happen for a long time. 
Nothing happens easily or quickly in this society. A certain 
consequence of a No vote will be Botha's replacement by De Kl°erk. This 
is to be w~lcomed as De Klerk is both more intelligent and more 
rational than Botha. He also has his eye ~ore on the main problem i.e. 
the blacks. 
The pressures pushing in on the formal political system will grow and 
increase in intensity. Urban violence will increase. Black unions 
will grow and become more militant. Populist movements amongst blacks 
will increase. 
In the end, all this may well result in a military government. 
Notwithstanding all the increases in pressure, it is very hard to 
imagine the Afrikaner majority agreeing to relinquish power. 
5. What is the South Africa of the fu::.'Jre which you would most like to see? 
There certainly can be no guarantees. Whites may well end up being 
politically irrelevant. 
Will Opera and Ballet continue? Almost certainly - however, much more 
imp6rtantly will the street lights still work? 
~. ~ow is this future best to be achieved? 
r~ it to be a~hieved? 
The forces described earlier will certainly lead to an extension of 
priviledge - but will they lead to a sharing of power?· 
Thus far, change has been limited to· those areas which do not pose a 
real threat to political power. This is likely to remain the pattern 
in the future. 
Short of major power intervention, the present regime is also 
unchallengeable from a military point of view. 
It is, therefore, hard to imagine a voluntary surrender of power and 
equally hard to imagine an involuntary seizure of power. 
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INTERVIEW FOUR 
1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiativesJ 
Mounting pressure - both internally (within the black community) and 
externally (particuiarly from the Reagan Administration). Something 
had to be done - also because of the conflict between the internal 
ideals of the nationalists (e.g. white democracy) and their external 
actions (e.g. white domination). · 
Change became imperative - however, it had to b.e change which gave the 
appearance of reform, without threatening the Nationalists' real grasp 
on power. 
2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation ·to the 
present constitution? 
The present constitution does not have to be changed in oider to extend 
the franchise - you can merely alter the qualifications of voters, as 
was the case in the extension of the franchise to white women. You 
could also repeal all Apartheid laws by simple majority in a.single 
·house. 
The present constitution is, therefore, a basis on which a democratic 
future could be built. 
In contrast, the new constitution is a fundamentally illiberal 
document. It enshrines within it provisions cornerstones of Apartheid 
such as the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act. It 
also provides for the maximum concentration .of power thus making a 
present white dictatorship and a future black dictatorship not only 
possible, but indeed likely. 
3. How would you judge the proposed constitution in relation to your ideal · 
constitution? 
An ideal constitution should be based on three key elements: 
universal adult sufferage; 
an abolition of the homeland policy; 
the protection of ·the individual against any arbitrary state action. 
Whilst .individual rights should form the basis, group rights could find 
expression in the form of the protection of language rights and the 
right to mother tongue education. . 
---·~ ------------------
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Ideally, power should be decentralised to the absolutely maximum 
degree. Furthermore, any rights constitutionally guaranteed to 
individuals and/or groups should not be able to be exercised at the 
e~pense of other (such as exclusive neighbourhoods etc.). 
- 4. What should liberals do in the referendum and what would be the 
consequences of their actions? 
Whilst there is a good (intrinsic or moral) argument that can be made 
for spoiling on's ballot, there are good strategic reasons for not 
doing this. 
Therefore, librals should vote no. 
A no vote provides the first real cipportunity of defeating this 
government since 1953. A no vote will not be interpreted as right wing 
victory • 
. Furthermore, it makes little difference whether Botha or De Klerk are 
at the helm •. The future does not revolve around pers-0nalities, but 
rather around pressures. These pressures will continue. 
5. What is the South Africa you most hope for? 
One in which (Micah 4/6) "every man shall sit under his own vine or fig 
tree undisturbed" - a society of maximum individual freedom. 
This will be difficult because considerable state intervention will be 
necessary to sort out the mess left by Apartheid. 
The chance of this liberal dream being realised is dependent on the 
present generation of liberal blacks and whites whose education was 
chiefly uncontaminated by either Bantu Education or CNE. If change 
takes place after this last liberal generation has vanished, liberals 
·in a future. majoritarian government will be condemned to the same 
gadfly role which they have· played under the Nationalists. 
6. How can this-society best be· achieved? 
We are in a hurry for the reasons given above. 
Non-violent disobedience or resistance is the most efficient and 
promising way of achieving change. Black subjugation is entirely 
dependent on their own co-operation. The withdrawal of this 
co-operation would bring society to a standstill.· This will create 




The most important role liberals can play in promoting (real) change is 
to teach: to teach civil disobedi~nce, but alsb ~o te~ch self-reliance 
and independance. To equip all South Africans with basic problem 
solving skills which allow them to act responsibily and freely for 
themselves. 
However, one has to be pess1m1stic about the emergence of this campaign 
of disobedience of a scale large enough and in time. Non-violent 





1. What is the origin of the present -'reform' initiatives? 
They arise from a combination of internal and external pressures. 
Internally, the changed pattern of labour usage res~lting from the move 
from_ primary to secondary industry. '!'he increased power of workers 
that this change had produced has in turn changed employer attitudes on 
issues such as influx control and the permanence of urban blacks, as 
well as the need for structural reform in other areas. In addition, 
black actions such as the school, rent and bus boycotts as well as the 
increase in sabotage had contributed to changed white attitudes. 
Externally, South Africa'~ relations with the West had created some new 
legitimacy needs. The threat of disinvestment has been a force of 
limited extent. The growing external military threat has also promoted 
reform. 
2. How do you judge the proposed constitution in comparison with the 
present one? 
It is worse for the following reasons: 
It is too rigidly structured, and it ~ill therefore be difficult 
to widen it in order to incorporate more people; 
The powers of the executive President are excessive and 
frighteni~g and exceed these of the preseni Prime Minister; 
The inclusion of the Coloured and Indians is fake as it offers 
them no real power they do not already pos~ess; 
The new constitution is unworkable; it is too complex; 
distinctions between own and general affairs can nev.er work; 
The 4:2:1 ratio built into the new constitution will make the 
future inclusion of blacks very.difficult. Any such. inclusion 
will be dependent on the further de-nationalisation of large 
·groups of blacks. 
However, at least the new constitution does legitimise the idea of the 
division of power. 
3. · How do you judge the present constitution in the light of your own 
constitutional ideals? 
An ideal constitution would be based on consociational principles. It 
should be federal in nature and should also exhibit the following 
features: 
a common role universal franchise; 
proportional representation; 
a Bill of Rights protecting individual rights; 
it should provide for review by the Courts; and 
it should uphold the rule of law. 
The proposed constitution has none of the above features. 
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4. What should liberals do in the referendum in order to obtain movement 
towards such an ideal constitution? 
And what will the consequences of such actions be? 
They should vote no, both for strategic and moral reasons. 
As to the consequences. If the "no" vote is victorious, the Government 
will not be able to implement the new constitution. P.W. Botha may 
lose power (but his government will not). The Nats will have to go 
back to the drawing board and redesign the constitution. In so doing, 
they will have to move left, both because of the continuing external 
pressures, also because the CP/NP split is now irreconciliable. Even 
if F.W. De Klerk takes over, it would take no more than a few years for 
him to 'learn' that he has to move left, mainly because of the demands 
of the economy. 
5. What is your vision of an ideal South Africa? 
This would be a non-racial, social democratic society where resources 
would be allocated according to the needs of the people. It would be 
governed by an interest-based multi-party democracy. Education would 
be universal and free. There would be no influx control and an 
equitable welfare system which was not economically crippling to 
maintain. The economy would be geared towards maximum employment. 
Individual rights would be guaranteed by a Bill of Rights. There would 
also be maximum decentralisation of power. 
There would be full racial integration. The role of whites in this 
future society would be similar to the role of the Jews in this 
society. 
6. How can this best be achieved, starting from where we are now? 
The present constitution should be rejected. This at least will keep 
options open. 
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Liberals will continue to have an important role in verbalising and 
keeping alive liberal values. They can also contribute to the build-up 
of pressure that will at least prevent the Nationalists from moving 
backwards; They can also assist change-oriented organisations to be 
more effective. 
Liberal influence in the past has been seriously limited by the lack of 
an alternative liberal vision. 
One has to be pessimistic about the future liberal role, though there 
are grounds aplenty for optimism about the future. Liberals don't plan 
strategically or effectively. Liberal values in themselves are not 
very powerful agents for organisation or mobilisation. : 
-386-
INTERVIEW SIX 
1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives? 
The major causes derive from military considerations .and are recorded 
in comments of P.W. Botha (then Minister of Defence); Magnus Malan 
(Head of the Defence Force) and General Geldenhuys (Military Commander 
in Namibia). All three of these made numerous statements indicating 
that South Africa's problems could not be resolved militarily, but 
required a political solution; further that the battle was for the 
hearts and minds of South Africa's people; and that it was impossible 
to ask coloureds to .serve on the border if they were not able to 
participate fully in society within these borders. 
The current reform initiatives were characterised by what many referred 
to as Old Cape Liberalism, but which could more accurately be described 
as old Cape racism. This was based on the unarticulated promise that 
coloureds and (by implication) Asians could be included in white 
society because they were like the whites,· but blacks must be excluded. 
2. How do you judge the proposed constitution in terms of our present 
constitution? 
The present 1961 constitution is really a re-affirmation of the 1910 
union constitution. This union ·constitution was the result of an 
admittedly all white nation convention. As such it did represent a 
Social Contract in the Lockean sense. 
The present constitution is also better than the proposed constitution 
in that it contains no explicit1y racial provisions. 
The proposed constitution. is in no sense a social cont.ract. It is not 
the outcome of sustained or sig~ificant debate. - not even within the 
National Party, its Caucus and Congresses. Rather it is the work of a . 
handful of individuals (Worral, De Crespigny, Heunis, Breytenbach and 
· Rautenbach) •. It is struct';ured along racial lines; and it is 
structured so as to ensure the continued dominance of a single party. 
It is really a constitution ~f the National Party, by the National 
Party but for all South Africa. 
3. How would you compare and contrast the proposed constitution with your 
ideal constitution? 
The process of making constitution is quite as important as its 
outcome. Any constitution which will really serve South Africa must b.e 
the outcome of real negotiations between all key groups in this 
society. · 
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An ideal constitution would regulate the division and devolution of 
power and responsibility as between the branches and units of 
governments, and as between the State and individual citizens. It 
should not be necessary in ari ideal situation to regulate group rights. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum to achieve positive movement? 
Vote No. 
A "no" vote will be an ambiguous left/right "no". However, blacks will 
be appreciative of the left no component. This will not persuade them 
that liber~ls are relevant, but it will act as a liberal sign of good 
faith. 
As far as the Na ts are concerned, a left "no 11 is. going to be seen as 
unpatriotic and un-South African. The "no" vote will most likely lead 
to a re-allignment in (white) politics. It will have a serious effect· 
on the fortunes of the PFP. 
In essence; the "no" vote is a vote of conscience. It will iead to 
no strategic advance. It will belp liberais retain their integrity. 
PFP leaders will be able to continue to look black leaders in the face. 
5. What are your best hopes for South Africa? 
Both the unitary state with universal franchise and radical partition 
are--to be rejected. The ideal must lie somewhere-between these. 
It would take the form of a federation of sorts, which federation would 
have both a territorial and ethnic nature. 
A possible model could be the United .States with a populist lower house 
and a federalist upper house •. 
It should have a Bill ~f Rights, possibly backed by internati6nal 
guarantees. 
6. How can these best. hopes best be achieved? 
I'm fatalistic. I don't see this change coming without Zimbabwe type 
conflict. I cannot see white South Africans ·sitting down to debate the 
real sharing oj power. 
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What is clearly happening is the growing militarisation of South 
African society. Most liberal institutions (PFP, universities even 
Race Relations) have ducked the challenge of this growing miltarism. 
On a more optimistic note, liberalism is likely to survive this violent 
transition more effectively as liberals have been both more prominent 
and more tenacious in this society than was the case 1n Zimbabwe~ 
The role of liberals in the meantime 1s to keep alive a basic set of 
values until change comes. 
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INTERVIEW SEVEN 
L What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives currently taking 
place in South Africa? 
The reform certainly does not arise out of some inner ferment within 
Afrikaner nationalism. 
Rather it arises ·from the sum 6f pressures in the society such as: 
Afrikaner fundame.ntalism and the need to formulate complete 
solutions: example, with independence "taking care" of black 
aspiratioins, there was a need to resolve the Coloured problems: 
where did they fit in? 
The changes in the economy which connnenced in the 1970's and are 
continuing in the 1980's are a very important pressure; 
The desire amongst· whites to be part of the West is another· source 
of pressure; 
Also, the incorporation of Afrikaner.dom into wider society in 
South Africa has also contributed; 
The turmoil evident in the Afrikaans churches is another genesis 
of change. 
2. How do you judge the prooosed new cons ti tut ion in the light of ::.,, 
present constitu1: ·.·~' 
On balance, the propo&ed constitu:. ~ ~s 
however, this view is. dependent on L" 
worse than the pres~n: one, 
c·nf· takes of the momentum 
-..~ess. Whatever changes 
have come about within the 
one belie~es _it wi)l give to the politic£ 
have been initi~ted over the last 12 years 
framewor~ of the present co~stitutiori. 
The new constitution amounts to the formal exclusion of a major. group 
in society. It ·also entrenches Apartheid legislation in a way which is 
not ~rue of the present constitution~ 
However, the sheer proximity of government leaders to people of colour 
in the new deal will create a symbol of change. This effect will be 
seriously vitiated, however, by the polarisation of these leaders' 
supporters ·on a pro- and anti-Apartheid ba_sis. 
·3. How do you judge the·proposed constitution in.the light of your ideal 
constitution? 
An ideal (though possibre) constitution should do the following: 
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It should leave the door open for black part1c1pation, indeed, it 
should commence with a commitment to their inclusion, and should. 
be accompanied by serious negotiations to this end; 
It should not institutionalise Apartheid; 
The numbers should be constructed in a way that no one group 
should be able to govern alone. This would produce a dynamic for 
further change and would make inter-racial consensus a political 
necessity. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their action? 
They should vote no; firstly because the constitution negates ha.sic 
liberal ideas; and, secondly because the exclusion of blacks means 
that the momentum away from these ideals will be gr-eater than the 
momentum towards them through the inclusion of coloureds and Indians. 
As to the consequences: Botha and Heunis will lose the ability to 
govern and will have to be replaced. The most likely candidate for 
this is F.W. De Klerk. He is intellectually superior to P.W. Botha, 
and doesn't have Botha's hang-ups with the past (for instanc~, he will. 
find it easier to talk with the PFP). De Klerk under the impact of a 
successfu.l "no" would have to move left., as reconciliation with the 
right is an impossibility. The Nats will· only be able to win support 
from the left. This will also help their alliance with the Coloureds. 
5 •. What is your v1s1on of an ideal South Africa? 
Politically we would have to contend with what could be described as 
fragmented ethnicity, at least in the transitional period. Race would 
still be important, but it would no longer be the only line of 
cleavage. 
. . 
In society, Apartheid in the sense of enforced separation will 
disappear (it's already on the skids). 
In the economy, significant government intervention will be needed to 
correct the distortions of the existing order. However, this 
intervention should not be at the cost of private 1n1t1ative. We may 
well have to ilow down growth in aider to a~hieve a fairer distribution 
of resources. 
Whites. are likely to play. a significant role in both the polity and the 
economy. We are not going to have simple political majoritarianism. 
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The longer we delay the transition, the more economic intervention we 
are likely to experience. 
6. How can such an ideal society best be achieved starting from where we 
are now? 
Liberals require a dual strategy: 
On the one hand, they must hold onto the pure liberal ethics. 
This remains the yardstick for measuring liberal action; 
On the other hand, they must.be ready to change roles from the 
resistors of reactionary politics, to the accelerators of the 
politics of reform. South Af~ica is now much more in the 
situation of the U.S. Civil Rights movement - liberals are now 
swimming with, rather than against, the current. 
I am not pessimistic about the future. 
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INTERVIEW EIGHT 
l. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives currently taking 
place in South Africa? 
I really don't know. I .suppose there are two or three possibilities: 
The first is the need the Government may feel to show the West 
that we are moving in the right direction, to impress .Washington 
and Bonn. 
It is bar~ to know how important this is. 
Jenkins thesis on the rise of the military 
really a Vorster/Pik Botha type reason; 
It runs counter to the 
establishment. It's 
The second is the O'Dowd/Opperihemer thesis about economic growth. 
The Coloured community is today in economic terms, where the 
Afrikaners were in the 1.930' s. The economic realities have 
changed creating a political need. The Government was faced with 
the alternative of either incorporation (ala Hertzog and Smuts) or 
separation (ala Malan and Verwoerd). 
A further related reason for change is the continued urbanisation 
of South African's people. Here it is important to not~ that the 
Coloured population is more.than 90 per cent urbanised. In 
essence~ ihe present refbrm policies should be s~en as an 
urban-oriented policy. It may well be a·ccompanied by much tougher 
influx control. The present reform policy is an "insider policy" 
which will only succeed to the extent that outsiders are kept out. 
A final factor could be that South Africa curr.ently has a Cape 
Nationalist Prime Minister. Vorster would never have brought the 
Coloureds in. 
2. How db you judge the nature of the proposed constitution in contrast to 
the present constitution? 
The proposed constitution is worse, for the following reasons: 
Firstly, it explicity excludes blacks. The system cannot now be 
reformed in order to include blacks. Balkinisation is now built 
into the constitution. The present constitution at least has a 
vision of a common country for all,- even if political power is 
limited. The new constitution now excludes a large proportion of 
South A,frica's inhabitants; 
------------ -----~--~ ----
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Secondly, it increases the concentration of power in the hands of 
the President. It is an undemocratic constitution in the sense 
that it further erodes the balance of power between the individual 
and. the State; 
Thirdly, it further entrenches and will further increase race 
group consciousness; it will divide functional activities (such 
as health) on a race group basis. This will increase the conflict 
between groups.:_defined around race-over scarce resources. 
3. How do you judge the nature of the proposed constitution in contrast to. 
your ideal constitution? 
The features o_f an ideal constitution should include: 
public accountability of state officials, ensured by the ability 
to remove through elections, key state officials, as well as 
through a free flow of information; 
the independence of fundamental institutions, in particular, the 
Press and the judiciary, ensuring access to information and so 
power; 
the entrenchment of individual human rights: group rights, should 
not be entrenched. Group rights are really group interests, and 
do not require entrenchment; 
the maximum decentralisation of power both by geographic, economic 
and political regions. 
4. What should. liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their actions? 
They should vote no; firstly because the implementation of the new 
constitution would be a. giant leap in the wrong direction. 
The consequences will not be disastrous. If there is a "no" majority, 
it will be.claimed equally as a victory for the right and the left. It 
will also increase polarisation within the white community. There is 
likely to be no constitutional movement for the next little while. A 
"no" majority will, however, open up the.debate. Already the 
referendum has been the most widely, and the most non-racially, debated 
issue for decades. 
----------------------------------------------·---
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It is hard to see whether P.W. Botha will survive a "no" majority. He 
is a well-experienced political survivor. It would be better to have a 
Cape Prime Minister than a Transvaal P.M. 
5. What is your vision of an ideal South Africa? 
As a mildly pink social democrat (a liberal socialist?), I ~ould like 
to see: 
the decentralisation of power; 
the entrenchment of individual rights; 
cultural diversity rather than cultural imperialism; 
experimental forms of econom1c partnership such as co-operatives; 
significant land reform; 
active measures to redistribute wealth, by taking the er·'.'!'f'" of 
the "people" seriously, but without increasing state po" 
As to the role of whites:· culture should become much more diverst. 
For example, the Cape Times should '.t.:'·;ect the full diversity of Cape 
(such as the number of Cape Townians studying at Cairo University). 
With regard to political power, whites will have a great deal of 
political influence (indire.ct political power. through the role in the 
economy), but little direct political power. · 
6. How can this ideal society be achieved, starting from where we ·are now? 
We require a multiple strategy. ·one of the exciting aspects of South 
Africa in the 1980's is the new opportunity for individual~ to play a 
creative role._ 
There will have to be a dramatic break with the past in one form or 
another. The Nationalists will not simply agree to give up power. 
Also this break may be a long time in coming, and it will involve lots 
of pain. In the meantime, there is likely to be an increase in 
guerilla activity and an increasing militarisation of our society. 
For now, liberals should concentrate on ·the creation· of non-gover-nment, 
grass roots, democratic organisations in the areas of worker 
organisation, health and education. Such organisations will contribute 
to the process of .change as well as being consistent with the type of 
society likely to emerge here in the longer term. 
I have optimism. for the long-term: there will be lots of pain along 
the way. In the long run, the kind of society envisaged above must 
emerge: it is the only way a society such as South Africa can be run 
iri the longer term. · 
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INTERVIEW NINE 
1. What is the origin of the prese~t 'reform' initiatives currently 
confronting the country? 
They are the result of pressure; primarily outside pressure. Botha's 
security people and his army people have told him that they cannot hold 
the present situation. At best they can give the pbliticians the time 
to solve the country's problems. Reform is essential for stability. 
This means that the changes are negative and reluctant in nature. The 
idealism of old-fashioned Apartheid has played no role. 
2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to the 
present constitution1 
There are ar.eas in which there are. considerable improvements. The fact 
th~t coloureds and Asians are being involved in the political process, 
however, reluctantly and inadequately, is positive. Indeed, it will be 
the Nationalists undoing. 
However, the participation is terribly ersatz. Not many believe it can 
work in practice. It will satisfy no one except some of the 
Nationalists. They will not be able to sell it to the coloureds and 
Asians, at least not as a finished or .final product. Yet they indicate 
that there is no chance of involving the blacks.- at least not in this 
process. 
Still it is a gesture. Perhaps we're wrong in not recognising this as 
a significant gesture. It is the beginning of the end. Verwoerd 
understood that separation could only survive as absolute separation. 
Treurnicht also understands this. 
3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of your own 
constitutional ideals? 
The individual is the key. However, I do not believe that you can have 
a universal franchise on the basis of equality. I do not want to swop 
one kind of tyranny for another. 
We need a process of checks and balances which can prevent group 
tyranny. I don't know how much you have to fiddle with democracy in an 
unequal society to achie~e this. Perhaps it is a qualified franchise 





People must have a legitimate 
perceive the process as f~ir. 
effectively if all the groups 
development. The aim must be 
-396-
share in decision-making, and must 
You can only make constitutions 
concerned are involved in their 
government by consent. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their actions? 
If we had been given an option, we could have exercised it. As it is, 
we must say an emphatic 11no". This is a move in the wrong.direction. 
We're going to eni::rench some of the most important sources of race 
conflict. In so doing, we may be ·identified with the right. This 
doesn '.t worry me. We should do all in our power to make plain the 
nature of our opposition. 
Consequences 
A successful "no 11 vote will place the government under severe pressure. 
They say they'll stay in power, but will they be able to govern? 
Botha will survive in the short-term, but in the longer term, he is 
likely to be replaced by De Klerk. Is this a good thingt He's very 
"behoudend". Botha did go a little forward. Will De Klerk? I don't 
kn~w. I certainly do not go along with the argument that says let's 
have the worst now, so that things can· get better more quickly. 
In any event, it is ·really more important to get _rid of the .Party, not 
just· change leaders. But how to do this? 
5. How would you describe your vision of an ideal South Africa? 
Whites will have an absolutely crucial ·role in building this future. 
You just can't have radical change without taking the white majority 
with you. 
Liberal values will also be absolutely basic to this future society. 
We must recognise the rights and dignity of the individual. Liberty 
consists {n the freedom for the individual to do what he believes is 
right without encroaching on the freedom of others. 
6. Starting from wher,e we are now, how·can such a society best be achieved? 
Violence must be eliminated as an option. I was born and lived for the 
f{rst 30 years of my life under the shadow of the Boer War. This 
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Liberals must hold firm to their basic beliefs. We have to keep on 
convincing people of the.rightness of our causes. The sheer logic of 
our position must triumph in the end. 
With regard to tactics and strategies, we ~ust use Parliament and also 
not be afraid to use extra-Parliamentary (but not extra-legal) 
activities as demonstrated by the Black Sash and the Institute of Race 
Relations. There is no single strategy. 
Also we must not become down-hearted or give into despair. This is 
exactly what the enemies of a free society want. And it leads eith~r 
to the acceptance of violence or apathy. 
Are you optimistic or pessimistic? 
I'm like a yoyo. At times, I believe that we cannot possibly succeed. 
There is so much unreason around. Yet there is also plenty of goodwill 
around. I cannot see this society disintegrating. There is too much 
that is good. 
Things will carry on simmering. life will become a little more 
brutish, but not unbearable. 
In the long-term, 
goodness of man. 
a sentimentality. 
I .remain hopeful because of my belief in the innate 




1. What is the origin of the current 1 reform' initiatives with which the 
country is being confronted? 
Soweto 1976 .was the El Alamein of the black man's struggle for the 
~ontrol of this ~ountry~ It is the psychological turning point for 
.both black and white. Since then blacks have had confidence that their 
day is coming and that whites are in retreat. The whites realise that 
they have to give ground. P.W. is trying to retreat in good order, 
whilst keeping control. 
2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to the 
present constitution? 
I see. it as worse. The new constitution takes what is a law (the 
Population Registration Act) and makes this the very essence of the 
constitution. That constitution cannot function without race 
classification. In order to reform, you will need not merely to change 
one law, but to amend the very constitution. 
·r can see that psychologically for the Afrikaner he may see it as a 
step towards the acceptance of other races and, therefore, the 
abandonment of pure Apartheid. But the Afrikaner is doing this because 
he wants to retain control of his future and his possessions. This is 
a f~lse hope and it ~annot work. Aparth~id has run them into a 
cul-de-sac. They're not going to come out unsc~thed. None of us are 
going to come out unscathed •. 
3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to your-own 
constitutional ideals? 
We should move away from this Group business entirely. ·The sooner' 
Groups are no£ part of a constitution the better~ Voluntary 
association is OK, but it must not be built in as a factor. This I 
derive from my understanding of the Christian faith and what the_Church 
must be as the Church. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their actions? 
(Note personal position re book of life). 
They should say no. On an ethical and moral assessment one has to 
. reject it. From the point of view of strategy, as to which option will 
bring more change - I· can't work this out. Therefore, the decision 
should be ethically based. 
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5. Describe your ideal vision of a future S.A. society? 
I don't work in terms of ultimate visions. Reality has to be be 
discovered as we go along, and that discovery takes place in 
inter-action, day-by-day. 
Race should not be a key factor in a future society. 
Ordinary biblical virtues should be the cornerstone: fair dealing, 
equity. However, human society being what it is, you cannot have a 
good society unless an element or group of its people are making 
sacrifices and not just demanding justice for themselves. Someone must 
be ready to take a "lower" place. This is the role of Christians in 
any society. 
6. Starting from where we are now, what can liberals do in order to best 
achieve this? 
You must do what is right, whether you can see the outcome or not. For 
example, in employing non-violent strategies you cannot weigh or 
measure the outcomes. However, if violence is wrong, it is wrong, 
whatever the consequences. I must do what I believe is right 
irrespective of the consequences• This is positive because I am taking 
responsibility for what I can control, rather than saying the situation 
forces me to do something which I really think I should not be doing. 




1. What is the origin of the "reform" initiatives with which the country 
is being confronted? 
The major origin lies in Afrikaner Nationalism's sense of 
"konsequentheid". The coloureds and Indians were left out: they were 
·without a place in the plan. They needed to be incorporated without 
threatening Afrikaner power. A second and related origin was the 
·desire to "bolster the barricades" against the black threat (see 
Grobbelaars PS in his letter to_Treurnicht in Rees & Domminee's 
Broedertwis). Thirdly, by increasing non-black numbers, it also 
enables the safe incorporation of some urban and non-independent 
blacks. (See Koornhof' s speech). · 
Giliomee has suggested that a Cape Nationalist sense of guilt about 
past Coloured treatment is at the root of these 'reforms'. However, I 
have seen little evidence for this. I .am also sceptical about the role 
of overseas pressure - this may have served. the role of a post-hoc 
rationalisation. One cannot be certain about the role conscription and 
the needs of the military have played in this. 
2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to the 
present constitution? 
It is better in the sense that it, con_fers a symbolic equality of status 
on Coloureds and Indians. Also Weichers is probably correct that it 
prevents a move to the political right • 
. However, it is worse in a number of impo:rtant ways: 
It is a symbolic entrenchment of the exclusion of blacks, and the· 
politics of symbolism is very important; 
It is a sanctification of fundamental Apartheid principles; 
It is not reformist. It is the very antithesis of reform. It 
will make the already difficult issue of black/white settelement 
much more difficult. 
On balance, therefore, whilst it represents one or two steps forward, 
it represents many more steps backwards. And it contains an irony. 
The more.successful it is in its own terms, the greater disaster it 
will· be for the society as a whole. 
3 •. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of your own 
constitutional ideals? 
The process of making a constitution is as important as its content. 
All groups must be involved in this process.· 
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A constitution should be democratic, in the sense of providing for 
universal political participation, civil rights and now majoritarian 
power sharing. Groups should play a role - but self-defined (voluntary 
association) groups. The influence of minorities is as good a judge as 
any a democracy. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their actions? 
They should vote no. As to the consequences: A deadlock (between 
right and centre within the governing party) is the most likely result. 
However, the exogenous pressures for reform will continue. This will 
eventualy require the government to reach an understanding with the PFP 
as to what constitutes genuine reform • 
. Whilst the white right wing is not.be underestimated, the Humpty Dumpty 
of Afrikaner Nationalism cannot be reconstructed. 
Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy. that will work. We have to 
go forward·in faith, doing what we can where we can. 
5. What is your vision of an ideal S.A. future society? 
It is of a liberal democracy (as described above). It is of an 
economic order that is not socialist (in the East European/Chinese 
sense), as it seems cleat that Socialist order cannot support freedom. 
However, it would also not be free enterprise~ It woul.d be a society 
aiming for .a pluralisation of ownership, experimenting with new forms 
of economic control. 
Whites would remain as a vigourous and secure.connnunity. It would be 
inconsistent :with my understanding of democracy if they were to be 
excluded from a meaningful share of power. 
6. Starting· from where we are now, what can liberals do to achieve this? 
Liberals should start where they are strongest i.e. in the economy, the 
-Church, the. Universi-ties, the.Private Schools, the Press. 
There is a case for "situational ethics". Reform will not come 
overnight. Liberals will have to be prepared to settle for incremental 
gains which~ steps in the right dir~ction. 
They must also keep alive basic liberal values. 
I am not optimist in the short run. Nor will we ever achieve a full 
liberal democracy. However, I can't see the holocaust either. We have 
a reasonable chance of some sort of reasonable settlement. 
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INTERVIEW TWELVE 
1. Why is· the country currently being confronted with "reform" ini ti a ti ves? 
I'm fairly certain that these "reforms" don't arise from a liberal 
tendency within Government. The pressures outside and against 
Government policy are.growing. The policy appears much less workable. 
The costs of countering subversion are growing. The policy is actually 
beginning to bre.ak down.· Botha has realised he has .to change, or face 
dramatically rising costs. 
This may mean that he (Botha) has to listen to some of his critics. 
Vide the new status of the Institute of Race Relations since it 
predicted Soweto. However, the limits of "reform" have become very 
evident in Pen Kotze's Group Areas statement, and the backing this has 
received from Botha. 
2 •. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in the light of the 
present one? 
It's worse. 
Firstly, because it provides for a greater centralisation of power. 
·This is not 'desirable, even if it were in the interests of reform. 
Liberals have always believed in the fragmentation of power. 
Secondly, because the exclusion of blacks (from the. political process) 
has. now been given a constitutional status. 
3. How do you judge the .proposed new constitution against your own 
constitutional ideals? 
One of the mistakes liberals have made in the past has been to 
concentrate exclusively on individual rights. Liberals were correct to 
opppose the Government's obsession with the group, but wrong to give 
the group no place in.their scheme of things. 
An ideal consti~ution should have a consociational form. It should 
provide limited recognition of group rights. However, it is critical 
thatthese groups are voluntary and self-defined. 
4. · What should libe::-<:lr do in the referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their action~? 
I.don't think they can support it. One hopes that this will bring home 
the illiberal tendencies. 
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As to the consequences: -- that is, of a victorious "no" vote, the ruling 
Party's power would be diminished. This would not necessarily be a bad 
thing. It would not, however, bring the right wing into power. 
The Gov:ernment would be wrong to interpret a "no" as a vote for a more 
conservative policy, as it is now trying to persuade the electorate 
that a "no" vote is an illiberal vote. 
Would P.W. Botha survive? 
Whether he survivies or not will. depend on the re-allignment of forces 
which emerge. If he (Botha) looks left, he will survive. If he stands 
still (as he is threatening to do) he will fall victim to the forces of 
the right. 
5. _- What is your v1s1on of an ideal South African society? 
A new society would be characterised 1n particular by two attributes: 
much more tolerance. It is the particular role of liberals t9 
keep this tolerance alive; 
constitutionalism or power restrained by law. Again, it is the 
role of the liberals to sell this idea. The whites in Zimbabwe 
failed to do this and they are now paying the price. 
6. Starting from where we are, what can liberals do t~ try to bring this 
ideal society about? 
The pro-blem is our p •erlessne.~s. 
One should not assume -- -~ b~~ral) ideas will be always 
unacceptable. We have L , '-'. ~:HT .c· .. :.:i_ve wi-th the climate changes. 
- Keep them alive and then transmit them. 
On the other handi l·iberals must guard against purist interpretations 
of their own values. Full freedom is possible in a society that has 
unresolved, fundamental conflict. To not imagine a full bill of rights 
in such a society is just dreaming. 
--
Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future? 
Pessimistic a:t the moment. I see an increasing struggle between the-
two nationalisms. The tendency of the Government to excessively 
oppress its black opponents is provoking an ever more violent response. 
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INTERVIEW THIRTEEN 
1. Why is the country currently being confronted with the present "reform" 
initiatives? 
Firstly, the homeland policy was devised to ·"deal" with the political 
·aspirations of blacks. The policy could not be applied to the Indians 
and coloureds. Hence, the new proposals. However, the extent of 
Indian and coloured incorporation will be limited by what Botha 
believes the political market can bear? 
Secondly, the need to reinforce and bolster the wh1te population has 
al so produced these reforms. This need is especially promoted by the 
military and the security forces. Again the extent of coloured and 
Indian incorporation in a common (i.e. with the whites) society is 
extremely limited. This could expand as the Nationalists get more used 
to it. . 
2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of the present 
constitution? 
1 judge it to be worse: firstly: because I see it as the 
constitutional exclusion of the i::•lacks from Sou:::h A'f~·: .· _. 's part of 
the plan to get all the homelanc.s to accept inc · . · , :,·~!.., so : there 
will then be no more black South Africans. 
Secondly, at present the recognition given to coloureds and Indians is 
derisory and farcical.· Some of the architects would like this to be 
expanded "."' but will. this ever happen? 
Thirdly, it's worse in that it places such enormous power 1n the hands 
of the Preiident. It sets up a trend ·towards mon•rchical or 
.authoritarian government. 
Final1y, it's worse because it simply cannot work. 
3. How·do you judge the proposed new constitution 1n terms of your 
constitutional ideals? 
For me, the idea1 would be something like the PFP constitution - · 
something open-ended, allowing for future development. Realistically, 
one cannot expect the white population to accept a sudden 
transformation from their present dominant role to a politically 
impotent one. 
Basic human rights should be entrenched: the right to work, education, 
freedom, etc. - but it should allow some flexibility in the very 
difficult area of political participation. 
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I don't see the proposed constitutions as having the flexibility and_ 
potential for future growth. 
4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their actions? 
They should vote no. The practical consequences will be the status quo 
constitutionally, leaving the situation as it is now, providing for the 
possibility of change later. Such change would arise from black 
pressure exercise by unions or alliances such as the UDF and the 
National Forum. SA has been forced to yield on the issue of trade 
unions - maybe it can also be forced to yield on the issue of political 
participation. 
Would P.W. Botha survive? 
I can't assess this~ I don't know what the feelings is in National 
Party circles. - This Party has survived crises in the past. For 
example, it survived opposition to its plan to remove the_ coloureds 
from the Common Role. 
- -
5. What is your vision of a future ideal South African society? 
_As an ide~l I would like to transcend the fact of group e~otibns. I 
would look forward to a democratic society where not only basic but 
also political and civic rights as is the-case in the US constitution 
~nd Bill ~f Rights. I would like to see that sort of Cha~ter here. A 
simil~r.concern with the ~ffective balancing of power between the 
executive, legislative and judicial arms of government. The 
independence of the judiciary is critical. 
In such, a society, the white would play a very useful role as citizens 
of a commbn society. 
6. Starting from where we. are now, what can liberals do to bring such a 
society about? 
_Liberals, whether of a Christian, Jewish of humanist orientation, 
should give for more attention to the problems of commun{cating their 
values to others (i.e. those who do not think as they do). 
I think that's the weakness of li~e~als: ihey assume that-if one 
formulates a good, consistant liberal proposition, that this 
proposition speaks for itself - that it needs no evangelisation or 
propagation. 
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Would you characterise yourself as an optimist or a pessimist? 
Schizophrenic: wheneverl indulge in human calculation I see no hope; 
but instinctively I can't escape the attitude of Christian Hope which 
we inherit from Israel. 
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INTERVIEW FOURTEEN 
1. Why is the country currently being confronted with "reform" ini'tiatives? 
Disquiet in the Church, disquiet in the universities, rebelliousness 
amongst the young, and this strange desire to be part of the West. I 
dor:i't know just what part the military have played, but Magnus Malan 
has noted the impossibility of fighting on two fronts. 
All this, and the continuing concern for the security and the survival 
of the Afrikaner. 
2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of the present 
constitution? 
Our present constitution means almost nothing. The 1910 Constitution 
entrenched the rights of English and Afrikaan~.- It al~o contained a 
"sort of" entrenchment of the Cape Franchise. However, Schreiner would 
not have seen it as an absolute entrenchment, and events proved him 
quite right. 
- This constitution (and here I am not making a moral judgement) does 
some things which the 1910_Constitution didn't. That constitution was 
purely and utterly devoted to white supremacy. That is exactly what 
Botha and Smuts intended it to be. _ 
For t·his reason, I cannot give a resounding no to the new constitution. -
The Afrikaners are now trying to get out of the fortress which they 
have been constructing for decades. They hav~ made it almost 
impregnable. Now they find that not only can no one get in, but also 
they cannot get out. The fortress has become a prison. 
3. How d6 you judge the proposed new ~onstitution in terms of your 
coristitutional ideals? 
If I am to judge the constitution morally, then it must be rejected. 
It gives coloureds and Indians a very limited participation, but at the 
price of excluding the black~, and excluding the blacks on the most 
immoral grounds i.e. that their constitutional rights must- be exercised_ 
via the Homelands. - -
4. What should liberals do in this referendum, and what will be the 
consequences of their actions? 
I know _what they should do, but I don't know what the consequences will 
be. 
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If the ~ vote is successful this will result in the further 
alienation of the black people. 
If the no vote succeeds the Nats would swing to the Right. I doubt if 
they ca~still re-unite with Treurnicht. I think the split has gone 
too far. 
This ·entire initiative has been ill-judged, ill-made, ill-thought out. 
History will have a very good question to answer: why did P.W. Botha 
split Afrikanerdom? 
5. What is your vision of a future, ideal South African society? 
The one hundred per tent moral view must be universal sufferage 1.n a 
unitary society. The question is how do we achieve .this? 
The only way I_ can see this coming about is through violent revolution 
assisted from the outiide. If we don't want this, then we will h~ve to 
accept some sort of a compromise - some form of confederal or federal 
society. 
The task 6f fashioning a liberal society in this country.will be a veiy 
daunting one. -I'd settle for a very painful evolution towards a better 
society. It will be more painful for the whites than for the blacks. 
It will be particularly painful for the radicals who want it all at 
once. 
6. Starting from where we are now, what can liberals do to achieve such a 
society? 
Liberals have paid too little attention to the ways of getting where 
we· want_ to go. 
The influence of liberal thinking on the Afrikaner himself has been 
more considerable than many people would think. There has been 
influence in the areas of the rule of law, of detention and the area of 
police action more generally. 
·Liberals also havE'. a role to play in doing what is often contemptuously 
referred to as '~-~~:ance work. But if there were no ambulances, the 
suffering in ~-~world would be greatly increased. 
Liberals cannot give up hope. If one gives up hope, then he or she 
should get out, or keep their mouths shut. 
ANNEXURE TWO 
SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON SOUTH AFRICAN LIBERALS 
INTERVIEWED FOR CHAPTER FOUR 
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Dr Zach De Beer (56) Businessman and Politician 
De Beer was born in Woodstock in the Cape in 1928. He trained at Cape Town 
University as a medical doctor. In 1953, he entered Parliament as the 
United Party member for Maitland, at the time one of.the youngest MP's in 
the Parliament's history. He played a key role in the spl1t with the UP 
and the formation of the Progressive Party. However, along with 10 of his 
11 UP Parliamentary colleagues, he lost hiE seat in the 1961 General 
Election. He has played a key role in this Party~ however, throughout its 
23 year existence, returning ro Parliament as its MP in the Transvaal 
constituency of Parktown in the period 1977 to 1980. 
He joined Anglo American in 1965. In 1970, he moved to Lusak6 t.:: ::ake C" • 
as chairman of Anglo American interest:· :i.n Central Africa. He is cur; entl) 
chairman of the Anglo-associated construction conglomerate LTA, Anglo 
American Properties and Anglo American Life Insurance (currently merging 
with Southern Life). 
Mr Rene De Villiers. (74) Journalist ~nd Politician 
De Villiers was born in.Winburg in the Orange Free State in 1910 and 
educated at what is now the University of the Orange Free State and the 
London School of Economics. 
De Viliiers' career in journalism has included editing some of the most 
influential English dialy newspapers - The Friend in Bloemfontein 
0949-1957), The Daily Press in Durban 0961) and The Star 0969-1970). 
De Villiers entered Party Pol{tics relatively late in his career being one 
of five Prog. MP's to be elected to· keep Helen Suzman company in the 1974 
eiections. (He represented the Parktown Constituency from 19i4 to 1977). 
He is a distingui~hed author having contributed ~he chapter on Afrikaner 
Nationalism to the seminal Oxford University History of South Africa. In 
1980/81, he served as the President of the Insti~ute of Race Relations, 
following in the footsteps of his uncle Leo Marquard. 
De Vil.liers has an honorary degree from Wits UQiversity. 
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Professor John Dugard (48) Academic Lawyer 
Dugard was born in Fort Beaufort in the Cape and educated at Stellenbosch, 
LSE and Cambridge. 
Dugard lectured at Natal University before moving-to ~its. He has 
specialised in the areas of constitutional law, international law and human 
rights. At Wits, he is the Director of the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies. 
He has taught at Princeton, Duke Law School and the University of 
California. 
He is the author of Human Rights and the South African Legal Order. He 
served as President of the Institute of Race Relations in 1979 and 1980~ 
and is a long-standing Executive member of that organisation. 
Mrs Sheena Duncan National President, The Black Sash 
Duncan has been a key figure in The Black Sash organisation for much of its 
thirty year existence. The daughter of one of the founders of the 
organisation, Mrs Jean Sinclair, Duncan has served as its National 
President for repeated terms of office. This is the office she currently 
holds. 
·Duncan was importantly instrumental in the establishment of The Black Sash 
Pass Laws Advice Office in Johannesburg as well as the establishment of 
similar offices in other centres. She has served as the Director of the. 
Johannesburg Advice Office, which currently handles some 20 000 cases per 
annum. 
She has been at the forefront of Black Sash activity in resettlement areas. 
Apart from her work in the Black Sash, she is Chairman of the Human 
Awareness Programme, an Executive member of the Institute of Race 
Relations of long-standing, and an active member of the Anglican Church. 
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Mr Colin Eglin (59) Politician 
Eglin was born in Cape Town in 1925 and trained at that city's university 
as a Quantity Surveyor~ 
He entered Parliament in 1958 for the United Party, bec_ame a leadership 
figure in the new Progressive Party in 1960, losing his seat in 1961. In 
1966, he became Chairman of that Party's National Executive and its leader 
in the period 1971 to 1979 (through two mergers). He returned to 
Parliament in the Sea Point constituency in 1974, serving as Leader of the 
Official Opposition in the period 1977-1979~ 
Archbishop Denis Hurley (69) Religous Leader 
··Hurley was born in 1915 in Pietermaritzburg and educated· in Rome. Since. 
1951 he has served as the Catholic Archbishop of Durban. He is currently 
President of the Catholic Bishops Conference, and in this capac{ty, is his 
church's key spokesman on social, economic and political issues. 
Outside of the Catholic Church, he has served as President of ~ace 
Relations (1975), creator and Trusteee of the Human Awareness Programme, 
member of the Study Programme on Christianity in Apartheid Society 
(SPROCAS), and a member of the Buthelezi Commission. . 
Professor Tony Mathews (54) Academic Lawyer 
Mathews was born in Pietoria in 1930, and completed his university 
education at Natal Un versity (Durban) and at Harvard. He has published a 
definitive study of Suth Africa's security legislation. Professor Mathews 
chaired the political commission of the Study project on Christianity in 
Apartheid Society (SPROCAS). He currenily teaches law at
0
Natal University, 
Pie.termari tzburg Campus. He was an active member of the Liberal· Party in 
Natal. 
Miss Marion Nell· Director - Human Awareness Programme 
Nell was born in Johannesburg and educated at that city's university. 
After working foi the Uniori of Jewish Woman, she joined the Institute of 
Race Relations in 1977 in order to -launch the Human Awareness Programme. 
This programme which seeks to train, assist and advise orgariisations 
working for peaceful change in South Africa, is now independent of the 
Institute. · 
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~r Harry Oppenheimer (76) Businessman and Politician 
Oppenheimei was born in 1908 in Kimberley, son of the founder of the Anglo 
·American Corporation, and educated at Oxford •. 
He repres~nted the Kimberley City constituency for the United Party from 
1948 to 1958, when on the death of his father, he took over the 
chairmanship of the Anglo American and De Beers Corporations. His interest 
and activity in politics has continued throughout his life. He has been a 
key supporter of the Progressive Party throughout its 23 year existence. 
He was a key figure in the creation of The Urban Foundation, and has served 
as its chairman since it~ inception in 1977. He is Chancellor of th~ . 
University of Cape Town and holds honorary doctorates from the Universities 
of Leeds, Rhodes, Natal and ~he Witwatersrand •. 
Mr Alan.Paton· (81) Author and Politician 
Paton was born in Piete~maritzburg in 1903 and educated at what is now the 
University of Natal. After a career in teaching, he wrote what has become 
one of the classics of the twentieth century, Cry, The Beloved Country in 
1948. He has published prodigously ever since. 
He became leader of the Liberal Party in 1954 and remained in this pos~tion 
until that Party's dissolution in the face of the Improper Interference Act 
in 1968. 
Paton holds honorary degrees from Yale, Harvard, Michigan, Kenyan College, 
Trent, Williamette, Edinburgh, Natal, Rhodes and the Witwatersrand. 
Reverend Robert Robertson (58) Religous Leader 
.Robertson was born in Johannesburg ~nd trained as an engineer before 
entering the ministry of the Presbyterian Church. In that church, he has 
pioneered multi-racial congregations in both East London and Johannesburg. 
He currently holds the chairmanship_of the (joint) corrrrnittee on Church and 
Nation (Presbyterian) and Chi.irch and Society (Congregational), which 
commi ttee.s these . two denominations on social issues~ 
-413-
Robertson served as the national chairman of its Christian Institute 
(headed by Beyers Naude) until that organisation was declared illegal by 
the State in 1927. 
Mrs Helen Suzman (67) Politician 
Suzman was born in Germiston and educated at Wits, where she was also a 
part-time lecturer in Economics. 
She entered Parliament for the United Party in the Transvaal Constituency 
of Houghton in 1953, and has represented that seat ever since. She was the 
only one of the 11 breakaway MP's who formed the Progressive Party in 1960 
to retain her seat in the 1961 election. From 1961 to 1974, she was that 
Party's sole Parliamentary representative. 
Suzman holds honorary degrees from Oxford, LSE, Harvard, Columbia, Smith 
College, Brandeis and Wits. She has twice been nominated for the Nobel 
Prize. 
P~ofessor David Welsh (47) Academic 
Welsh was born in 1937 in Cape Town.· He was educated at Cape Town and 
Oxford and is currently Associate Professor of Comparative African 
Government and Law at the University of Cape Town (UCT). 
He has yublished extensively and co-authored with Frederick Van Zyl 
Slabbert on "South Africa's Options:· . Strategies for Sharing Power". 
W~lsh is a long-standing Executive member of Race Relations, and has stood 
(unsuccessfully) as a candidate for the PFP~ 
P~ofe~~or Francis Wilson Academic Economist 
J 
. Wilson was born in the Eastern Cape, the son of Professor Monica Wilson, 
one of the foremost Anthropolo~ists this country has yet produced._ He was 
educated at UCT and Oxford. 
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He is professor of economics at UCT, and director of the S.A. Labour and 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU) of that University. 
He has published prolifically, and his study "Migrant Labour in South 
Africa" is regarded as the definitive study in the area. He is currently 
conducting an investigation into Black Poverty in South Africa on behalf of 
The Carnegie Foundation. 
He is editor of S.A. Outlook - one of the important li6eral journals in 
this country. 
